Wreck Report for 'Finchley', 1884

(No. 2363.)

"FINCHLEY" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 12th of November 1884, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains PARISH and CURLING, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "FINCHLEY," near Port Isaac's Harbour, Nova Scotia, on the 29th day of September 1884.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said ship was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of Jacob Garson, the master. The Court accordingly suspends his certificate for six months, but recommends that during the period of such suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 12th day of November 1884.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

WILLM. CURLING, R.N.R.,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 12th of November 1884, when Mr. Ravenhill appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Botterell for the owners, and Mr. Beaufort for the master of the "Finchley." Seven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Ravenhill handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Beaufort then addressed the Court on behalf of his party, and Mr. Ravenhill having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Finchley" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of London, of 1,951 tons gross and 1,265 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 250 horse-power. She was the property of Mr. Edward Hannay Watts, of 85, Gracechurch Street, in the city of London, and others, Mr. Watts being the managing owner. She left Coosaw in South Carolina on the 23rd of September last, with a crew of 25 hands all told, and a cargo of about 2,352 tons of phosphate rock, besides 200 tons of coal in her bunkers, bound for Dublin, but with directions to call at Sydney, Cape Breton, for coals. At noon of the 28th an observation was obtained, but what the latitude and longitude at that time was neither the captain nor the chief officer could remember, and the log book and all the papers had been lost with the vessel. We are told, however, that from that time she was kept on a N.E. by E. 1/4 E. course by the standard compass, or N.E. by E. 1/2 E. magnetic, there being a quarter of a point deviation on that course. From that time the engines were kept going at full speed, the vessel making 9 1/2 to 10 knots an hour until about 4 a.m. of the following day, when the weather having set in foggy, the chief officer, whose watch it was, ordered the engines to be put at half speed, and then called the captain. From that time the engines were kept at half speed, the vessel making about 4 1/2 to 5 knots until about 6.30 a.m., when the captain, who was on the bridge with the second officer, ordered the vessel to be stopped, and a cast of the lead to be taken which gave 35 fathoms, the log at the same time shewing that they had run 177 miles from the previous noon. The engines were thereupon put at what the captain called three-quarter speed until nearly 8 o'clock, when the engines were again stopped for the purpose of taking another cast of the lead, but before the way was off her she struck, and after two or three revolutions of the engines astern they were again put full speed ahead, and her helm being ported she was brought round with her head to the southward. At about 10 o'clock, the weather being still very thick, they picked up a fisherman, who volunteered to take them into Isaac's Harbour; and accordingly the ship's head was brought round again to the north, and she steamed on until about 12.30 when she struck a second time, but coming off again in about two minutes afterwards she foundered in deep water. Before, however, she did so, all hands had succeeded in getting into the boats, which had previously been swung out over the side, and they subsequently landed in Isaac's Harbour. The shoal on which she is supposed to have first struck is said to have been either Pollock's or Taylor's Shoal; that on which she struck the second time was off Harbour Island at the entrance to Isaac's Harbour.

These being the facts of the case, the Board of Trade have put to the Court the following questions, viz.:—

1. What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?

2. What number of compasses had the vessel on board, and where were they placed?

3. Did the master ascertain the deviation of his compasses by observation from time to time?

4. Whether the errors of the compasses were correctly ascertained and the proper correction to the courses applied?

5. Whether the master took proper measures to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at 4 a.m. and thereafter on the 29th of September?

6. Whether safe and proper courses were steered thereafter, and whether due and proper allowance was made for tide and currents?

7. Whether at about 3.30 a.m. of the 29th of September and thereafter, when the weather became thick with fog, the speed of the vessel was promptly and sufficiently reduced?

8. Whether the lead was used with sufficient frequency?

9. Whether a good and proper look-out was kept?

10. What was the name of the rock upon which the vessel struck about 8 a.m. on 29th of September?

11. Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

12. Whether the master and officers are, or either of them is, in default?

And it is added that "the Board of Trade are of? " opinion that the certificate of the master should be " dealt with."

And first as regards her compasses, of which it seems she had four in use—a standard compass with azimuth adjustment on the top of the chart-house, a steering compass in the wheel-house on the bridge, a pole compass forward of the bridge, and a compass at the after wheel. They had, we are told, been adjusted at Greenhithe in May last, and the captain stated that it was his practice night and morning to take azimuth observations, whenever the weather permitted, for the purpose of correcting the deviation. She appears, therefore, to have been well supplied with compasses, and we have no reason to think that the master neglected to ascertain the deviation of the compass from time to time, and to apply the proper corrections to the courses.

