Wreck Report for 'Kepier', 1886

(No. 2846.)

"KEPIER" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Newcastle-on-Tyne, on the 8th day of March 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains PARFITT and DAVIES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "KEPIER," of Sunderland, near Flamborough Head, on the 12th ultimo.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said vessel was due to the negligent navigation thereof by Carl Mohrke, the master, and it accordingly suspends his certificate for three months, but recommends that during the period of such suspension a first officer's certificate be granted to him.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 8th day of March 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

W. PARFITT,

T. DAVIES,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Newcastle-on-Tyne on the 8th day of March instant, when Mr. de Hamel appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Roche for the owners and master of the "Kepier." Nine witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. de Hamel handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Roche then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. de Hamel having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion has been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Kepier" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the port of Sunderland, of 703 tons gross, and 518 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 90 horse-power. She was built at Deptford, in the county of Durham, in the year 1869, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Henry Thomas Morton and another, Mr. Thomas Jowsey Reay, of the Cedars, Sunderland, being the managing owner. She left Sunderland Harbour at about 7.10 p.m. of the 11th February last, with a crew of 15 hands all told, and a cargo of 828 tons of coals, besides 20 tons in her bunkers, bound to London, and as soon as she was clear of the piers she was put upon an E. by S. course for the purpose of getting a good offing. Having been kept for about seven minutes on that course, during which it was estimated that she had gone about a mile, the course was altered to S.E. by S., and she was kept on that course until about 8.15. At 8.15 the course was altered to S.S.E. 1/2 E., and she was kept on that course, going full speed, and making from 8 to 8 1/2 knots, until 12.10, when it was estimated that they had run 38 miles, and were off the Whitby High Lights, and at a distance of about 3 miles from the land. During all this time the weather had been more or less hazy over the land, so that no shore lights could be seen, but they had passed several steamers going northwards on the one side as well as on the other, and had seen their lights. From 12.10 a.m. the course, according to the captain, was S. by E. 1/2 E., to make Flamborough Head, and that course was continued until shortly before the ship struck, except that they ported twice for a short time to clear meeting vessels. During all this time the weather had remained more or less hazy over the land, but not so much so as to prevent their seeing approaching vessels in time to avoid them; and there was a light breeze from the S.W., with a smooth sea. At 2.20 a.m., however, the weather became so thick and foggy that it was necessary to slow the engines, and from that time they were kept going sometimes at half-speed, sometimes at slow, until 3.10, when the master, not hearing the fog horn on Flamborough Head, ordered the boatswain to get the lead ready to take a cast, and just as they were about to do so the look-out man on the top-gallant forecastle called out "land ahead and on the starboard bow," upon which orders were at once given to hard-a-starboard the helm, but before she had paid off half a point, she struck the rocks on her starboard side and became fast. Rockets were thereupon sent up, and at about 6.30 a.m. some fishermen came on board, and it was then found that the ship had gone ashore on Thornwick Scar, some two miles to the north of Flamborough Head. With the assistance of the fishermen a portion of the cargo was jettisoned; but on the tide rising it was found that the water was rising as rapidly inside as it was outside, until it filled the engine room and put out the fires. Ultimately the vessel broke her back, and became a total wreck.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion is asked is, "Whether safe and " proper courses were set between 7.10 p.m. and mid- " night of the 11th February?" It was the chief mate's watch from 8 p.m. to midnight, and there is a trifling discrepancy between him and the master as to the courses steered during that time. According to the master the course steered from 8.15 to midnight was S.S.E. 1/2 E. by the bridge compass; according to the mate the course steered from 8 p.m. was S.E. by S., from 9 p.m. S.S.S. 1/2 E., and from 10 p.m. S.S.E. 1/4 E., and that course was continued till midnight, when he went below. The difference between them is not very great, but whatever the course was there is no reason to think that it was not a safe and proper course, as it took them clear of the Whitby Buoy, but how far outside of it no one can possibly say.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify " the assumed position of the vessel at and after mid- " night of the 11th?" At midnight, or rather at 10 minutes after midnight, the captain, finding by the log that they had run 38 miles, estimated that they were off Whitby High Lights, but how far from the land could only be a matter of conjecture, for the lights were not visible, and he took no steps to satisfy himself as to the vessel's position, either by taking a cast of the lead, or otherwise.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper alteration was then made in the " course, and whether due and proper allowance was " made for tide or current?" The course at 12.10 was altered to S. by E. 1/2 E., but whether this was or was not a safe and proper course on which to put the vessel, would depend entirely on the distance at which they were from the land when they were abreast of Whitby High Lights. The master estimated that they were then 3 miles off, and if a S. by E. 1/2 E. course had been made good from that point, it would no doubt have taken her a mile and a half outside Flamborough Head; but we have no evidence, nor had the master any assurance that they were at a distance of 3 miles from the Whitby High Lights when they passed them; and from the fact of her having struck to the north of Flamborough Head, we know that the course steered could not have been a safe and proper one.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Having " regard to the state of the weather, was the speed of " the vessel sufficiently reduced?" Before 2.20 a.m. the weather does not appear to have been so foggy as to make it necessary for them to reduce the speed of the vessel to clear any vessels which they might meet, but after 2.20 a.m. there can be no doubt that the weather became very foggy indeed, so much so, that according to some of the witnesses, a light could not be seen at more than a ship's length off; and from this time we are told the speed of the vessel was reduced, sometimes to slow, and sometimes to half speed.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the neglect of the lead was justifiable?" In our opinion the neglect of the lead was in this case wholly unjustifiable. From the time of leaving Sunderland until the vessel struck they saw no shore lights at all, so that the only way in which the master could ascertain his true position was by taking a cast of the lead. Had he done so when he was off Whitby High Lights, it would have shewn him at what distance he was from the shore, and on what course therefore he ought to put the vessel to clear Flamborough Head. Again, when the weather became so thick and foggy that it was not possible to see more than about a ship's length off, he should have taken a cast of the lead, and he would then have found that he was in about 14 to 16 fathoms of water, and therefore very much too near the shore. In our opinion the neglect of the lead was in this case quite unjustifiable.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" To continue going ahead when the fog was so dense that they could not see more than a ship's length off, and without taking any steps to ascertain the vessel's position by a cast of the lead, was neither proper nor seamanlike conduct. The master it seems has been for the last 16 years in command of this vessel, for the most part engaged in carrying coals from the northern ports to London, so that he has been in the habit of passing Flamborough Head on his way to the south some 45 to 50 times in the course of each year. He felt satisfied therefore that he was on a right course. It was, as Mr. Roche remarked, a case of over confidence, which has resulted in the loss of this vessel and her cargo.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the stranding?" The cause of the stranding probably was that the vessel, when they passed the Whitby High Lights, was much nearer to the shore than the master expected, added to the porting of the helm twice to avoid meeting steamers.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cost of the vessel to her owners?" The managing owner has told us that she cost them originally 13,200l.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "What " was her value at the time she left on her last voyage?" She seems to have been a good vessel, classed 90 A 1 at Lloyd's, and, although built in the year 1869, she was well kept up, so that she retained her class to the last. The owner estimated her to be worth when she was lost, 8,000l., and seeing that she was at the time in constant employ, we are not prepared to say that that is too high a value for them to put upon her.

