Wreck Report for 'Earl Beaconsfield', 1884

(No. 2141.)

"EARL BEACONSFIELD."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Glasgow, on the 26th, 27th and 28th March 1884, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains PARISH and PARFITT, and W. B. ROBINSON, Esquire, Chief Constructor R.N., as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment of the sailing ship "EARL BEACONSFIELD," on the 13th of February 1884.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the said ship, when she left Glasgow in February last, was in a good and seaworthy condition so far as regards her hull, but that proper measures were not taken to prevent the cargo from shifting, and that no blame attaches to the master for having left her when he did.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 28th day of March 1884.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

 

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

Assessors.

 

 

W. B. ROBINSON,

Chief Constructor R.N.,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Glasgow on the 26th, 27th and 28th of March 1884, when Mr. Douglas appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Aitken for the owners, and Mr. Shearer for the master of the "Earl Beaconsfield," and Mr. Spens watched the case on behalf of underwriters. Ten witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Douglas handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Three witnesses having then been produced by the owners, and one by the master, Mr. Spens, Mr. Aitken and Mr. Shearer addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Douglas having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Earl Beaconsfield" is an iron four-masted sailing ship, belonging to the Port of Glasgow, of 1,960 tons gross and 1,893 tons net register. She was built at Port Glasgow in the year 1883, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the present inquiry she was the property of Mr. Alexander McAlister, of No. 21, West India Dock Road, London, and others, Mr. McAlister being the managing owner. She left Glasgow on 26th January last for San Francisco, with a crew of 32 hands all told, one stowaway, and a cargo of 2,867 tons, of which 2,508 tons consisted of coal, and about 360 tons of general merchandize. On reaching the Tail of the Bank it was blowing a snow-storm, and she accordingly came to anchor, and remained there until the 28th, when she was towed to Gareloch for the purpose of having her compasses adjusted. The weather still continuing very bad, she lay at the Tail of the Bank until the 2nd February, when she left in tow of a steam tug, cast off abreast of Ailsa Craig, and then continued her course down channel in charge of a pilot. On the 7th, when off Minehead, she discharged the pilot, and then proceeded on her voyage, the weather at the time being fine, and the wind about S.E. At 4 p.m. of the following day, the 8th, the wind began to rise, upon which sail was taken in, and at 10 p.m., the wind having veered round to the S.W., she was wore with her head to the southward close hauled on the starboard tack. Throughout the 9th the wind continued to blow with great violence, amounting, according to the captain, almost to a hurricane, and on the following morning, the 10th, a heavy squall struck the vessel, throwing her on her beam ends. She remained thus, with her port rail under water and the water over the deck nearly up to the coamings, until the morning of the 11th, when the wind and sea having somewhat gone down the master determined to run for a port of safety. Accordingly at 11.30 a.m. the ship was put about, and she was steered for Queenstown, the wind at the time being about S.S.W., and a little on the port quarter. At 11.30. p.m. the same day Roche's Point was observed bearing about N.W., and thinking that it would not be safe, with the vessel in the disabled state in which she was, with a heavy list to port, and partly unmanageable, to attempt to enter Queenstown, the master put the vessel's head to the eastward with the view of going to Holyhead; this brought the wind again upon the