Wreck Report for 'Joseph Rickett', 1886

(No. 2838.)

"JOSEPH RICKETT" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 2nd of March 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains RONALDSON and KENNEDY, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "JOSEPH RICKETT," of London, near Staithes, on the coast of Yorkshire) on the 9th ultimo.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding of the said vessel was due to the negligent navigation thereof by Robert Cockerton, the master, and William Brannen, the mate, and it accordingly suspends their certificates for three months and one month respectively, but recommends that during the period of the suspension of his master's certificate, the master should receive a first mate's.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 2nd day of March 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

H. C. KENNEDY,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 2nd day of March instant, when the Honourable Alfred Lyttelton appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Gibson for the owners, and Mr. Baden Powell for the master of the "Joseph Rickett." Seven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Lyttelton handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Gibson and Mr. Baden Powell then addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and the mate of the "Joseph Rickett" having been heard on his own behalf, and Mr. Lyttelton in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:

The "Joseph Rickett" is an iron screw steamship belonging to the port of London, of 716 tons gross, and 449 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 90 horse-power. She was built at Kinghorn, in the county of Fife, in the year 1879, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of Mr. George Robert Carter, of 53, Coal Exchange, London, Coal Merchant, and others, Mr. Carter being the managing owner. She left Sunderland in the afternoon of the 9th of February last, with a crew of 14 hands all told, and a cargo of 740 tons of coal, bound to London; and having cleared the harbour was, at about 5.30 p.m., when about two cables' lengths inside of Hendon Rock Buoy, put upon a S. by E. course by the bridge compass, to make Whitby Light. At this time we are told the weather was fine with more or less haze, and the wind light from about W.S.W., and she proceeded at full speed, making from 8 to 8 1/2 knots. It was the master's watch from 6 to 8, but at 7.30 he went below, leaving the deck in charge of the boatswain, and soon after 8 p.m. the chief mate came on deck and took charge. At this time a flare, which no doubt came from the Skinningrave Furnace Works, was seen away on the starboard quarter; and shortly afterwards the mate observed what he took to be a black bank of fog ahead, and on the starboard bow. Whilst he was trying to make out what it was breakers were suddenly seen ahead, upon which orders were at once given t starboard, but before the vessel had time to answer her helm she struck the ground, and although on the master's coming on deck the engines were reversed full speed, the vessel remained fast. A short time afterwards some fishermen came on board, and the master, finding that he could not move her, despatched a boat to Hartlepool for a steam tug, and at the same time engaged about 30 men to help jettison the cargo. On the following morning two steam tugs arrived, and about 50 or 60 tons of coals having by that time been jettisoned, the vessel was hauled off and was taken to Hartlepool. The place where the vessel had struck was opposite the village of Boulby, and about a mile and a half to the north of Staiths.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What was " the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" The stranding of the vessel was no doubt due to her having been put on a course to pass too close to the shore without regard to the flood tide, which was at the time running to the south, and which would tend to set her to the westward of her course, and so on to the land.

The second question which we are asked is, "What " number of compasses had the vessel on board, where " were they placed, and when and by whom were they " last adjusted?" There were three compasses on board, a pole compass on the upper bridge, a bridge compass before the midship wheel, and a steering compass aft, They had been adjusted in November 1879, when the vessel was first built, but not since.

