Wreck Report for 'Lottie', 1883

(No. 1930.)

"LOTTIE" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 20th of September 1883, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain CASTLE and Captain RONALDSON as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "LOTTIE," near Peniche, on the coast of Portugal, on the 22nd of August 1883.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circum stances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the said steamship was due to the negligence of Henry Gilbert Sanders, the master, in not taking a cast of the lead when approaching a dangerous channel, the weather at the time being to foggy that no lights could be seen, and the master in ignorance of his true position. Under all the circumstances of the case, however, the Court will not deal with his certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 20th day of September 1883.

 

(Signed)

H.C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

JOHN S. CASTLE,

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 20th of September 1883, when Mr. Muir Mackenzie appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Nelson for the master, and Mr. Botterell for the chief officer of the Lottie." Six witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade, and examined, Mr. Muir Mackenzie handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Nelson then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Muir Mackenzie having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Lottie" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of Newcastle, of 1,163 tons gross and 739 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 120 horse power. She was built at Stockton-on-Tees in the year 1872, and at the time of her loss was the property of Messrs. Lawes, Surtees, and Co., of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and of Leadenhall Street, London. She left Newcastle on he 15th of August last with a crew of 19 Hands, and a cargo of 1,100 tons of coal, besides 300 tons in her bunkers, bound to Savona, in the Mediterranean, and at about 9 p.m. of the 20th had arrived off Cape Finisterre. distant between 5 and 6 miles, upon which she was put upon a south course true. On the following morning she was kept a little more to the eastward; but at noon of the same day, finding that she was in about latitude 41°6` north and longitude 9°19` west, a south course true was resumed, it being the master's intention to pass between the Burlings and Cape Peniche. During that afternoon the weather continued to be fine and clear with a light wind from the north, and the vessel was kept on her course, going full speed, and with her topsail set. At 8 p.m. the weather began to be a little hazy, but the vessel was kept on the same course until about 10 p.m., when the weather being hazy, the master determined to go outside the Burlings, and with that view the course was altered to S. 37° W. true. Up to this time no light had been seen to indicate to the master his true position, but at about ten minutes to 11 a light was observed some 3 or 4 points on the starboard bow, which the master and 2nd officer took to be the Burlings, upon which he determined to keep the vessel with the light about 1/2 a point on his starboard bow, which he thought would take him safely through the channel between the Burlings and Peniche. Accordingly the course was altered to S. 58° W., the light bearing S. 65° The light was seen three or four times between ten minutes before and ten minutes after 11, sufficient we are told for the master to count the time of revolution, and it was then lost sight of and was not again seen. The vessel was, however, kept on her course, S. 58° W., until shortly before midnight, when the master and 2nd officer, who were still on the bridge, observed what they took to be the loom of the land on the port beam; and in about 10 or 15 minutes after wards breakers were seen in the same direction, upon which the captain at once ordered the helm to be put hard-a-port, and the vessel had come round to about N. by W. when she struck. In a few minutes afterwards she had 4 feet 6 water in the fore hold and 2 feet in the after hold, upon which the captain gave orders for the boats to be got out, and in about 20 minutes from the time of her striking they left her, the cabin at the time being half full of water, and at about 4 a a.m. the same day they landed at a place called Baleal, some 2 miles to the eastward of Peniche. The place where the vessel struck was about midway between Baleal and the entrance to Obidos Lagoon, and about 4 miles to the eastward of Peniche. The vessel became a total wreck, and was lost with everything on board.