Portcities Southampton
UK * Bristol * Hartlepool * Liverpool * London * Southampton
*
You are here: PortCities Southampton > [15154] 'Duke of Westminster', 1884
* Text only * About this site * Site Map * Feedback
*
*
*
Explore this site
Start Here
About Us
Partners And Collections
Timeline
Get Interactive!
Help
Galleries
Image galleries
Biographies
Southampton
The Docks
River Itchen
Southampton at war
Flying Boats
Titanic
Finding Out More
Southampton speaks
Street Directories
Historic Buildings Survey
Registers and Records
Lloyd's Register
Official Sources
Other Records
Finding Out More
Wrecks and Accidents
Why accidents happen
Investigations
Improving Safety at Sea
Finding Out More
Wreck Reports
Life of a Port
How a port comes to life
At work in a port
Ports at play
Trade - lifeblood of a port
Finding Out More
On the Line
Company growth and development
Shipping lines
Transatlantic travel
Preparing a liner
Finding Out More
Sea People
Life at sea
Jobs at sea
Travelling by sea
Starting a new life by sea
Women and the sea
Finding Out More
Diversity of Ships
The variety of ships
What drives the ship?
Ships of ancient times
Ships in the age of sail
Ships of the steam age
Ships of today

Wreck Report for 'Duke of Westminster', 1884

PDF file

This resource is available to view as a PDF document.

Click here to view 'Wreck Report for 'Duke of Westminster', 1884'.

You will need a PDF viewer to view this document. Tell me more...

Unique ID:15154
Description:Board of Trade Wreck Report for 'Duke of Westminster', 1884
Creator:Board of Trade
Date:1884
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

(No. 2069.)

"DUKE OF WESTMINSTER" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 29th and 31st days of January 1884, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esq., Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains HIGHT and RONALDSON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "DUKE OF WESTMINSTER," on Atherfield Ledge, Isle of Wight, on the 3rd of January instant, whilst on a voyage from Brisbane to London.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding of the said vessel was due to the wrongful act and default of Joshua Sinclair Cox, the master, in putting her, after they had passed the Start, on a course too far to the northward, and in keeping her on that course, at an average speed for the whole way of 10 knots an hour, without taking proper steps to ascertain her true position, although the weather was very thick. The Court accordingly suspends his certificate for six months, but recommends that during the period of such suspension he be granted a first mate's certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 31st day of January 1884.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

EDWARD HIGHT,

Assessors.

 

 