starboard side, and caused the vessel to lay over still more to port. At this time she was under her three lower topsails, and, finding that she had still a very heavy list to port, and that she was nearly unmanageable, the master endeavoured to shorten sail, but in doing so all the topsails blew away, and the vessel then drifted before the gale up channel. At 11.30 a.m. the Saltees or Conigbeg Lightship was observed bearing about E.N.E., and as the master saw that the ship was drifting towards the shore, he ordered the chief mate to go forward and get both anchors ready to let go. A cast of the lead was then taken, which gave 15 fathoms, and from that time a cast was taken every, five minutes until they were in 10 fathoms, when both anchors were let go at the same time, and 135 fathoms of cable paid out on each. The vessel, however, still continued to drift towards the shore, and accordingly the master ordered the topmasts to be cut away, which was done, and she was then brought up, but in doing so one of the boats was smashed. Signals of distress were thereupon made, and when night set in, rockets were fired, which were answered from the shore, but no one came to their assistance until the following day between 12 and 1 o'clock, when the lifeboat from Duncannon came near, and having asked if they wished to leave her, and having been told that they did, preparations were at once made for that purpose. Although the wind had by that time somewhat gone down, it was impossible for the lifeboat to go alongside, partly owing to the sea, and partly owing to the wreckage alongside. The men were, however, lowered down into the ship's pinnace, which was the only boat they had remaining, the others having all been damaged, and they were thus transferred to the lifeboat. When 25 of them had got into the lifeboat, the coxswain called out for the captain, on which he got into her, and the remaining 7 having got into the pinnace, they all pulled for the shore. The "Earl Beaconsfield" was then lying in Ballyteige Bay, some 2 miles to the east of the N. Saltee, and about 2 miles from the shore. The sea, however, was still so bad that it was soon found impossible for the pinnace to make way against it, and accordingly the lifeboat took her in tow, and between 3 and 4 o'clock the same afternoon they all landed safely at a little place called Fethard. On the following morning, the weather having moderated still more, some tugs belonging to the Waterford Steamship Company went out, and having taken hold of the vessel, brought her into the river, but before they could get her up into the harbour the tide had turned, and they were obliged to cast anchor and hold on until the following tide, when they took her up the harbour, and laid her on the mud. There the cargo was retrimmed, and the vessel pumped out, and she has since been towed round to Greenock, where she now is, her cargo having been discharged preparatory to undergoing repairs.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether, when the vessel left Glasgow, she was in good and seaworthy condition?" The "Earl Beaconsfield" is a perfectly new ship, having been launched only on the 17th January last. She is, we are told, a first class vessel, well found in every respect, and is classed 100 A 1 at Lloyd's. Indeed we could hardly have a better proof of her strength than the fact that she lay from the 10th, when she took the list to port, until the 15th, when she was brought into Waterford Harbour, exposed to a succession of most violent gales, with the water half way over the deck, and yet seems to have made no water, all the water that got into her having come in through the hawse pipes, passed down into the compartment forward of the collision bulkhead, and thence into the hold, the sluice being open. When, however, that water had been pumped out, she seems to have made no more, and came round to Greenock without any repairs having been done to the hull. We can therefore have no doubt whatever that, when the vessel left Glasgow, she was, so far as her hull and equipments are concerned, in a good and seaworthy condition.

