Wreck Report for 'Hathersage', 1886

(No. 2837.)

"HATHERSAGE" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 26th and 27th of February 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain PARISH, Vice-Admiral PICKARD, and Captain HARLAND, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the casualty to the steamship "HATHERSAGE," on the 11th of December 1885, whereby one life was lost.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the said ship was, so far as regards her hull, in a good and seaworthy condition, but that she was much too deeply laden having regard to the time of the year; and that the loss of the master's life was due partly to the violence of the gale, and partly to her being so deeply laden.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated this 27th day of February 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

BENJN. S. PICKARD,

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 26th and 27th of February 1886, when Mr. Mansel Jones appeared for the Board of Trade. The managing owner of the "Hathersage" was present, but was not represented by either counsel or solicitor. Nine witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. The managing owner then addressed the Court on his own behalf, and Mr. Mansel Jones having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Hathersage" is an iron screw steam ship, belonging to the port of West Hartlepool, of 1693 tons gross, and 1085 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 150 horse-power. She was built at West Hartlepool in the year 1879, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of Mr. Joseph Benjamin Lister Merryweather, of Victoria Terrace, West Hartlepool, and others, Mr. Merryweather being the managing owner. She left Sebastopol on the 21st of November last, with a crew of 21 hands all told, and a cargo of 2120 tons of rye, bound to Gibraltar, and duly arrived at Malta in the morning of the 28th. Having there taken in 100 tons of bunker coal, she left again the same day, and on the 3rd of December following reached Gibraltar, where she took in 60 tons more of coal, and having received orders to proceed to Amsterdam, she sailed again on the 6th. At 6.30 a.m. of the 9th she was off Cape Finisterre, and at that time it was blowing fresh from about E.N.E., which increased during the day, and at midnight, according to the log book, it was blowing a strong gale with a very heavy sea, and the vessel was shipping much water forward. At 2 a.m. of the following morning, the 10th, two very heavy seas broke over her, throwing her, it is said, on her beam ends, and causing her to take a list to port. During the day it was found that the wheel chains were slack, upon which 6 links were taken out on each side. The gale continued throughout the day, backing gradually to the S.E., and at about 5 p.m., whilst the crew were attempting to hoist the bright light on the foremast head, a sea broke over them, which compelled them to let go, and the lamp was washed overboard, and after this the lamp had, during the continuance of the gale, to be hung from the compass pole at the forepart of the bridge. At midnight we are told there was a strong gale with a very high and most dangerous sea, which was making a clean breach over her, sweeping the decks fore and aft, and flooding the cabin. At 2 a.m. of the 11th she shipped a very heavy sea on the bridge, which carried away both the starboard boats, with their chocks and fittings, the stoke-hole ventilator, the rails on the upper and lower bridges, the hen coop, the skylight cover, and the chart room shutters, damaging also the engine room skylight and the port lifeboat, besides straining the forecastle considerably. At about 11.30 a.m. of the same day the captain, in going aft, observed that the forelock of one of the block pins of the steering gear on the port side was adrift, and he therefore called to the mate to bring him a hammer and a forelock to secure the bolt, and whilst they were thus engaged, a heavy sea broke over the weather quarter, which carried the master overboard, the mate saving himself by clinging to one of the ventilators. At this time we are told that the sea was running so high that it was quite impossible to put the vessel about, or to lower a boat. Two life buoys were, however, thrown to him, but he failed to reach them, and in a very short time he sank and was not seen again. The next day, the 12th, the gale abated, upon which the engines were again put full speed ahead, and she arrived at Amsterdam at about 8 p.m. of the 15th.