A. RONALDSON,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 29th and 31st days of January instant, when Mr. Middleton appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Laing for the owners, and Mr. Aspinall for the master and officers of the "Duke of Westminster." Twelve witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade, and examined, Mr. Middleton handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Laing then produced a witness, and he and Mr. Aspinall having been heard on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Middleton having replied for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Duke of Westminster" is a screw steamship built of steel, belonging to the Port of Barrow-in-Furness. of 3,725 tons gross and 2,426 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 350 horse power. She was built at Barrow in the year 1882, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the present inquiry she was the property of the Eastern Steam Ship Company, Limited, Messrs. McDiarmid, Green-shiels, and Company being the managing owners. She left Brisbane on the 6th of November last with a crew of 102 hands, 20 passengers, and a general cargo, bound to London through the Suez Canal, and on the 21st of December following passed Port Said. At 2 a.m. of the 3rd instant the Lizard was sighted, and at 8.50 a.m. of the same day she was abreast of the Start Point, which they passed at the distance of 5 miles. The vessel was then put upon a north 77° east course true, with the object, as the captain stated, of passing about 5 miles to the south of St. Catherine's Point in the Isle of Wight; but at 11 a.m. the course was altered one degree to the north, to north 76° east, and at noon it was altered one more degree, to north 757° east. During the morning the weather had been more or less hazy, as indeed it had been for several days previously, but at noon it cleared up sufficiently to enable the second mate to get an observation, which put the ship, as he stated, in latitude 50° 8´ north, her position at noon, as estimated by the chief officer by dead reckoning, being latitude 50° ´ north and longitude 2° 50´ west, St. Catherine's Point bearing, as he told us, from that position north 68° east, distant 64 miles. The captain then thinking, as the result of the second officer's observations, that she must have got 4 miles to the southward of her course, put the vessel on a north 68° east course, which he estimated would take her 4 miles south of St. Catherine's Point; but at 2 p.m., the weather having become more foggy, he altered the vessel's course one degree to the eastward, to N. 69° E., and at the same time directed the steam steering gear to be counected, and the helmsman to be shifted from the wheel aft to 'midships, and at 3 p.m., the weather having become still more foggy, the course was again altered 2 degrees, to N. 71° E. Up to 3 o'clock the engines had been going at full speed, the vessel making, as was thought, from 10 to 10 1/2 knots, but at 3 p.m. the captain ordered the 4th officer to go and tell the chief engineer to keep her at 7 knots, and we are told that the engines were then slowed down to 7 knots. At 3.30, the weather having become still thicker, the captain ordered the telegraph to be rung for "half speed," which we are told would be 5 knots, but thinking that she was still going too fast he subsequently sent down to the engine room to tell them to keep her at 5 knots. At 5 p.m. the weather had become very foggy, and accordingly orders were given to put the engines at slow, or, according to the master, at dead slow, giving her, we are told, a speed of from 2 1/2 to 3 knots. I ought to state that at 3 p.m. the headsails and foresails had been taken in, and that at 5 p.m. the upper and lower fore topsails were taken in, leaving only the main trysail and mizen set. There is not much difference between the witnesses as to the courses steered; the chief officer, indeed, could give us no information on the point, having had other duties to attend to; but according to the second officer, the course steered after passing the Start was S. 75° E. by compass, and allowing 19 1/2 degrees for variation, and 8° for compass deviation, that would give N. 77 1/2° E. true, the evidence of the master being that the course from the Start was N. 77° E. true. The 2nd mate also told us that the vessel's course was afterwards slightly altered to the north, the course steered from 11 a.m. until noon, when his watch terminated, being S. 76° E. by compass, which would be N. 76 1/2° E. true. He also stated that at 4 p.m., when he resumed the watch, he found her on a S. 83° E. course by compass, which would he equivalent to N. 69 1/2° E. true, the course which the master gives us at that time being N. 71° E. true, a difference of only 1 1/2°. It seems that during the afternoon the captain had ordered the lead to be got ready, intending, as he said, to take a cast at 6 o'clock. A few minutes however before 6, the master and 2nd officer were on the bridge, there were two Lascars forward on the look-out, and the vessel was proceeding at slow or dead slow, when she suddenly came to the ground. The weather at the time was so foggy that they could see nothing ahead, but it was subsequently found that they had run upon the Atherfield ledge, a ledge of rocks on the south coast of the Isle of Wight, some 3 or 4 miles to the N.W. of St. Catherine's Point. On her taking the ground the engines were at once put full speed astern, and in about 20 minutes afterwards all the blades of the propeller were carried away. Upon this two kedges were carried out from the stern of the vessel, and the ship was hauled off into five fathoms water; finding, however, that the anchors were coming home, the captain ordered the port bower anchor to be dropped, upon which the vessel swung with her stern towards the shore, and the propeller blades having been carried away, she was not able to prevent herself going again on the ledge, where she became fast, the tides taking off. Between midnight and 1 a.m. the passengers were sent ashore, and the same afternoon the crew also were landed; but the captain and officers remained by her until the evening of the 5th, when the weather having become stormy, it was deemed advisable to go ashore. During the following day it blew so hard that they were not able to get on board, but on boarding her on the morning of the 7th, they found a quantity of water in her. Tug boats having been procured, various attempts were made to haul her off, but it was not until ten days after she had taken the ground, and when the next spring tides had begun to make, that they succeeded in getting her afloat; upon which she was towed up to London and placed in the Victoria Docks, where, we are told, she now is. The fact that she remained for ten days on this ledge of rocks without breaking up, although during a part of the time at all events the weather was so stormy that it was impossible for them to get on board her, is a strong proof of the substantial character of her hull. According to Mr. Bisset, the senior surveyor to the Board of Trade for the Port of London, if she had been made of iron she would in his opinion have left her bones there. We were told by the secretary to the company by which she is owned that she had cost 69,000l., but was at the time insured for only 60,000l., and that the freight at risk, which was 8,500l, was insured for only 8,000l., so that the owners had a considerable interest at stake.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which the Board of Trade have asked for our opinion is, "Whether proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel when off Start Lighthouse on the morning of the 3rd of January?" We are told that when passing the Start the 1st and 2nd officers took a four-point bearing, which shewed the distance to be 5 miles, and we have no reason to think that that was not the proper distance.