I will take the next two questions together; they are, "2. Whether she was overladen?" and "3. Whether she had sufficient freeboard?" The vessel it seems was loaded at Glasgow, and when she left the water was just over the top of her disc. On getting down to Gareloch, however, where the water is salt, it was found that she had risen 6 inches, and that, consequently, the load line was then on a level with the water. Now we are told that this load line had been placed on her by the authorities at Lloyd's, and that it was placed at 5 feet 7 below the deck. Comparing it with the Board of Trade rules we find that for an iron sailing vessel of her length, that is to say, 269 feet long, 2.75 inches or 2 3/4 inches per foot depth of hold would be a proper minimum allowance; and as the vessel's hold was 24.39 feet deep, that would give us exactly 5 feet 7 inches as a minimum freeboard. Seeing, then, that both Lloyd's and-the Board of Trade agree in assigning a freeboard of 5 feet 7 inches as a minimum freeboard for a vessel of her dimensions, and as that was her freeboard on leaving, we are not prepared to say either that she was overladen, or that she had an insufficient freeboard, but undoubtedly she was loaded to the extreme limit.

The fourth and fifth questions I will also take together; they are as follow:—"4. Whether the cargo was properly stowed and trimmed, and whether proper measures were taken to prevent it shifting?" and "5. Whether, considering the circumstances of the intended voyage, shifting boards ought to have been used for stowing the coal cargo, and whether that would have prevented the casualty?" The cargo, as we have seen, consisted of 2,508 tons of coal, and 360 tons of general cargo. The coal was for the most part stowed in the lower hold, 500 tons according to the captain, and according to Gavin Brown, the stevedore, only 360 to 400 tons, being in the 'tween decks. We are told also that it was all properly stowed and trimmed both in the lower hold and in the 'tween decks, and that it was levelled off at the top, and sloped down both forward and aft, leaving only a very small space in the fore part of the lower hold, owing to the chain locker being there, but larger spaces in the after part of the lower hold, as well as both forward and aft in the 'tween decks, and it was in these empty spaces that the general cargo was stowed. And, first, as to the general cargo, the evidence is that it was exceedingly well stowed, and although a small portion of what was in the after part of the lower hold shifted slightly, three of the tiers of casks having, we were told, bulged, it could have had no effect whatever on the listing of the ship; and it is admitted that the permanent list which the vessel got was due to the shifting of the coal from the starboard over to the port side, and to that alone. Gavin Brown, the stevedore, who was responsible for the proper stowage of the cargo, stated of course that it was properly stowed and trimmed and levelled off at the top, but he admitted that there were no shifting boards, and in his opinion they were not necessary. Now, I am told by the assessors that, if coal is properly trimmed throughout and levelled off from wing to wing, there is no reason why it should shift even in the worst weather. It seems, however, from the evidence of Mr. Scott, the superintendent of the Caledonian Railway Company at the terminus quay, Glasgow, where the vessel was laden, that vessels are now much more quickly loaded than they used to be, I think he said in about one-third less time; and it may well be that greater expedition in the shipping of the cargo may be attended with less care in stowing and trimming it. Now it is admitted that, if the coal is badly trimmed, and not levelled at the top, it will have a tendency to shift; and it is obvious that in that case shifting boards would be of the greatest use, as they would prevent the cargo on the one side from passing over to the other, and thus giving the vessel a permanent list. Looking, then, at the danger that must necessarily exist when coal is shipped very expeditiously, of its not being so carefully stowed as when a longer time is allowed for the purpose, it does appear to us that, when large quantities are shipped as in this case, in a vessel leaving this country in midwinter, and when she might reasonably expect to meet with bad weather, it would be a wise precaution to have shifting boards. And without doubt it would in the present case have prevented the casualty, for although the shifting boards might not have prevented the coal on the starboard side shifting as far as the centre, they would certainly have prevented it going over to the port side; so that when the gale abated, the vessel could easily have been righted again.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether as laden, the vessel had sufficient stability?" On this point very little evidence has been laid before the Court. We were told by the captain and the officers that she was in their opinion a very stiff vessel, and that they had moved her from Port Glasgow to Glasgow with only 270 tons of coal in her. But we have no evidence as to where her centre of gravity was, or what was her inetacentric height, either empty or full, and under these circumstances it is impossible for us to say whether she had or had not sufficient stability.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the casualty the vessel encountered on 11th February, and what was the cause of her going over so much as to be nearly on her beam ends?" In the first instance it was no doubt due to the violence of the gale which threw her over on her beam ends; but the reason why she did not righten again when the gale abated, was because she had no shifting boards to prevent the coal going over from the starboard to the port side, and possibly also because the cargo was not properly trimmed.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether every possible effort was made to get the vessel into port?" When the master found that the vessel had got a permanent list to port, we think that he was quite right to put the ship about and run for Queenstown. We think also that he was quite right when he made Roche's Point, bearing some 4 points on his port bow, seeing that it was then only about midnight, and that he had about 7 hours' darkness before him, that his vessel was partially disabled and unmanageable, and that it was blowing hard from the S.S.W., not to attempt to enter Queenstown Harbour, but to keep her off the land, and endeavour to make for Holyhead. When, however, his topsails were blown away, and the vessel became totally unmanageable, we are at loss to see what else he could have done to get her into port than he did do.