Wreck Report for 'Austria', 1884

(No. 2357.)

"AUSTRIA" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Moot Hall, Newcastle-on-Tyne, on the 4th and 5th of November 1884, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains BEASLEY and COMYN, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "AUSTRIA," on Ailsa Craig, on the 15th of October 1884.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said ship was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of Frederic Ernest Carl Helig, the master, and James Webster Morris, the second officer.

The Court accordingly suspends their certificates for six months each, but recommends that during the suspension of their master's certificates they be allowed fist mate's certificates.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 5th day of November 1884.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

THS. BEASLEY,

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Newcastle-on-Tyne on the 4th and 5th of November 1884, when Mr. Israel Davis appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Forster for the owners and master of the "Austria." The first and second officers of the vessel were present, but were not represented by either counsel or solicitor. Nine witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Israel Davis handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Forster then addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, the second officer was heard on his own behalf, and Mr. Israel Davis having replied for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Austria" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of Newcastle, of 1,662 tons gross and 1,083 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 150 horse power. She was built at Howdon in the present year, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. George William Ward, of Baltic Chambers, Quayside, Newcastle, and others, Mr. Ward being the Managing owner. She left Fiume, in the Adriatic, on the 28th of September last with a crew of 21 hands all told, a stoaway, and a cargo of about 1,800 tons of general merchandize, bound to Glasgow; and having, in crossing the Bay of Biscay, met with very bad weather, she had to put into Holyhead on the evening of the 13th October to replenish her stock of coals. Having taken on board 27 tons she resumed her voyage at 1 p.m. of the following day, the 14th, made the Mull of Galloway in due course, and having passed Port Patrick was abreast of Corsewall Light at about 35 minutes past midnight. There the course, which had hitherto been N. by E. to N. 1/2 E., was altered to N.E. by the standard compass, which, we are told, was equivalent to N.E. 1/2 N. magnetic, there being half a point deviation on that course. It was the master's watch from 12 to 4 a.m., but after he had put the vessel upon her course he went into his cabin, leaving the deck in charge of the second officer, with one man at the wheel, a stand by, and one man forward on the topgallant forecastle on the look-out. The vessel continued her course, with the wind from the westward, and the weather somewhat misty with a drizzling rain, the vessel going at full speed and making from 9 1/2 to 10 knots an hour, when, at about ten minutes after two o'clock, the second officer, who was on the bridge, suddenly observed a cliff, which proved to be Ailsa Craig, looming out of the darkness, and only a very short distance ahead. He at once ordered the helm to be put hard-a-starboard, and telegraphed to the engineroom to reverse full speed, but before either the helm or the engines had had time to act the vessel struck. After the engines had taken a few revolutions astern they were stopped, but by whose orders we do not know. On sounding both inside and outside it was found that there were about 13 or 14 feet of water forward and about 6 fathoms amidships and aft, and that there were from 12 to 13 feet in the forehold. It was then about low water, but nothing appears to have been done then beyond swinging the lifeboats out and raising a derrick over the forehatch to discharge the cargo. But between 7 and 8 a.m., the tide having then risen, the captain, we are told, gave orders to put the engines full speed astern, but this the engineers refused to do, thinking that if she came off the rocks she would go down in deep water. At this time the captain, it is admitted, was in a very excited state, and the chief officer thereupon called the men aft and asked them whether, in their opinion, the captain was drank and incapable of doing his duty; and on their replying that he was, the chief officer assumed the command, and the captain then went down into his cabin and turned in. Having engaged a tug, the chief officer then went to Ardrossan and telegraphed to the owner, who arrived on the 16th with labourers and pumps but nothing could be done to get the vessel off; and on the 17th the vessel's stern went under water, and she has since become a total wreck.

These then being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What " was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" But it will perhaps be better to defer answering this question until we have disposed of some of the other questions.

The second question which we are asked is, "Was the " vessel properly and sufficiently manned" It appears that the crew consisted of a master, two mates, boatswain, carpenter, five A.B.'s, two stewards, a cook, three engineers, donkeyman, and four firemen. There were thus 10 hands, including the officers, to do the work on deck, giving 5 men to each watch, namely, the master, second mate, and 3 A.B.'s for one watch, and the chief officer, boatswain, and 3 A.B.'s for the other, the carpenter being an A.B., and taking his watch with the others. Now if all these men had been good and efficient hands, we are not prepared to say that they would not have been quite sufficient for the navigation of the vessel. We are told, however that on the voyage out one of the A.B.'s was lost off Algiers, and that at Trieste a black man was engaged in his place; but this man, although engaged as an able seaman, seems to have been totally unfit for his duties, and during the voyage neither went to the wheel nor kept a look out, but he was employed to do some painting. Another of the men was Morrison, the carpenter, who has given evidence before us, and whose appearance was not much in his favour, Nor were we much impressed by the appearance of the second officer. On the whole, although we are disposed to think that with 10 hands for deck work, she would, had they been a11 good and efficient, have been properly and efficiently manned, we are not prepared to say that, with the men that she actually had, she was so,

