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Wreck Report for 'Cromartyshire', 1884

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Unique ID:15216
Description:Board of Trade Wreck Report for 'Cromartyshire', 1884
Creator:Board of Trade
Date:1884
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

(No. 2403.)

"CROMARTYSHIRE."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 19th of December 1884, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain PARISH, Vice-Admiral POWELL, C.B., and Captain PARFITT, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the casualty which occurred on board the sailing ship "CROMARTYSHIRE," on the 18th of September 1884, whereby two of the crew were lost.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the said casualty was due to the hook of the lower block of the watch tackle having given way, whilst they were in the act of taking a turn out of the sheet of the foresail; and that, although the vessel had left San Francisco on that voyage not properly or sufficiently manned, it has not been shewn that the casualty was due to that fact, or to any neglect or default on the part of the master or officers of the ship.

The Court is not asked to make .any order as to costs.

Dated the 19th day of December 1884.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

 

 

 

R. ASHMORE POWELL,

Assessors.

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 19th of December 1884, when Mr. Middleton appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Lawrence for the owners, master, and officers of the "Cromartyshire." Seven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Middleton handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Lawrence then produced a witness, and having addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Middleton having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Cromartyshire," which is an iron sailing ship belonging to the Port of Glasgow, of 1554 tons gross, and 1461 tons net register, was built at Port Glasgow in the year 1879, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of this inquiry, she was the property of Mr. James Law, of No. 123, Hope Street, Glasgow, and others, Mr. James Law being the managing owner. She left San Francisco on the 9th of August last, with a crew of 24 hands all told, and a cargo of 2390 tons of wheat in bags, bound to Queenstown for orders; and on the 18th of September following had arrived in about latitude 45° south, and longitude 117° west. It was the second officer's watch on that day from 4 a.m., and at that time the vessel was under fore and main topgallant sails, reefed upper topsails, courses, lower staysails, jibs, and fore topmast staysail, and was close hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, making from 8 to 9 knots an hour, the wind blowing strong from about S. by E. At about 6.30 a.m. the second officer, observing that there was a turn in the fore sheet, ordered it to be taken out, and accordingly the watch or preventer tackle having been hooked on to the clew of the foresail, and the hook of the lower block passed through an eye bolt on the deck, the tackle was hauled taut, and secured round the stanchions to an iron pin. The sheet was then let go, and the turn having been taken out, the sheet was again hooked on to the clew of the foresail, and whilst they were putting on the mousing, the book of the lower block of the watch or preventer tackle gave way, and, the sheet being slack, two of the seamen, McKenna and Harvey, were knocked overboard. The second officer at once gave orders to put the helm down, and then ran. aft to cut away the life buoys, of which there were two hanging on the rail aft, one on each side, but, the deck being very slippery, he fell, and two or three of the men fell over him. On getting up he ran aft, but by that time the two men had dropped so fat astern that. it was deemed useless to throw them a buoy. In the meantime the captain had come on deck, and seeing what had occurred, he sent a man up into the mizen crosstrees to look out, and then ordered the main course to be hauled up, and the vessel to be put about. In about 15 to 18 minutes she came round on the other tack, and after looking about for some time, and seeing nothing of the men, she was put about and proceeded on her voyage.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What was " the cause of the casualty to this vessel, whereby loss " of life ensued" There is no question that the immediate cause of the casualty was the parting of the hook of the lower block of the preventer or watch tackle.

The second question which we are asked is, " Whether, when the vessel left San Francisco, she " was properly and sufficiently manned?" We are told that, when she left San Francisco she had a crew of 24 hands all told, namely, a master, two mates, a steward, a carpenter, a cook, 12 able seamen, 2 ordinary seamen, a boy, and three apprentices; giving 6 able seamen and 3 ordinaries, boys, or apprentices for each watch. Now Mr. Middleton has told us that he is instructed to say that a vessel of her size should, besides the two mates, have had a boatswain, and a crew of not less than 28 hands all told, of which one half, or 14 hands, should have been able seamen; and in that opinion the assessors entirely concur. They think that that would be a minimum allowance for such a vessel, and seeing that she had only 24 hands all told,. of whom only 12 were able seamen, and that she had no boatswain, they are of opinion that she was not properly or sufficiently manned.

The third question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the preventer tackle hook carrying " away?" It is impossible to say what was the cause of the preventer tackle giving way; it may have been owing to some flaw in the iron; but I am told by the assessors that it is not by any means an unfrequent occurrence.