The second question that we are asked is, "Whether proper courses were set and steered therefrom, and whether due and proper allowance was made for tides and currents?" According to the captain, the course set and steered from the Start, so as to pass St. Catherine's Point, was N. 77° E. true; according to the second officer, it was N. 77 1/2° E. true. Now the bearing of St. Catherine's Point from the Start is E. 3/4 S. magnetic, which would be about N.79° E. true. In steering, therefore, N. 77° E. true or N. 77 1/2 E. true from 5 miles S. of the Start, it would, if it had been made good, have taken her, not perhaps quite 5 miles south of St. Catherine's Point, but yet sufficiently far to the south of it as not to make it other than a safe and proper course, so long as the weather continued to be moderately clear. It is true that at 11 a.m., and again at noon, the master altered the course of the vessel 1° to the north, probably with a view of seeing the Bill of Portland, but even that, in the opinion of the assessors, would not make the course steered an improper one. As regards the tides, the course being fair up and down channel, there was no necessity to take any heed of them, so long as the vessel did not get too far to the north, and within the indraft along the coast.

The third question that we are asked is, "Whether proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at noon on the last-mentioned date?" It seems that it was the practice on board this vessel for the observations to be taken at noon, not, as the captain wished us to believe, by the second officer alone, who held an only mate's certificate, but by him in conjunction with the first and third officers, who held master's certificates; and the vessel's position was then determined by a comparison of the three observations. But on the present occasion, owing to the clock having been put on half an hour that morning, the vessel having been running to the eastward, the chief and third officers were not on deck at noon, and did not therefore assist in taking the observations, so that the assumed position of the vessel rested solely on the observation of the second officer, who, as I have already stated, holds an only mate's certificate. Now the second officer has told us that when he took the observation there was a slight haze upon the horizon, and the assessors say that under these circumstances it would be very difficult to fix the vessel's position with certainty to within 5 or 6 miles. That is so far as the latitude is concerned. As regards the vessel's longitude, the chief mate told us that he estimated it by dead reckoning to be 2° 50´ west, but this was without taking into account the flood tide, which they had had with them from the Start, and in fixing it at 2° 50´ he stated that he had allowed her speed at 10 to 10 1/2 knots, that being the average rate of the vessel when going at full speed. It seems, however, that they had a patent log on board, which showed at about 9 a.m., when they were off the Start, 7 knots, and at noon 44 knots, being a difference of 37 knots, and deducting 1 1/2 knots for slip, which the captain said would be a proper allowance, that would leave 35 1/2 knots run in about 3 hours and 10 minutes, which is considerably more than 10 knots an hour. It does not, however, appear that any account was taken of the distance run between the Start and noon as shewn by the patent log, and that the distance run was assumed to be at the rate of 10 to 10 1/2 knots. Besides what has been stated no measures were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at noon, and the assessors are of opinion that what was done with that view was not sufficient to determine the vessel's position with any accuracy.

This brings us to the fourth question, with is, "Whether safe and proper alterations were made in the course at 1 p.m., and whether due and proper allowance was made for tides and currents?" Relying on the report of the chief officer, that St. Catherine's Point would bear N. 68° E. from the position assigned to her by dead reckoning, and that from the second officer's observation she was about 4 miles to the south of that position, the master thought that by steering a N. 68° E. course it would take him the same distance to the south of St. Catherine's Point, that is to say, 4 miles. Accordingly at 1 p.m., after he had obtained the officers' reports, he altered the vessel's course to N. 68° E.; and although the course was afterwards altered 2° further east, no N. 71° E. true, she ultimately went ashore some miles to the north of St. Catherine's Point. The alteration of the course from N. 77° E., which was first steered after passing the Start, to N. 68° E., was an alteration of 9°, or more 3/4 of a point to the north; and it is clear from the result that it was neither a safe nor a proper alteration to make.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether every possible effort was subsequently made to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel?" So far as appears no effort of any kind was made after that time to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether the total neglect of the lead was justifiable?" A glance at the chart will shew that on the course on which this vessel was she must have struck the 20 fathoms line of soundings some 24 or 25 miles before reaching the spot where she grounded; and as we are told that for the last three hours she was going at first 7 knots, then 5, and then 2 1/2 to 3, and with the tide during all that time against her, it is obvious that for some hours before striking she must have been in less than 20 fathoms, and that a cast of the lead during that time would have shewn her that she was not on her proper course, and was too far to the north. Under these circumstances the assessors are clearly of opinion that the neglect of the lead was quite unjustifiable.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether, having regard to the thick state of the weather, the speed of the vessel was sufficiently reduced?" We are told that she was going at full speed from 8.50 a.m., when she passed the Start, to 3 p.m., or for 6 hours and 10 minutes; and that during this time she did till noon 10 1/2 knots, and for the last 3 hours 10 knots, which would give up to noon say 33 knots, and from noon to 3 p.m. 30 knots; then from 3 to 3.30 p.m. she was going 7 knots, which would give 3 1/2 more, and from 3.30 to 5 at the rate of 5 knots gives 7 1/2 knots, and from 5 to 6 only 3 knots, making a total of 77 knots. To this would have to be added 1 hour's flood, the vessel having had the flood tide with her from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. and the ebb from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m., for which the master allowed 2 knots, making 79 knots altogether. As a fact, however, the distance of the vessel when 5 miles south of the Start would be about 99 miles from the place where she took the ground, so that there are some 13 miles to account for. Now we were told by the captain and officers that the greatest speed that could be got out of the vessel on the voyage home, when her bottom would not be clean, would be 10 knots, or at the outside 10 1/2 knots. But to have done the distance from the Start to the place where she grounded, 92 miles in the 9 hours and 10 minutes, she must, even allowing for the tide, have been going at an average rate of very nearly 10 knots an hour the whole way. Either then during the first six hours she was going at a greater speed than they say it was possible for her to do, or during the last three hours she was going at a greater speed than she ought to have been going considering the very dense state of the atmosphere. On the whole, looking at the distance run in the time and the hazy state of the weather, we think that the speed was not sufficiently reduced.