The third question which we are asked is, "Were " proper measures taken to ascertain and verify the " position of the vessel when Port Patrick or Corse- " wall Point Lights, or either of them, were made?" We are told' that Port Patrick Light came in view before they had lost sight of the Mull of Galloway, which would give them cross bearings; Corsewall Light, too, when first sighted, bore about N.E., and when abeam would be about E. by S., which would have given them a four point bearing. Whether the master did or did not take the proper steps, which were open to him, to ascertain his true position when off Port Patrick and Corsewall Point, there is no reason to think that the distances which he has given us, namely, three miles from Port Patrick, and four and a half miles from Corsewall Point, were not fairly correct.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Was a " safe and proper course set and steered after leaving " Port Patrick Light, and was a safe and proper altera- " tion made in the course when the vessel was off " Corsewall Point Light, and was due and proper " allowance made for tide and currents?" Assuming that they passed. Port Patrick at the distance of three miles, a N. 1/2 E. to N. by E. course from there would be a proper course, and would have taken the vessel some 4 1/2 miles from Corsewall Point when they got abreast of it. From Corsewall Point, however, the course steered was N.E. by the standard compass, or N.E. 1/2 N. magnetic, there being half a point westerly deviation on that course. Now such a course, if made good, would take the vessel less than half a mile to the west of Ailsa Craig, which in our opinion was dangerously near, seeing that the wind was-at the time from the westward, which would tend to set the vessel to the eastward, and therefore towards Ailsa Craig. Moreover, we were told by the second officer that the vessel would not steer to a degree, nor yet to a quarter of a point, which, if true, would be another reason for giving the rock a wider berth.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Was the " master on deck at all times when the safety of the " vessel needed his personal supervision, and when the " said supervision could be reasonably required?" The master has told us that, after he had put the vessel upon her course, he went down to his cabin, and sat down in a chair close to the door, in case he might be wanted on deck. Now it must be remembered that it was misty with a drizzling rain, and that he had laid his vessel on such a course that, if she got set only a little to the eastward of it either by bad steering or by the wind or tide, she would inevitably go on Ailsa Craig. The master has told us that he bad been on deck more or less since leaving Holyhead at 1 p.m. that day, and that he thought it a good opportunity to get a little rest, knowing that he would have to be on deck continuously after sighting Pladda Light. But that in our opinion is no justification for his conduct; if he wanted a rest, he should have taken it earlier in the day, and when he had a clear course before him, and no dangers ahead. Mr. Ward, the owner, himself a shipmaster of long standing, admitted that in his opinion the master had no right to have left the deck at that time, and in that opinion we entirely concur. We think that the master was not on deck when the safety of the vessel required his personal supervision, and when that supervision could reasonably be required.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "When the " master went below, did he give proper and sufficient " instructions to the second officer as to the course to be " steered, and as to the navigation of the ship?" and the seventh, which I will take with it, is as follows:— " Did the second. officer carry out the captain's reason- " able instructions?" The master told us that the instructions which he gave the second officer when he went below were, to. call him when he lost sight of Corsewall Point and when they got within about four miles of Pladda, and of course it would be the second officer's duty to call him in case the weather changed. The second officer has told us that he had lost sight of Corsewall Light before the casualty occurred, but that there were some steamers passing him then, and that he therefore could not leave the deck; but he had a spare hand on the bridge, and he might easily have sent him to call the master. He has also told us that, after the master had left the deck, the wind changed and came more aft, blowing the smoke of the steamer over the bows, so as to prevent his seeing ahead; and surely that was a change which required him to call the master. In our opinion he did not carry out the master's reasonable instructions.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Was a " good and proper look-out kept?" It is admitted that the vessel was close to the rock when she struck; in fact, the water is deep almost close up to the rock on the S.W. side where she struck. And yet it was not seen by the second officer until just before she struck, and was not reported at all by the look-out man, although the rock was distinctly visible to all the rest of the crew as soon as she had struck. The excuse which the second mate gives for not seeing it sooner, was because the weather was misty, and because the wind had come aft and was blowing the smoke over the bows, and thus prevented his seeing any distance ahead. But, if so, what right had he to be going at the rate of 9 1/2 to 10 knots an hour, when he could only see a few yards ahead. We are strongly inclined to think that neither the second officer nor the carpenter who was forward were keeping so good a look-out as they should have been doing.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Was the " vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" And with it I will take the first question, "What was " the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" The stranding of the vessel was, in our opinion, due to the vessel having been put upon a course to pass too close to Ailsa Craig, to the absence of the master from the deck when he ought to have been there, and to her having been allowed, owing either' to bad steering or to the wind on her port side, to get to the eastward of her course. We think that it was also due either to there having been no good look-out kept on board, or to the vessel having been allowed to go at too great a rate of speed, when owing to the smoke they could not see many yards ahead. In any case, she was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "At the " time of the casualty, or thereafter, was the master in " a state of intoxication; and if so, did such intoxi. " cation cause or contribute to the stranding or sub- " sequent loss of the vessel?" Now when a charge of intoxication is preferred against a master, it behoves the court to look most carefully at the evidence; for, on the one hand, such charges are, as we know, sometimes made without sufficient