Wreck Report for 'Avebury', 1884

(No. 2370.)

AVEBURY" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of a formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 20th day of November 1884, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains RONALDSON and HYDE, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "AVEBURY," of Sunderland, in Mounts Bay, on the 28th of October last, whilst on a voyage from Lisbon to Cardiff.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said vessel was due to the negligent navigation thereof by Robert Amon, the master, in having laid her on too easterly a course from Ushant, and in having, when approaching the Cornish coast, neglected to take a cast of the lead to ascertain his position. And it accordingly suspends his certificate for three months, but recommends that during the period of such suspension a first mate's certificate should be granted to him.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 20th day of November 1884.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

GEORGE HYDE,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 20th day of November instant, when Mr. Macdonell appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. King for the master, and Mr. Botterell for the owners of the "Avebury." Nine witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Macdonell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. King then addressed the Court on behalf of his party, and Mr. Macdonell having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Avebury" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the port of Sunderland, of 737 tons gross, and 461 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 99-horse power. She was built at Middlesbrough in the year 1870, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. John Chapman, of the Exchange Buildings, High Street, Sunderland, and others, Mr. John Chapman being the managing owner. She left Lisbon at about 4 p.m. of the 23rd October last, with a crew of 16 hands all told and a cargo of 440 tons of iron ore, besides 210 tons of esparto grass, bound to Cardiff. At about 4 a.m. of the 25th she was off Cape Finisterre, which bore E. 1/2 S., distant about 10 miles, and was then put on a N.E. 1/4 N. course magnetic, which, we are told, would, if made good, have taken her well out of sight of Ushant Lights, and some 7 or 8 miles to the eastward of the Bishop's Rock. In crossing the bay, however, she encountered strong winds and a heavy sea from the N.W., and at 4 p.m. of the 27th they found themselves abreast of Ushant Light, bearing S.E. 3/4 E., distant from 9 to 10 miles, which showed them that she must have been driven considerably to the eastward of her course. From Ushant the master determined to steer so as to pass between the Seven Stones and the Wolf Rock. What that course was will be one of the principal points to be ascertained in this case. During the night the weather came on thick with rain, the wind and sea being still from the northward and westward, and at 3 a.m., not seeing the Wolf Light, the master sent a man up to the topsail yard to look out for it. During all this time the vessel was proceeding at full speed, making, we are told, from 6 to 6 1/2 knots, and a little before 4 a.m. land was seen ahead, and on the port bow, upon which orders were at once given to stop and reverse full speed, but before the engines had had time to act the vessel struck on the rocks forward, and although the engines continued to go astern she remained fast. Finding that she would not come off, the master and crew, in about an hour after she had struck, clambered from the bowsprit on to the rocks, and thus succeeded in getting ashore; but the vessel herself is, we are told, still on the rocks, and has since been totally lost, together with her cargo. The place where she struck is about 3/4 of a mile to the westward of Lamorna Cove, and about 6 miles from Penzance.

These, then, being the facts of the case, the first question on which the Board of Trade have asked for our opinion is, "Whether the master took proper " measures to ascertain and verify the position of his " vessel when off Ushant on the 27th October?" We were told by the master that when they passed Ushant it bore S.E. 3/4 E., distant from 9 to 10 miles, and there is nothing to show that that was not its correct bearing and distance.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " safe and proper courses were then and thereafter " steered, and whether due and proper allowance was " made for tide, currents, and the heavy beam sea?" The master told us that when they arrived off Ushant he found that they had been set some 7° or 8° to the eastward of their course by the strong westerly wind and sea that they had had in crossing the bay; and as the wind and sea continued from the same quarter, wishing to make a N. 1/2 E. course, so as to pass between the Seven Stones and the Wolf Rock, he had put the vessel upon a N. 2° W. course, allowing from 7° to 8° for leeway; and that that course was continued up to the time of her taking the ground. He also told us that on this course the compass was quite correct and shewed no deviation whatever. Now in saying that the vessel had been steered on a N. 2° W. course from Ushant until she struck, the master is not supported by any one of the witnesses who have been produced before us. The chief officer, who had the watch from 6 to 8 p.m. and from midnight to 4 a.m., told us that from 6 to 8 p.m. the course steered was N. 1/2 E., and from midnight to 4 a.m. north nothing to the east. The second officer, who had the watch' from 4 to 6 p.m. and from 8 p.m. to midnight, stated that from 4 to 6 they steered N. 1/2 E., that when he went on watch at 8 o'clock she was still on a N. 1/2 E. course, but that soon afterwards the captain ordered him to put her head north, owing to the heavy beam sea that was then running. When, however, the two men who were at the wheel from midnight to 4 a.m., Pickess and Spall, were examined, they stated positively that the course steered during that time was N. 1/2 E., Pickess having been at the wheel from 12 to 2, and Spall from 2 until the vessel struck. There is thus not a single witness who supports the master's statement that the vessel was kept upon a N. 2° W. course from 4 p.m. of the 27th until she struck, the first and second officers saying that from 4 to 8 p.m. she was on a N. 1/2 E. course, and after that north nothing to the east, whilst the two men who were at the wheel from midnight till she struck say that during that time she was steered N. 1/2 E. Under these circumstances it is impossible for us to believe the master's statement that she was kept on a N. 2° W. course from off Ushant until she struck, but we must hold that for the first four hours at all events, if not for the whole time, she was steered on a N. 1/2 E. course.