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether " safe and proper courses were set and steered after " passing Cape Finisterre, and whether due and proper "allowance was made for tides and currents?" Seeing that the weather was fine and clear when they passed Cape Finisterre, and that it remained so until 8 p.m. of the following day, the assessors are of opinion that the master was fully justified in attempting to pass between the Burlings and Peniche Point, and that under the circumstances the courses set and steered were safe and proper. It is true that the course steered would take the vessel a little to the east of Peniche, but so long as the weather continued to be fine and clear, the assessors are of opinion that the course was a proper one, for as soon as the lights came in sight a slight alteration of the helm would enable him to pass safely through the channel.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper course was set when the course " was altered at 10 a.m.?" If the master's assumption was correct that he had only been making 8 knots an hour, and that he had not during that time drifted to the eastward of his course, or in other words, if the vessel had been at the place where the master assumed that she was at 10 p.m., the alteration of the helm from south true to S. 35° W., with a further alteration which he tells us that he intended to make at 11 o'clock, would have been quite safe and proper, as it would have taken him clear to the north of the Farilhoes and the Estellas. But in assuming this to be his position the master made no allowance for the wind which was dead aft, and which, with his topsail set, had, it is admitted, put him some 8 miles ahead of his reckoning; and under these circumstances, even assuming that she had not then drifted at all to the eastward, the course steered would not have been either a safe or proper one, for it would have taken him either on the Burlings or on the Estellas or the Farilhoes. Not having seen any light, and not knowing his exact position, it was not a safe or proper course to alter his helm as he did at 10 o'clock, more especially as the weather was so hazy that he could not see the lights, and he was approaching a dangerous channel.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify " the position of the vessel when the light was seen at "about 11 p.m.?" Apart from taking the bearings of the light, it does not appear that the master took any steps whatever to ascertain or verify his position. There was one thing which he might and ought to have done, namely, to have taken a cast of the lead, but this will more properly form the subject of a subsequent question.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper alteration was then made in the " course, and whether due and proper allowance was "made for tides and currents?" The master and 2nd officer both stated that they were quite certain that the light which they saw was the Burlings light, for that they had seen it three or four times, and had by counting ascertained the time of revolution to be three minutes, which is that of the Burlings. Mr. Nelson, however, contended that both the master and the 2nd officer must be mistaken in this, and that it was the Carvoeiro, and not the Burlings, light which they saw. We think, however, that Mr. Nelson's contention is not well founded, for the light was seen bearing S. 65° W., or about W.S.W. true, and that bearing, if it had been the Carvoeira light, would have put the vessel farmland. Now, if the light seen was really the Burlings light, as we believe it was, the course which the master tock was a proper one so long as he could see it, for if he had kept that light half a point on his starboard bow it must have taken him safely through the channel between the Burlings and Peniche. When however he lost sight of the light, and was therefore not able to see that he was keeping it half a point on his starboard bow, it was no longer a proper or a safe course, the more so as he knew, before he made the light, that the current had been setting him rapidly to the eastward, and he might very naturally conclude that it would continue to do so.