The third question which we are asked is, "Did the " master ascertain the deviation of the compasses from " time to time; were the errors correctly ascertained " and the proper correction to the courses applied?" The master told us that he used from time to time to ascertain the deviation of the compasses, but that he had not done so during the last three months that he had been running up and down the coast. He told us that the deviation cards which he had on board, and which had been drawn up in November 1879, Were of no use, and that the bridge compass showed about half a point easterly deviation on a S. by E. course, whereas the deviation on that course was about a point and a half. Whether, however, the master had correctly ascertained the errors of his compasses, and applied the proper corrections to the courses, it is not possible to say, for he kept no deviation book, nor made any entry of the deviation in the log book, so that if any accident had happened to him during the voyage, no one on board would have known what courses to steer.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper course was set and steered after " leaving Sunderland on the 9th of February, and " whether due and proper allowance was made for tide " and currents?" We were told by the master that the course set and steered from about two cables' lengths inside of the Hendon Rock Buoy, was S. by E. by the bridge compass, which he said would be equivalent to a S.S.E. 1/2 E. course magnetic, there being a point and a half of easterly deviation by that compass on a S. by E. course. It was, however, pointed out to the master that, if the compass had had a point and a half of easterly deviation, a S. by E. course would be equivalent not to a S.S.E. 1/2 E. course, but to a S. 1/2 W. course magnetic, which if he had steered would have put him ashore long before he had reached the Tees Bay. The deviation was no doubt westerly and not easterly, but it only shows what the Court has so often had to remark, that masters of many of these steamers do not seem to know the difference between easterly and westerly deviation, nor how to apply the deviation in order to obtain the correct course. Assuming, however, that in this instance there was a westerly deviation of one and a half points, so that a S. by E. course by the compass would be equivalent to a S.S.E. 1/2 E. course magnetic, such a course would in our opinion not be either a safe or a proper course, for it would take him, even if he made it good, very near the land before he reached Whitby. Now it must be remembered that up to the time of their going ashore they would have the southerly tide with them, and their course being S.S.E. 1/2 E., that would tend to set them somewhat to the westward of their course, and would be quite sufficient to account for the vessel having gone ashore where she did. According to the mate, the proper course on leaving Sunde land is to steer first S.E. by S. until they get a good offing, before putting the vessel on a S.S.E. course. It seems also that, although they had a pole compass on the upper bridge, there was no light in it, as the master said that he thought that the glare of the light would prevent the officer of the watch, who would be on the upper bridge, from seeing so well ahead. The result was that the courses were set and steered by the bridge compass, which was on the lower bridge, and just in front of the wheel, but where it is admitted that it could not be seen by the officer who was on the upper bridge. Now one of the most important duties of the officer of the watch is to see that the vessel is being kept on her course, and this it was not possible for him to see from the upper bridge, and without going down to the lower bridge; he had, therefore, to trust entirely to the man at the wheel that the vessel was being kept on her proper course. Even therefore had the course set been a safe or proper course, there was really no security that that course would be kept.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master was on deck at a time when the safety of " the vessel required his personal supervision?" Seeing that the master elected to put his vessel on a course which would take her so close to the land that a slight set of the tide or current to the westward would put her ashore, and that he had not seen any light from the time of leaving Sunderland, and was therefore ignorant of his true position, we think that he was not justified in leaving the deck, at any rate until he had passed the Whitby Light, and put the vessel on a clear course for Flamborough Head. In our opinion the master was off the deck at a time when the safety of the vessel required his personal supervision.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the weather became thick, and if so, whether the " speed of the vessel was promptly and sufficiently " reduced?" The master told us that the weather was slightly hazy, but not sufficiently so to prevent their going at full speed, for that they could see a ship's lights at the distance of a mile and a half; he said that there was a kind of smoky haze towards the land, caused by the furnaces on shore, the whole way. On the other hand, the mate and the rest of the crew say that the fog was so thick that they could not see more than about two ships' lengths off. We have also the fact that neither the Hartlepool Lights nor the lights at the mouth of the Tees were seen, and that, although they heard the whistle of a steamer they did not see her; nor do the breakers appear to have been seen until they were just about to strike. Whether then the weather was so foggy as to make it expedient to reduce the speed of the vessel, it is clear that it was bad enough to make it necessary to take especial precautions to prevent the vessel going ashore, and these do not appear to have been taken.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " the total neglect of the lead was justifiable?" If the master chose to put her on a course so near to the land, he should have kept the lead going to prevent her going ashore. But what he ought to have done was to have given the land a wider berth, and in that case there would have been no necessity to use the lead.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel was properly manned?" She had a master, a mate, a boatswain, 5 A.B.'s, two engineers, a donkey man, and two firemen. There were thus the boatswain and two A.B.'s in the master's watch, and three A.B.'s in the mate's watch. And seeing that it was only a voyage of from 33 to 34 hours, we are not disposed to say that she was insufficiently manned. There were three hands besides the officer in each watch, sufficient therefore to relieve the wheel and the look-out, and, if necessary, to take a cast of the lead.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether a good and proper look out was kept?"

It seems that the look - out was stationed on the upper bridge alongside the officer of the watch. Looking, however, at the state of the weather, we think that he should have been stationed forward on the topgallant forecastle. We are not, therefore, prepared to say that there was a good and proper look out.

The tenth question is, "Whether the vessel Was " navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" In our opinion she was not.

The eleventh question is, "Whether the master and " mate are, or either of them is, in default?" and it is added that "the Board of Trade are of opinion " that the certificates of the master and chief officer " should be dealt with." It appears to us that the master is to blame for having put the vessel on a course to pass too near the land without making any allowance for the tide, which would be setting him to the westward of his course; and for having gone below at a time when, owing to the foggy state of the weather, and to the fact that he had seen no light since leaving Sunderland, his presence on deck was required for the safety of the vessel. We think also that the mate is to blame for not having, when he saw what he took to be a dark fog bank ahead, either reduced the speed of the vessel, or put her head off shore, until he had ascertained what it was, or at any rate called the master; he did, however, none of these things, but kept her going ahead at full speed, until she struck the rocks. Upon the whole we think that both these officers have committed, not a mere error of judgment, but a wrongful act and default, for which it is our duty to deal with their certificates. We are told that the master has been in the ship ever since she was built, rather more than 6 1/2 years, and that during the whole of that time he has not before met with any casualty; on the contrary, he has received a high character from his employers for steadiness and sobriety, and has been rewarded both by the owners and by the underwriters for the way in which he has managed the vessel. The mate also has produced a number of certificates from former employers of his general good conduct and attention to his duties. There can, however, be no doubt that the chief responsibility for this casualty rests with the master, although in our opinion the mate is not altogether free from blame. Looking at all the facts of the case, and having regard to their previous good characters, the assessors are disposed to pass a lenient sentence upon them, and we shall therefore suspend the master's certificate for only three months, and the mate's certificate for only one month. The Court will also, on the application of Mr. Baden Powell, recommend to the Board of Trade that the master shall, during the suspension of his master's certificate, receive a chief mate's.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

H. C. KENNEDY,

Assessors.

L 367. 2617. 180.—3/86. Wt. 408. E. & S.