And now comes the important and almost only question in the case, namely, how came the vessel to strike upon Pollock's or Taylor's Shoal, at the entrance to Isaac's Harbour, when, according to the master, he had put her on a course to pass about 25 miles to the southward of Whitehead, or, in other words, how was it that she got some 40 miles out of her course? The master told us that they had not seen land since leaving Coosaw six days before, and although he says that he had obtained an observation on the preceding day both for latitude and longitude, neither he nor the chief officer could remember where it was. He told us that all that they did under these circumstances to ascertain and verify their position was to take a cast of the lead at 6.30 a.m. of the 29th, which he said gave them 35 fathoms. He told us that he thought they should at that time have been about 45 miles to the south of Isaac's Harbour, where he no doubt ought to have been in order to pass 25 miles to the southward of Whitehead on a N.E. by E. 1/4 or 1/2 E. course. And finding, he said, that the soundings which he had got agreed with those on the chart, he continued his course at three-quarters' speed until 8 a.m., when he stopped the ship to take another cast of the lead, but before she had lost her way she struck. On being asked to put down his assumed position on the chart at 6.30 a.m., namely, 45, miles south of Isaacs Harbour, it was seen that the depths shewn there and thereabouts were not 35 fathoms, but from 50 to 60 fathoms; but it was said that ten miles further south on the Sable Banks we should find 35 fathoms of water, and that this would be a sufficient justification to him for continuing his course; but in our opinion that is not so. It is to be remembered that the vessel's course was between the S.E. coast of Nova Scotia and Sable Island, and it was the master's duty to avoid the dangers on the one side as well as on the other, and he could do so only by keeping in deep water midway between the two. Mr. Beaufort has said that his proper course was to follow the Sailing Directions, and that those Sailing Directions told him that there was a current which would be likely to set him to the west, and that he followed out those directions by putting the vessel on a course to pass 25 miles to the south of Whitehead, but that the current had set his more to the westward than he anticipated; and Mr. Beaufort called our attention to the concluding paragraph on page 15 of the Sailing Directions for the south-east coast of Nova Scotia, where it is said, " These currents are rendered inconstant and irre- " gular both in strength and direction by local and " distant winds; but' the general tendency is well " known to be to the westward, for vessels find no " difficulty in working to windward in that direction " anywhere to the northward of the Gulf Stream; and " hence it is, that many of the vessels wrecked on " Sable Island were supposed to have been well to the " eastward of its position when they ran on shore." I would, however, also wish to call attention to other passages in these Sailing Directions, where the course which the master should have taken is very closely pointed out. Thus at page 16, under the heading of "Caution," we find the following passage: "It is " essential to the safety of vessels to attend to these " indications, for to the neglect of such precautions, " more especially of the deep sea lead, no less than to " the fogs and irregular currents, the frequent ship" " wrecks on Sable Island and the S.E. coast of Nova " Scotia are attributable. All this portion of the sea " from the eastern limit of the Bank of Newfoundland, " past Cape Race to Halifax, as well as to Portland, " Boston, or other harbours of the coast of the United " States, is within soundings, and therefore during " foggy weather, or when in doubt respecting the ship's "position, frequent soundings are absolutely neces- " sary." Again at page 20 we have the following caution: "It is essentially necessary, when approaching " Cape Canso from seaward, that great caution be " exercised, in consequence of the numerous detached " shoals and rocks which lie at some considerable " distance from the land; and that at all times, but " more especially during foggy weather, the constant " use of the lead should be deemed indispensable." Lastly, we have at page 92 a further caution as follows: "For the remainder of the coast it would not be " advisable to approach within the 40 fathom line; but " it must be borne in mind that this depth may be " found within the distance of three miles of some of " the most formidable dangers between Cape Canso " and Halifax."

Now with these directions and warnings before him, what ought the master to have done when he found himself at 6.30 a.m. in only 35 fathoms, and with the weather thick? He should have known that he was out of his course and was too near either to the coast of Nova Scotia or to Sable Island, and he should have at once taken every means in his power to ascertain his true position, and the only way of doing so was by frequent casts of the lead. But instead of this we find that from 4 a.m., when the weather came on thick, till 6.30, there was no cast taken; and that when he did take one, although it gave him only 35 fathoms, which shewed him that he was out of his course and had got too much to the one side or the other of the channel, he continued on the same course, going at what he called 3/4 speed for another hour and a half and until just before she struck. No doubt the stranding of the vessel was due to her having been swept by the current more to the westward than the master expected, but if he had consulted his Sailing Directions he would have seen that they warned him against this, and instructed him to take frequent casts of the lead; and had he done so after 6.30 a.m., when he found that he was out of his course, he would soon have seen that he was within the 40 fathoms sounding on the coast of Nova Scotia, and that he was rapidly shoaling his water. In our opinion the neglect of the lead in this case was utterly unjustifiable.

We are also asked whether the speed of the vessel' was sufficiently reduced, and as to this there seems to us to be some question. According to the master she was going at three quarters speed, which he described as being between 1/2 and full speed. The chief engineer, however, stated that she was only going at half speed, the engines making about 40 revolutions, but the second engineer, who was at the time working the engines, told us that they were making 50 revolutions, full speed being 56 or 57 revolutions. But whatever the speed was, it may be questioned whether it was not too great, seeing that the weather was so thick that they were not able to see the mainland, although it was only about a couple of miles off when they struck the first time, and that when they struck the second time they must have been close to Harbour Island without being able to see it.

We were told that the master was on the bridge with the second officer from 4 a.m., when the weather came on thick, keeping a good look-out and attending to the navigation of the vessel, and that there was also a lookout man stationed on the forecastle head; but the neglect of the lead, which was the only means he had at his disposal to ascertain his true position, is in our opinion unjustifiable. He has told us that he has been in the service of his present owners since 1875, and as master since 1877, and that during that time he has lost only one ship, namely, in 1880 or 1881. He added that the Court which had inquired into the facts of that casualty had acquitted him, and that his owners continued to place their confidence in him. We think, however, that this is not a case of mere error of judgment, but that it was an act of neglect and default, and under all the circumstances we think that we should not be doing our duty unless we dealt with his certificate, and we shall therefore suspend it for six months.

The Court, at the application of his counsel, agreed to recommend to the Board of Trade that during the suspension of his master's certificate he be allowed a chief mate's.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H.C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

WILLM. CURLING, R.N.R.,

Assessors.

L 367. 2138. 170.—11/84. Wt. 36. E. & S.