And now let us see where such a course would have been likely to land her. We were told by the master that the course steered from off Cape Finisterre was N.E. 1/4 N., and that that course would, had it been made good, have taken them well out of sight of Ushant, and some 7 to 8 miles to the eastward of the Bishop's Lights; but as a matter of fact it took them within 9 or 10 miles of Ushant, and he tells us that he estimated that the leeway which the vessel made in coming across the bay from Cape Finisterre to Ushant was from 7° to 8°. If, however, a course be laid down on a chart from 10 miles off Cape Finisterre to 10 miles off Ushant, it will be found to be as nearly as possible a N.E. 3/4 E. course, or a point more to the eastward than that which they had been steering in coming across the bay; so that she must during that time have been making about a point of leeway, and not, as the master stated, only 7° or 8°. And seeing that the wind and sea continued from the same directions, the master might naturally have concluded that she would continue after passing Ushant to make a point of leeway; so that, if the course steered was N. 1/2 E., the course which she would make would be about a N. by E. 1/2 E. Now, if a course be laid upon a chart from 10 miles off Ushant to the place where the vessel stranded, we shall find that it is very nearly N. by E. E., which renders it highly probable that the course steered from off Ushant was not, as the master stated, N. 2° W., but N. 1/2 E. What the master no doubt did was to put the vessel on a N. 1/2 E. course, which, if it had been made good, would have taken her between the Wolf Rock and the Seven Stones; but with a strong beam wind and sea setting her about a point to the eastward of her course, she would make about a N. by E. 1/2 E. course, which would take her to where she grounded. In our opinion the courses steered were not safe and proper courses, due and proper allowance not having been made for the heavy beam wind and sea.