I will take the next three questions together, they are as follow:—"(4) Whether prompt and proper measures " were taken to save the lives of the two men? " (5) Whether failure to save life was attributable to " any defect in relation to the boats? and (6) Whether " such failure was attributable in any way to under- " manning?" There is no reason to think that any undue delay occurred either in putting the helm down or in bringing the ship round on an opposite tack; but the question is whether this was the proper measure to take under the circumstances. It seems that the vessel had five boats, of which three were forward on skids, bottom upwards, and two aft, one on each quarter, also on skids, but with their keels downwards. Of the two after boats, one only, that upon the port side, had her tackles rove; but the starboard boat had no tackles, and the captain told us that during the two years and a half that he had been in the vessel, that boat had never been lowered, and he did not think that there were any tackles for her on board the ship. The result was that there was only one boat, the after boat on the port side, which was capable of being lowered. Now so long as the vessel remained on the starboard tack, it might be possible to lower the boat on the port side, that side being to leeward; but, when the vessel was brought round on the other tack, with her port side to windward, we are told that it would not have been possible to have lowered the port boat; and as the starboard boat could not be lowered, owing to her having no tackles, the result would be that, when they got round on to the port tack, if they had come across one or both of the men, they could not have lowered a boat to pick them up, but they would have had to go about and get her on the starboard tack again before they could do so. It may, therefore, perhaps be a question whether it might not have been the better plan to have kept the vessel on the starboard tack, stopped the way of the ship by heaving her to, and then turned the whole of their attention to lowering the port boat, and sending it off to the men's assistance. It is true that, with the comparatively small crew which she had, it would have been a risk to have sent away an officer and boat's crew in such weather, and that the few hands that would have been left on board, would have been wholly insufficient to have put the vessel about to follow em, the whole ship's company being required to haul up the main course, when once it was aback. If, indeed, the vessel had been better and more fully manned, the two operations might possibly have been tried; but the Court is not disposed to blame them for having taken a course, 'which, under the circumstances, they no doubt believed to be the best.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seaman- " like care?" Looking at all the facts of the case, we are not prepared to say that she was not properly navigated.

The last question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and officers are, or either of them is, in " default, and whether blame attaches to the owner?" And it is added that "the Board of Trade are of " opinion that the certificate of the master should be " dealt with."

And first as regards the manning of the vessel. Mr. Law, the managing owner, told us that when the captain joined the ship in May 1882, about two years and a half since, they had some conversation together as to the number of hands which she ought to have, and that they came to the conclusion that 26 hands would be a proper complement for her, and he stated that that was the number which she usually carried. I have already stated, however, that in the opinion of the assessors, 26 hands would not be a sufficient crew for her; and that the minimum allowance for a vessel of her size would be 28 hands, including a boatswain and 14 able seamen; that, in their opinion, is the very smallest number that she should have had.

We have seen, however, that on this voyage she left San Francisco with only 24 hands all told, of whom 12 only were able seamen. Now the excuse which the master gives for this, is that on his arrival at San Francisco the whole of his able seamen, except one and one apprentice, left the ship, and he had consequently to engage a new crew, and he told us that of the men who then signed articles, two did not join when the vessel was getting under weigh, and that they had, therefore, to leave without them. But we were told that the vessel had taken in her cargo some 35 miles up the bay, and there was no reason why the master should not have brought up off San Francisco, where he could have got as many hands as he pleased. For this, no doubt, Mr. Law is not responsible, but both he and the master are responsible for having habitually navigated this vessel with too small a crew.

And here I must call attention to a paragraph which appears on the first page of the ship's articles, and which is in these words; "she shall be considered fully " manned with 16 hands all told, all above that number " are extra;" 16 hands for a sailing vessel of 1,554 tons gross! Mr. Lawrence has endeavoured to explain away the meaning of that passage, but in our opinion the meaning of it is obvious, it was to give the master the power of compelling the men to go to sea in her, even if she had only 16 hands on board; when both Mr. Law and the captain were of opinion that 26 hands would not be more than a proper complement; and the assessors think that she ought not to have been allowed to go to sea with less than 28 hands. In our opinion this is a most improper clause, and could only have been introduced with the object of subjecting the crew, if need be, to the greatest injustice. Mr. Law cannot pretend to have been ignorant of that clause in the articles of agreement, and we think that both he and the captain are greatly to blame for having allowed it to be introduced.

I now come to the question as to who is responsible for the want of proper tackles being fitted to the after boat on the starboard side. It is obvious that it would be quite impossible to say beforehand which of the two boats it might be necessary to lower in order to save life, whether that on the port or on the starboard side; and, under these cirumstances to have only one of them with tackles rove and in a condition to be lowered, was neither right nor proper. From what the captain told us it would seem that this had been the state of affairs ever since he joined the vessel some two years and a half ago, and that not only were the tackles not rove for that starboard boat, but that there were no tackles at all on board for her. Mr. Law has endeavoured to shelter himself under the general assertion that he left all these matters to the captain; but had he any right to do so? As managing owner he is responsible for the vessel being sent to sea in a proper and seaworthy condition, and so as not to involve risk to the lives of those on board; but the fact that the after boat on the starboard side could not be lowered owing to her not having been fitted with tackles, might, undoubtedly, as we have seen in the present case, be attended with danger to the lives of those on board in case any of them fell overboard. In our opinion both the managing owner and the master are to blame for having allowed this boat to be for so long a time without tackles.

Seeing, however, that the casualty cannot be said to have been directly due to any neglect or default on the part of the master, we have no power to deal with his certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

 

 

 

R. ASHMORE POWELL,

Assessors.

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

 

L 367. 2178. 170.—12/84. Wt. 36. E. & S.

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