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether the master and crew were justified in abandoning the vessel on 11th February?" Mr. Spens has asked us to say nothing that would imply that the master had abandoned the vessel sine animo revertendi, so as to constitute her a derelict, and we shall therefore not do so, as it is not necessary to enable us to answer this question. All that we have to do is to say whether the master was justified in leaving her when he did, and whether he neglected any opportunity that presented itself of returning to her. We have seen that when they left her the vessel was lying over on her port side with the water up to the coamings of the hatchways, all the topmasts gone, and with only one boat, the pinnace, remaining. True it is that the wind and sea had somewhat gone down, but it was still so bad that the lifeboat could not go alongside, and that the pinnace was unable to face it. Under these circumstances it appears to us that it would have been madness on the part of the master and crew to have remained by her, not knowing what the weather would be during the night, for if the gale had then recommenced the vessel would probably either have gone down at her anchors, or been driven ashore. Under these circumstances we have no hesitation in saying that the master was perfectly justified in abandoning her when he did. Then, did he make any efforts to resume possession of his vessel? It would have been useless for him to have attempted to return to her in the pinnace, for that boat had already proved herself to be unfit to face the wind and sea; and if he had gone off in her with some of the hands and got to her, what could he have done? Night was coming on, and such was her condition when they left her, that according to the coxswain of the lifeboat, he expected every moment that she would come over on the top of them, and he was therefore very urgent that they should get away from her as soon as possible. Fethard again, where they were landed, was some 10 miles from where the vessel lay, and even in daylight the ship would not have been visible to them. It seems, however, that the master did ask the coxswain of the lifeboat to return with him to the vessel that night, but the coxswain was not allowed to do so by the secretary of the Lifeboat Association, on the ground, as we are told, that the services of the lifeboat were required to save life and not property; and there may be something in the secretary's objection, for, if the lifeboat is encouraged to go off to render services to property alone, there would be some danger lest, when her services were needed for saving life, she should be away salving some vessel. We are, therefore, not satisfied that the secretary of the lifeboat was wrong in the decision to which he came. Be this, however, as it may, it appears to us that the master did all he coutd reasonably be expected to do to resume possession of his vessel; and on the following morning the Waterford tugs had got hold of her, and she was on her way to Waterford Harbour.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel and freight were over - insured?" Mr. McAlister, the managing owner, is it seems a ship chandler, residing at No. 21, West India Dock Road, London, and it is to him that this vessel may be said to have owed her existence. The agreement entered into between him and Messrs. Russell and Company is as follows:—"The former (that is, Messrs. Russell and " Company) agree to build, and the latter (that is, " Mr. McAlister) agrees to purchase an iron sailing ship " according to specification as signed relative hereto, " at the rate of 13l. 5s. per net register ton, payable as " follows: One-fourth when vessel is framed, one- " fourth when she is plated, one-fourth when she is " launched, and one-fourth when it is completed. " Payment may be by cash or bills equal to cash, in " purchaser's option, but when vessel is handed over " at least one-half of her price to be in builders' hands " in cash. Balance by purchaser's acceptance, of " builder's drafts shall be equal to cash, renewable, so " that part is paid at six months, part at twelve months, " and part at eighteen months. And in security for " such acceptances the purchaser to hand builders' " bills of sale for such number of sixty fourth shares " in said vessel, as the bills may represent. Builders " to allow purchaser thirty-five shillings per net ton of " the vessel's tonnage in consideration of him supplying " all outfit circumflexed or deleted in said specification " in red ink, but the purchaser to bind himself to " supply such outfit as it may be required by the " builders, so that their work may not be detained, " purchaser to supply stiffening for vessel when " required, and take delivery in Port Glasgow, or " Greenock as builders may arrange." That agreement is dated the 23rd March 1883, and in pursuance thereof the vessel was put in hand, and on the 23rd of July the first instalment of 6,290l. 13s. 2d. was paid; on the 2nd November a second instalment to the same amount was paid; on December 5th a third instalment became due, and on the 17th January the vessel was completed and the last instalment of 6,209l. 9s. 7d. became due. The two first instalments seem to have been paid in cash; the two last instalments, however, have not yet been paid, but bills we are told have been given for the amount, payment of which has been guaranteed by a Mr. Henry Birkmyre, to whom Mr. McAlister has accordingly transferred 26 shares in the vessel as a security. The total amount paid for the vessel either in cash or by bills is stated to have been 25,081l. 9s. 1d., and Mr. McAlister received a commission of 1 per cent. thereon, which he divided between himself and the master for their services in superintending the building of the vessel, the master receiving 160l. and he 90l. When she left on her last voyage she was insured for the sum of 25,000l.