I will now take the three next questions together. They are, (3) "What number of compasses had the "vessel on board?" (4) "Where were the compasses " placed, and did the master ascertain their deviation " as far as possible by observation from time to time?" and (5) "Whether the errors of the compasses were " correctly ascertained, and the proper correction to " the courses applied?" We were told that the vessel had three compasses, one on the lower bridge before the midship wheel, another at the after wheel, and a tell-tale compass in the saloon. There was no pole compass, but the vessel, we are told, was navigated and steered by the midships steering compass, which on a north course had not, we are told, any deviation. He stated that the compass had been adjusted in April last, and that he had taken every opportunity of testing them by azimuth observations, and had found them to be correct. He added that from the time of their leaving Lisbon he had not been able to get an observation, but there is no reason to think that the compasses had been affected by the iron ore which he had on board, for he told us that, in running from the Burlings to Cape Finisterre, he found the compass was quite correct, and that he made the Cape as he expected to do. We have therefore no reason to think that the leeway which the vessel made between Cape Finisterre and Ushant was in any respect due to any error in the compass, but that it was due solely to the strong wind and sea on her port side setting her away to eastward of her course.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " before midnight of the 27th October and thereafter, " having regard to the thick state of the weather, the " master was justified in neglecting to reduce the " speed of the vessel?" and the seventh question is, "Whether a good and proper look-out was kept?" There is no evidence that there was not a good and proper look-out being kept, for the master was on the ridge as well as the officer of the watch, and before the casualty occurred a man had been stationed on the topsail yard to look out for the Wolf Light. But notwithstanding this, the land appears not to have been seen until they were close upon it. The man on the topsail yard told us that, when he first saw the land, there were breakers almost under the bows of the vessel. Moreover, we have the fact that the vessel forward was right up on the rocks, and that the master and crew got on shore by letting themselves down from the bowsprit end. Either then the night must have been intensely dark and thick, or the vessel must have been going at too great a speed. We were told by the master that from 3 o'clock a.m. the speed of the vessel had been reduced to about three fourths, and in this he is to a certain extent supported by the chief engineer, who told us that from 3 a.m., the speed was reduced from 7 knots to about 6 knots. On the other hand, the donkey-man, who was in charge of the engines at the time when she went ashore, stated positively that she was going at full speed, until just before she struck. Either then there was not a good and proper look-out, but of which there is no proof, or the vessel must have been going at a greater speed than in the then state of the weather she ought to have been, in as much as they did not see the bold and rocky coast on which they struck until they were close to it.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether, " having regard to the state of the weather, and the " fact that no lights had been sighted, the total neglect " of the lead was justifiable" The master admitted that he had not taken any cast of the lead, and the reason he gives is, because he found on examining the patent log at 3 a.m. that they had run only 72 miles from his place of departure off Ushant, and he thought therefore that he must be in deep water. The master stated that the speed of his vessel was from 6 to 6 1/2 knots; the chief engineer puts it at 7 knots; but that the speed must have been greater than that is clear from the fact that the distance from her point of departure off Ushant to where she struck is just 94 miles giving her nearly 8 miles an hour for the 12 hours from 4 p.m. of the 27th to 4 a.m. of the 28th. It must also be remembered that during all this time the vessel had her fore trysail and main staysail set, the fore topmast staysail having blown away during the night, and that the wind was blowing strong from the N.W. to west, which would considerably increase the vessel's speed. The master admitted that he was anxious at not seeing the light of the Wolf Rock, and that it was on that account that he had stationed a man on the topsail yard. Now there is no excuse for the master not forming a more accurate estimate of the vessel's speed; had he done so he would have known that, if he was on his proper course, he ought by 3 a.m. to have been close to the Wolf Rock; and not seeing it, it was his duty to have taken a cast of the lead; had he done so, he would have found that he was within the forty fathoms line of soundings, and not seeing the Wolf Light, that he was not on his proper course. He ought then to have con. tinned sounding, and he would soon have found that he was shoaling his water; and long before he grounded he would have found himself in less than 30 fathoms, and would have known that he was nearing the land. In our opinion there is no justification whatever for the captain not taking a cast or casts of the lead, having regard to the thick state of the weather, and to the fact that he was out of his course, and that the light, which he knew that he ought to have seen, was not visible.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" And the tenth is, "What was the cause of " the casualty?" In our opinion the casualty was due to the fact that the vessel was kept on a course too far to the eastward, no allowance having been made for leeway, and that the master neglected to take a cast of the lead to ascertain his true position, although he could not see the light, which he ought to have seen, had he been on his proper course. In our opinion the vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

The last question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and mate are, or either of them is, in " default?" And it is added that "the Board of Trade " are of opinion that the certificate of the master should " be dealt with." Of course the whole blame for this casualty must rest with the master, and with him alone, as he had the sole charge of the navigation. So far as appears, no blame whatever attaches either to the first or to the second officer. Here then is a valuable ship and cargo lost by the neglect of this master to take the ordinary seamanlike precaution of making due allowance for leeway, it having been found that in the run from Cape Finisterre to Ushant she had got about a point to the leeward of her course, and for not taking a cast of the lead when he was out of his course, and in doubt as to his true position. It is said that this was merely an error of judgment, but in our opinion it is a case of neglect and default, and for which, notwithstanding the high character which he has received, we have no option but to deal with his certificate; but under the circumstances, seeing that we are told that he was for about twenty years in the service of the same employers, and that during that time he conducted himself to their entire satisfaction, we shall only suspend his certificate for three months.

The Court, on the application of his solicitor, recommended that during the suspension of his master's certificate he should be allowed a first mate's certificate.

I should add, that this is one of the cases in which, under the advice of their solicitor, Mr. Botterell, the owners have refused to give any information as to what they gave for the vessel, what they have spent upon her, and for what she was insured at the time of her loss.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

GEORGE HYDE,

Assessors.

L 367. 2145. 170.—11/84. Wt. 36. E. & S.