The tenth question which we are asked is "What " were the insurances effected on her, and how were " they apportioned?" The owner told us that up to last January she was insured for 9,000l., but that the insurances were then reduced to 8,000l., 5,000l. on the hull and 3,000l. on the machinery, one half being insured at Lloyd's, the other half in the Mutual clubs. Besides this, there were no other insurances of any kind upon either the vessel, the cargo, the freight, premiums, commissions, advances, or outfit.

Lastly, it is said that "in the opinion of the Board " of Trade, the certificate of the master should be " dealt with." It seems that this gentleman has been in the service of the Lambton Company for 20 years, and that he has, as I have said, commanded this vessel for the last 16 years, which is in itself a sufficient guarantee of his past good conduct. On the present occasion too he seems to have been on the bridge from the time of leaving Sunderland, except when he had to go into the chart room to lay down the vessel's course. It is not one of those cases in which the master has been entirely neglectful of his duties; it is, as I have said, a case of over confidence, owing to the number of times that he has been up and down this coast. Moreover, he gave his evidence in a very straightforward way, and it is very painful to the Court to have to deal with the certificate of a gentleman who has had so long and so good a service. At the same time the neglect of the lead is so fruitful a cause of disaster, and has in the present case led to the total loss of this vessel and her cargo, for which the master can make no compensation, that we feel that we should not be justified if we did not deal with his certificate. Looking however at all the facts, we shall suspend it for a period of only three months.

The Court further, on the application of Mr. Roche, agreed to recommend that during the suspension of his master's certificate he should be allowed a chief mate's certificate.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

WM. PARFITT,

T. DAVIES,

Assessors.

L 367. 2625. 180.—3/86. Wt. 408. E. & S.