The fifth question that we are asked is," Whether at " or after 11 p.m. the weather became thick with fog, " and if so, whether the master took the proper mea- " sures to reduce the speed of the vessel?" There can be little doubt that the weather must have become thicker after 11 o'clock than it was before, otherwise he would in all probability have continued to see the light, for by keeping it half a point on his starboard bow the would be nearing it every instant. But whether this be so or not, it is not pretended that the master gave any orders to reduce the speed of the vessel, his excuse being that he knew that the engineers were clearing out the tubes of one of the boilers, and that the vessel's speed would therefore only be between and 6 knots, instead of 8 knots, which was her full speed.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether, " when the loom of the land was seen at midnight, " prompt and proper measures were taken to avoid "stranding?" The master had told us that about 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour before he saw the breakers he observed what he believed to be the loom of the land, and if so, he ought at once to have ported his helm and put the vessel's head off shore; for if the weather was so thick that he could not see the Burlings light it is obvious that he must have been very close to the land when he saw the loom of it; and yet he does nothing for 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour. We cannot therefore say that, after seeing what he believed to be the loom of the land, the master took either prompt or proper measures to avoid stranding.

The seventh question that we are asked is, "Whether " a good and proper look-out was kept?" There seems to be no reason to think that there was not a good lookout being kept on board the vessel; the master, and the second officer were on the bridge, and there was a lookout man stationed forward. It is true that the witness Niels Nielsen, who was on the look out from 11 to 12, stated that at about 11.30 p.m. he saw a light 4 or 5 points on the starboard bow, and reported it; and if so, it should have been seen by the master and second officer; but Nielsen may well have made a mistake as to the time when he saw this light, and it may well have been soon after 11 when the master and second officer saw it, and not at 1/2 past; and I do not understand the learned counsel for the Board of Trade to contend that this was not so.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the total neglect of the lead was justifiable?" Here, it appears to us, was the master's chief fault. At 10 p.m. when he altered the course from south true to S. 30° W., he ought to have taken a cast of the lead, for he had then seen nothing to guide him as to his true position. If he had then taken a cast of the lead, and had been in the position where he supposed himself to be, he would have found about 45 fathoms of water; on the other hand, if he had run ahead of his reckoning, as it seems he had done, he would perhaps have found himself over the large hole or depression in the bed of the sea with from 500 to 900 fathoms of water, or if he had by that time been set by the current to the east he would be in somewhat shallower water, and at all events not where he imagined himself to be, and he would then have known at once that there was need of the greatest care and caution, seeing the narrowness of the channel between the Burlings and Peniche and the dangerous rocks and islands lying to the north of the former. But if it was necessary to take a cast of the lead at 10 o'clock, it was still more necessary to do so at 11, when be found that the Burlings light, instead of being as he supposed it to have been on his port bow, was some 3 or 4 points on his starboard bow, which must have shewn him that he had been set a long way to the eastward of his proper course. Again, when the light had disappeared it was madness to continue on the same course without taking a cast of the lead, seeing that the same cause which had already set him far to the eastward of his course would probably continue to act on the ship, and if so, that it would be setting him directly on the coast. Had the master taken a cast of the lead at any time after 11 o'clock he would probably have found himself in from 10 to 16 fathoms of water, which would have shewn that he was very near the land, the water along this part of the coast gradually shoaling from 20 to 16, 14, and ultimately 10 fathoms; he would then have seen at once that there was a current setting him to the eastward, which would speedily put him ashore, and that his only course then was to put the vessel's head off the shore, feeling his way with the lead. In our opinion the neglect of the lead was totally unjustifiable.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" No doubt the master was guilty of great negligence in not using the lead, and to this mainly the loss of the vessel is to be attributed. Generally speaking, however, the vessel appears to have been carefully navigated; for instance, a night order book was kept on board, azimuth observations were taken both morning and afternoon, and the master was on the bridge that night and up to the time of the accident attending to the navigation of the vessel. It is true that no observation appears to have been taken for longitude in the afternoon of the 21s5, which is much to be regretted, for if it had been it might have shewn him that there was a current setting him to the eastward of his course. Speaking generally, however, the vessel seems to have been navigated with care, the chief fault being the neglect to take a cast of the lead.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "What "was the cause of the stranding?" The stranding of the vessel is, in our opinion, due partly to the vessel having overrun her reckoning, owing to the master making no allowance for the wind, which was dead aft, and which, with his topsail set, would obviously increase the vessel's speed; and partly to the strong current which was setting him to the eastward, and which we are told put several other vessels ashore the same night.

The eleventh question that we are asked is, "Whether " the master and officers are, or either of them is, in " default?" And it is added that "the Board of Trade " are of opinion that the certificate of the master should "be dealt with." It is admitted that no blame what ever attaches to the first or second mate, and that the whole responsibility for the casualty rests with the master, and the master only. That he has been guilty of great negligence in not taking a cast of the lead when approaching a dangerous channel in foggy weather and in ignorance of his true position, cannot for a moment be denied. At the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that he has hitherto borne a very good character. Testimonials have been produced from his former employers dating from 1862, which give him the highest character for sobriety and good conduct. On only one occasion during that period has he met with any casualty, and that was when the ship on board of which he was acting as chief officer caught fire; they succeeded, however, in getting her into Lisbon, and his conduct on that occasion was, we are told, highly commended. He has been a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve for the last 16 years, was chief officer in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's service for 4 years, and has been for the last five years master of steam vessels. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, although we think that in the present case he has been guilty of great negligence, we shall not deal with his certificate.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

JOHN S. CASTLE,

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

L 367. 1702. 150.—9/83. Wt. 73. E. & S.