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether " the load line disc was properly placed?" It seems that the load line disc was placed at 1 foot 9 below the deck line; and what we have to consider is, whether there were any circumstances under which they would have been justified in loading her to that depth. It must be remembered that the regular trade in which this vessel was engaged was carrying coals, chiefly to the Mediterranean, but occasionally also to the United States and the Black Sea, and returning with grain. Now on such voyages could she properly have been loaded down to 1 foot 9 from the deck? Mr. McGlashan, the chief draughtsman to Messrs. William Gray and Co., the builders of the vessel, told us that he had calculated what freeboard this vessel should have by the tables of the Load Line Committee, which have been adopted by Lloyds and the Board of Trade, and that she should have a freeboard of 2 feet 2 1/2 inches for a summer voyage, and of 2 feet 5 for a winter voyage. On the other hand Captain Chalmers, the Nautical Surveyor and Detaining Officer of the Board of Trade at the Hartlepools, has told us that she should have 5 inches more, that is to say 2 feet 7 1/2 for a summer voyage, and 2 feet 10 for a winter voyage. The difference however is easily explained by the fact that Mr. McGlashan has omitted to make the necessary additions to the freeboard required by sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of the 11th Article of the Regulations. It should be stated that the "Hathersage" was a well-decked ship, having a well 68 feet long, extending from the bridge to the forecastle, with bulwarks on each side 4 feet 9 inches high, which would, if a sea broke into it, necessarily hold a large quantity of water. Now the note to sub-paragraph (e) is as follows:—"If the crew are not berthed " in the bridge house, and the arrangements to enable " them to get backwards and forwards from their " quarters are not satisfactory, an addition shall be made " to the freeboard of 1 per cent. of the moulded depth of the ship." And as it is admitted that the crew were not berthed in the bridge house, and that there were no arrangements whatever to enable them to get backwards and forwards from the bridge to their quarters, except by passing through the well, it is clear that there would have to be added ,to the freeboard one per cent. of the moulded depth, which we are told would be 2 1/2 inches. Again, sub-paragraph (f) is in these words:—"The minimum freeing port area is " to be one square foot for each 3 feet in length of " the bulwarks in the well, and two thirds of this is " to be in the after part of the well; if the freeing " port area is less than that stated above, an addition " is to be made to the freeboard of one per cent. of the " moulded depth of the ship." Now there were six freeing ports in the well, three on each side, each of them 2 feet 4, by 1 foot 10, with their lower sills raised 14 inches above the deck. These ports were thus distributed; it was 14 feet from the centre of the aftermost port to the bridge bulkhead; 19 feet from the centre of that port to that of the next forward one, and 22 feet from the centre of the middle port to that of the foremost one, the distance from there to the forecastle bulkhead being 13 feet. It is obvious therefore that neither in the area of the ports nor in their positions was there a compliance with sub-paragraph (f), and consequently there must be a further addition of one per cent. to the freeboard, or 2 1/2 inches more, making the difference of 5 inches between Captain Chalmer's and Mr. McGlashan's estimates. The freeboard therefore required for this vessel being 2 feet 7 1/2 inches for a summer voyage, and 2 feet 10 inches for a winter voyage, it is obvious that under no circumstances ought she to have been loaded down to 1 foot 9 inches. There was therefore no justification for putting the load line at that place.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel's deck openings were properly and effi- " ciently protected?" So far as appears the deck openings were properly and efficiently protected. The hatchways in the well, of which there were two, seem to have been strongly constructed, having coamings 2 feet 6 inches high, with one fore and after and two 'thwart ship bars, and each of them being covered with three tarpaulins. The ventilators also seem to have been well placed, so as not to be a source of danger to the vessel. The only defects seem to have been in the forecastle bulkhead, in which there were 4 doors, one leading to the petty officers' quarters, one to the seamen's forecastle, one to the firemen's forecastle, which was below deck, and one to the lamp room. Of these doors that leading to the seamen's forecastle had a hinge off, that leading to the firemen's forecastle could not be closed, and the water seems to have passed readily through all the doors, rendering the place quite uninhabitable in bad weather. But as there was no communication with the hold, any water that might get through these doors would not be likely to endanger the vessel, further than by putting her down by the head.