grounds; whilst on the other hand, if they are established, there is no punishment which this court can inflict which would be adequate to meet the gravity of the case. A man who has so little self-control that he can get drunk when in command of his ship, and thus endanger, not only the property of his owners, but also the lives of all on board, is not fit to have charge of any vessel. Let us see, then, how stand the facts. As soon as the vessel struck the master came upon deck, and after the boats had been swung over the side ready to lower, he ordered a derrick to be raised over the fore hold to lighten her forward. The chief officer suggested that, as the upper part of the cargo was all in bags, it would be better to take it out by hand and throw it overboard, as it would save time; the master, however, insisted upon a derrick being put up, and accordingly the chief officer proceeded to carry out his orders. Shortly afterwards the master returned, and finding that the derrick was not being got up so quickly as he wished, high words passed between them. When, however, the derrick was up, the master would not give any orders to discharge or jettison cargo, but said he would wait till daylight; and nothing was done until between seven and eight in the morning, when the master gave orders to put the vessel full speed astern to get her off the rocks, but the chief engineer refused to obey that order, as he thought that, if she did come off, she would probably sink at once. Then occurred the scene between the master and the chief officer, when the latter called the men aft, and asked them if they thought the master was drunk and incapable, and they all, we are told, answered unanimously that he was; upon which the chief officer assumed the command of the vessel, and the master went below and turned in. The question then is, was the master at that time only excited, or was he drunk and incapable of performing his duties. On the one hand we have the evidence of Mr. Henry, the chief officer, who has sworn positively that the master was drunk, and his evidence is supported by two of the seamen, George Ross and Patrick Moran, who gave their evidence in a very clear and straightforward way, and in a manner to lead the Court to think that they were speaking the truth. On the other hand we have Morris, the second officer, who boldly stated that the master was not drunk or the worse for liquor; but then his evidence is open to some suspicion, as he is in the same boat with the master, and is responsible for the loss of this vessel; moreover, his manner when giving his evidence was not such as to impress the Court in his favour. Then there was the man Morrison, the carpenter, who had been on the look-out when the casualty occurred, and he also swore that the captain was not drunk; but then Morrison himself was the worse for liquor when he was giving his evidence, and admitted that he had that morning drunk three glasses of whiskey, two glasses of brandy, and two glasses of ale, partly bought with his own money, partly given to him, he said, by a friend. The exhibition which the man made of himself in the box rendered his evidence utterly untrustworthy. Then we have the chief and third engineers, but whose evidence was of so shuffling and evasive a character, that the Court could place no reliance on it. The chief engineer admitted that the chief officer before he took charge had asked him whether he did not think the captain was drunk, and the chief engineer stated that he then turned away, and did not answer either yes or no. The third engineer, again, although he tried to evade answering the questions put to him in every possible way, at length said, "I would not like to say whether the captain was " drunk or not." Now the captain has admitted that during the night he had taken a glass of whiskey with the chief engineer; that he had given a glass to the second officer as well as to the second and third engineers; in fact there was a good deal of whiskey going about that night. He has also stated that after the casualty he was almost mad, and he would not undertake to say that he had not himself taken a good deal of whiskey that night. Taking all these facts into consideration, and above all, the acts of the master in going below and turning in when the chief officer assumed the command of the vessel, we can have no doubt whatever that the master was drunk, not perhaps at the time when the stranding took place, but after the accident; and the question arises whether that intoxication caused or contributed to the stranding or subsequent loss of the vessel. As there is no evidence that he was drunk or the worse for liquor when he laid the vessel's course from Corsewall Point, or when she stranded, we are not prepared to say that his intoxication caused or contributed to the stranding of the vessel. Did it then contribute to her subsequent loss? Now, seeing that within a few minutes after the stranding the water in the fore holds was almost on a level with the water outside, we are not prepared to say that anything could then have been done to save the vessel; and if she had then come off the rocks, in all probability she would have gone down in deep water. It has not therefore been shewn that the master did anything which caused or contributed to her subsequent loss, or that he omitted to do anything which would have been likely to save the vessel. If so, his intoxication cannot be said to have caused or contributed either to the stranding or to the subsequent loss of the vessel; it will therefore not in any way influence the decision which we are about to give.

The last question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and officers or either of them is in " default;" and it is added that "the Board of Trade " are of opinion that the certificates of the master, " Frederick Helig, and the second mate, James Webster " Morris, should be dealt with." There can in our opinion be no doubt that the master and second officer are mainly responsible for this casualty—the master for having laid the vessel on a course to pass too near to Ailsa Craig, and for having left the deck and gone into his cabin at a time when his presence on deck was absolutely necessary; and the second officer for not having kept a good and proper look-out, or, if we are to believe his evidence, that he could see only a very short distance ahead, for having under these circumstances kept the vessel going at full speed ahead, making 9 1/2 to 10 knots. Under the circumstances we think that we are bound to deal with their certificates, and we shall suspend each of them for six months.

The Court on the application of the parties agreed to recommend to the Board of Trade that during the suspension of their master's certificates they be allowed chief mate's certificates.

The court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

THS. BEASLEY,

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors.

L367. 2132. 170.—11/84. Wt. 36. E. & S.