The eight question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the stranding of this vessel?" In our opinion there is no doubt as to what was the cause of the stranding. The master, instead of keeping her on the course on which he had originally put her on leaving the Start Point, namely, north 77° east true, thought proper, because the second officer reported to him that she had got 4 miles to the southward of her course, to alter the course of a point to the north, or to N. 68° E. true, and to continue that course without taking any steps whatever to verify his position, either by a cast of the lead or otherwise. This, no doubt, brought him within range of the in-draught, which we are told in the Channel Pilot sets directly on the Atherfield Ledge.

I will take the ninth and tenth questions together; they are as follow:—"(9.) Whether serious damage to the ship was caused by the wrongful act or default of the master, or any, and which of the officers?" and "(10.) Whether the master and officers are, or either of them is, in default?" And it is added that "the Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificate of the master should be dealt with." It is not denied that the vessel was very seriously damaged by going on the Atherfield Ledge, indeed, it appears to me that, apart from Mr. Bisset's evidence, the fact that she lost all four blades of her propeller would be sufficient to constitute serious damage within the meaning of the Act, for the captain told us that the loss of these blades rendered the vessel quite unmanageable, and incapable of saving herself from going upon the rocks a second time after she had been hauled off by her two kedges. But apart from this, Mr. Bisset has told us that the stern-post is cracked across about 18 inches below the boss, and that it will be necessary to put in a new stern frame, and that although none of the plates were cracked, several of them were indented, and that water was dripping down from the starboard side. The damage, therefore, is of a very serious character, much too serious to permit her to go to sea without very extensive repairs; if then the casualty arose from the wrongful act or default of any of the certificated officers, there can be no question that this Court would have power to deal with his certificate. Now, it it is not denied that the master was alone responsible for the proper navigation of this vessel; he chose to accept the observation of the 2nd officer as correct, and to act upon it, although he knew that the weather was at the time hazy, which would render it difficult, if not impossible, to get a reliable observation; he it was who ordered the course to be altered from N. 77° E., at which it was originally set, to N. 68° E.; it was by his orders that the vessel was kept going at the speed at which she was, notwithstanding the hazy state of the atmosphere; and it was his fault that no cast of the lead was taken. Mr. Aspinall has said that there was no neglect, no carelessness on the master's part; but in our opinion that is not so, all these acts were acts either of neglect or default. He had no right to have relied, as he did, on the 2nd officer's observation, knowing the circumstances under which it had been taken; and he had no right to keep her going at that speed in such foggy weather without knowing her position, and without taking any cast of the lead. it seems that the master has been for a good many years in the service of this company, and the secretary has told us that he is the best captain in their service. That may be so, for we know nothing of the qualifications of their other captains; but at any rate this captain has in the present case been guilty of very great neglect, which has caused the stranding of this vessel, at imminent risk to the lives of those on board, and involving heavy expenses to the owners; and we should not be doing our duty if we did not suspend his certificate, and we shall do so for six months from this day. At the same time we shall recommend to the Board of Trade that during the suspension of his master's certificate he should be granted a chief mate's.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

EDWARD HIGHT,

Assessors.

 

 

A. RONALDSON,

 

L 367. 1841. 150,— 2/84. Wt. 73. E. & S.

*
Search

Advanced Search
*
*
*
Southampton City Council New Opportunities Fund Lloyd's Register London Metropolitan Archives National Maritime Museum World Ship Society  
Legal & Copyright * Partner sites: Bristol * Hartlepool * Liverpool * London * Southampton * Text only * About this site * Feedback