And now as to the freight. It seems that the charter for the voyage out to San Francisco was at the rate of 20/- per ton, making a total of 2,867l. 2s. 6d. Of this, one half, or 1,433l. 11s. 3d., less 5 1/2 per cent. commission, was to be paid in advance; the remaining half, less a commission of 2 1/2 per cent., being payable on the arrival of the vessel at San Francisco; and the freight, including the disbursements were, we are told, insured for the sum of 3,500l. Now was this an excessive sum or not? Mr. McAlister brought in an account setting out in detail the amounts which he said that he had at risk on this voyage. These consisted of a sum of 701l. 7s. 2d., mainly for provisions supplied to the vessel for the voyage; of a further sum of 701l. 2s. 3d. for disbursements paid by Messrs. Thomas Skinner & Co., the shipbrokers, including their brokerage, commission on the advance freight, advance notes to the crew, and other charges; of 1,328l. 10s. 8d. paid by him for insuring ship, freight, and disbursements; of 334l. 4s. for three months' wages, which he said that he should have had to pay on the arrival of the vessel at San Francisco over and above the advance notes, and of 1,400l., the balance of freight payable at San Francisco, less the commission, making up a, total of 4,465l. 14s. 1d. And as the total of the insurances on freight and disbursements were only 3,500l., he said that it shewed that he would be a loser of about 1,000l. had the vessel gone down on the voyage. At first I was disposed to think that as the two sums of 701l. 7s. 2d. and 701l. 2s. 3d. had been paid out of the moiety of the freight which he had received in advance they could not be said to have been at the owner's risk; but on more mature reflection, I have come to the conclusion that they are, and that they are therefore proper subjects for insurance. Mr. McAlister was entitled to be paid half the freight in advance, and when he received it he might do what he pleased with it; if he had put it into his pocket and paid for the ship's disbursements out of other monies belonging to him, there could be no question that he might properly have made these disbursements the subject of insurance, and the fact that he chose to pay for them out of the advance freight can, in my opinion, make no difference whatever; they were paid out of monies belonging to himself, and if the vessel had gone down on the voyage these disbursements would have been absolutely lost to him; they were, in effect, put into the ship previous to her departure. So also the premia of insurance, he had to pay them before the vessel left, and if she had foundered on the voyage out he would have lost them. But with regard to the two remaining items of the account, the case is totally different. Mr. McAlister told us that, if the vessel had arrived safely at her destination, he would have been entitled to claim the balance of freight amounting, after deducting the commission, to about 1,400l., and this he tells us he would have lost had the vessel gone down on the voyage, and that he is therefore justified in insuring it. To a certain extent Mr. McAlister is quite right; he would have lost the balance of the freight, but he forgets that, in order to entitle him to receive this 1,400l., he would have had to pay not only the wages of the crew up to the time of the vessel's arrival, which he estimates at 334l., but likewise the inward charges at San Francisco, amounting as he has told us to from 10s. to 15s. per ton, or from 1,000l. to 1,500l., all of which would have been saved to him had the vessel gone down on the way out. So that instead of receiving a net sum of 1,400l. as the balance of freight, it would have been all absorbed by the charges necessarily incurred to entitle him to claim it. Instead therefore of having, as he endeavoured to make out, a sum of 4,465l. 4s. 1d. at risk, he would have on his own showing only about 2,731l. at risk, namely, the two sums of 701l. 7s. 2d,. and 701l. 2s. 3d., and the 1,328l. 10s. 8d. for the premia of insurance, to cover which he had an insurance of 3,500l., leaving him a gainer of something like 700l. or 800l. in case the vessel had gone down on the voyage. Mr. McAlister thereupon made out another account, in which he included various sums not claimed in his previous account, namely, a charge of 285l., being a commission of 1 per cent., which he said that he would have had to pay for collecting the insurances, and 45l. for what he called his own management or trouble in the matter. This being so, let us now see how the account would stand had the vessel gone down at her anchors in Ballyteige Bay or been lost on her voyage out. First there would have been the total cost of the ship, 25,081l. 9s. 1d.; then the charges incurred previous to her departure, namely, 701l. 7s. 2d. and 7011. 