I will next take the third and the fourth questions together, they are as follow:—(3) "Whether, when the " vessel left Sebastopol, she was in all respects in a " good and seaworthy condition, whether her cargo was " properly stowed, and whether she had sufficient free- " board?" and (4) "Whether the cargo was properly " stowed, and whether the vessel had sufficient free- " board when she left Gibraltar?" So far as the hull is concerned she seems to be a very superior vessel, having been built under special survey, and classed 100 A 1 at Lloyds. Moreover, immediately previous to her departure from this country on her last voyage, in October 1885, she was surveyed, and found to be fit to be continued on her class. We are told also that she delivered her cargo at Amsterdam totally undamaged; and Captain Chalmers stated that he had surveyed her after her return to West Hartlepool, and found the hull in excellent condition. The cargo also seems to have been well stowed. There were shifting boards extending from the keelson to the deck; and although from the fact of her having taken a list it might be supposed that the cargo had shifted, it was found on her arrival at Amsterdam that this was not so. The way in which the list is explained is this:—It seems that some time during the gale the screw of the sounding tube to No. 1 tank was washed off, so that the water which was in the well got down it, and filled the tank to the height of some 23 or 24 inches. As soon as this was discovered, the pumps were set on to clear it out, but owing to the heeling over of the vessel, from the wind being on the starboard side, a portion of the water remained on the port side, and could not be reached by the pumps; and this it is supposed gave her the list to port, which does not however appear to have been very considerable, being at the outside from 2 feet to 2 feet and a half. As regards the freeboard, we are told that she drew 19 feet 10 when she left Sebastopol, and 19 feet 9 when she left Gibraltar. It is also admitted that when she left the latter place the water was within an inch or so of the centre of the disc; there is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to whether she had at that time a slight list to port, but all agree that the water was then within an inch or so of the centre of the disc, and as the load line was placed at 1 foot 9 inches below the upper line of the deck, it follows that she would have a freeboard of only 1 foot 10 when she left Gibraltar, and of 1 foot 9 when leaving Sebastopol. Seeing, however, that this was a winter voyage, and that she ought by the present rules to have had a freeboard of 2 feet 10 inches as a minimum, it follows that she had 1 foot 1 inch too little freeboard on leaving Sebastopol, and 1 foot too little on leaving Gibraltar.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether, after passing Cape Finisterre, the vessel had from time " to time any unusual quantity of water on deck; if so, " to what extent the weight of water on deck increased " the draught forward and the mean immersion of " the vessel respectively; and whether the water on deck " prevented the crew from obtaining access to their " quarters?" There can be no doubt whatever that this vessel must during the gale have taken large quantities of water into her well; according to the crew there was almost continually water there; according to the chief officer it soon cleared off. Captain Chalmers has, however, told us that, owing to the height of the bulwarks and the position of the aftermost freeing port, there must always, whenever she took a sea into the well, have been from 20 to 25 tons of water, for which there would be no means of escape except through the scuppers, which would always render it extremely difficult for the men to get to their quarters. We have also the fact that during the three days that the gale lasted neither the petty officers nor the crew were able to occupy their berths, but preferred to remain in the stoke hole or in the bunkers. That water did get into the forecastle, and more especially into the firemen's forecastle, which was below the deck, and remain there, can hardly be denied, and this, together with the water in the well, and what could not be pumped out of the No. 1 tank, would no doubt put the vessel down by the head and increase the mean immersion of the vessel, but to what extent it is of course impossible for us to say; it would also increase the tendency to take in water forward, and thus render it more difficult for the crew to go forward.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "If there " was an unusual quantity of water on deck, what was " the cause thereof?" The cause was no doubt due to her being too deeply laden.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Was " the vessel overladen?" Seeing that she had a freeboard on leaving Gibraltar of only 1 foot 10, whereas she should have had 2 feet 10 inches, it follows that she had one foot too little freeboard, and as her displacement was about 18 tons to the inch she should, in our opinion, have had about 200 tons less on board.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the steering gear was in good order?" The chains seem to have stretched, but this was remedied by taking out six of the links on each side, and they then worked well.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the casualties to the vessel on the " 10th—11th December last?" The casualties were due partly to the extreme violence of the weather combined with the depth to which the vessel was laden. Had she not been so deeply laden, there can be little doubt that she would have risen more readily to the seas, and might thus have escaped the serious injuries which she sustained.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the master being washed overboard, " and was the condition of the weather such that no " efforts could be made to save him?" The master was washed overboard by a sea which broke over the weather quarter, owing to her having been so deeply laden. According to the evidence of the crew, she kept dipping her bows and stern into the sea alternately, the sea sometimes making a clean breach over her. When, however, the captain had been washed overboard, it was, in our opinion, quite impossible to do anything to save him. It would have been impossible at that time to have put the ship about or to have launched a boat; they did all they could by throwing life buoys to him, but he sank before he could reach them.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and " seamanlike care?" We have no reason to think that the vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care. She was kept, with her engines going easy, head to wind and sea during the gale, and the fact that she was got safely to Amsterdam without any damage to the cargo, although the vessel had a list to port, is sufficient proof that she was well and skilfully handled.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the chief officer is in default, and whether blame " attaches to the managing owner?" In our opinion no blame attaches to the chief officer. As regards the managing owner, however, we cannot acquit him altogether of blame. He has admitted that he is alone responsible for having put the load line at 1 foot 9 below the upper line of the deck; looking, however, at the trade in which she was engaged, she ought never, even in the summer time, to have had a less freeboard than 2 feet 7 1/2. And yet, with the load line placed at 1 foot 9, he seems never to have instructed his masters that they were not on any occasion to load down to it; and judging from the cargoes which he told us she had carried, she seems to have been very frequently loaded, as she was on this occasion, down to the centre of the disc. Indeed, he told us that some of his masters had said to him that they would be quite ready to cross the Bay of Biscay in her, even in the winter, with a freeboard of only 1 foot 6. At the same time, in justice to Mr. Merryweather, we ought to say that, although he has been engaged in this trade for about 13 years, he tells us that during all that time he has never lost a ship, with the exception of the "Ackworth," which struck on the Pearl Rock in the Bay of Gibraltar, but from no fault whatever of the owner.

At the conclusion of the Inquiry Mr. Mansel Jones asked on behalf of the Board of Trade that the owner should be condemned in costs. Seeing, however, that Mr. Merryweather has given us all the assistance in his power, that he has acted quite openly throughout, and has not by his conduct increased the costs of this Inquiry; seeing, also, that the present tables for fixing the freeboard were only issued by the Board of Trade in January last, and therefore subsequent to the loss of this vessel, we shall not condemn the owner in the costs. It is a very different case from that of the "Furius," which lately came before us.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

BENJN. S. PICKARD,

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

L 367. 2616. 180.—3/86. Wt. 408. E. & S.