2s. 3d.; then the premia of insurance, amounting to 1,328l. 10s. 8d.; then the commission of 1 per cent, on collecting insurances, 285l.; and lastly Mr. McAlister's expenses of management, 45l., making a total of 28,142l. 9s. 2d. And against this he would have received insurances amounting to 25,000l. on the ship, and 3,500l. on the disbursements and freight, making a total of 28,500l.; so that on the whole Mr. McAlister instead of being, as he endeavoured to make out, a loser of about 1,000l. by the transaction, would have been a gainer to the extent of between 300l. and 400l. The case, however, is not complete unless we take into account the fact that, although Mr. McAlister would if the vessel had performed the voyage in safety, have had to pay charges more than equal to the balance of freight that he was to receive there, he would have had his vessel at a place and in a position where he might fairly have expected to obtain a profitable freight. On the other hand, however, it must not be forgotten that, owing to the fall in the price of iron ships since March 1883, when the contract for this ship was entered into, Mr. McAlister would, as he admitted, probably be able to get a better ship at the present time for the 25,000l. which he would receive from the underwriters, or as good a ship for less money, and with the contingent advantages of receiving a commission on the building of the new ship, and of supplying her with her outfit at 35s. per registered ton. On the whole the conclusion to which we have come is that, whilst this is not a case of excessive over insurance, it is one in which Mr. McAlister has taken care to insure against all eventualities, and if not a gainer, he certainly would not have been a loser had this vessel gone down on her outward voyage.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Whether the master and officers are, or any of them is, in default, and whether blame attaches to the owner?" And it is added that "the Board of Trade are of opinion " that the certificates of the officers should be dealt " with." The only matter in respect of which the owner could be held to blame is in regard to the stowage of the cargo. It is no doubt the duty of the owner, if he is there, to see that the cargo is properly stowed; but in the present case he seems to have employed recognised stevedores to do the work, and he could hardly be required to go down into the hold and see that it was properly done. He seems to have taken all reasonable precautions to have the cargo properly stowed; and to blame him for not having had Shifting boards put up would hardly be just, seeing that he acted in accordance with the usual custom of the port, and that hitherto it has not been deemed expedient to put up shifting boards in coal ships. As to the master and officers we see nothing for which they can properly be held to blame. Had the vessel been in a foreign port it would no doubt have been the duty of the master to see that the cargo was properly stowed; but she was here under the personal supervision of her owner, who took upon himself to employ proper persons to stow the cargo, and so far to relieve the master from responsibility. And as regards the management of the vessel we think that no blame attached either to the master or to any of the officers, who all seem to have done their best in the trying circumstances in which they were placed. And it is certainly not a case in which we should think of dealing with their certificates.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

 

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

Assessors.

 

 

W. B. ROBINSON,

Chief Constructor R.N.,

 

L 367. 1913. 170.—4/84. Wt. E. & S.