Wreck Report for 'Hudson Bay', 1886

(No. 2848.)

"HUDSON BAY."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Glasgow, on the 12th day of March 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain WILSON, Vice-Admiral PICKARD, and Captain ANDERSON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the sailing ship "HUDSON BAY," of Glasgow, and the loss of the lives of 15 of her crew, off the Coast of South Africa on the 10th ultimo.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that when the said vessel sailed from Samarang on her last voyage she was, so far as relates to the hull and equipments, in a good and seaworthy condition, that she had sufficient stability as laden, was not, so far as appears from the evidence before the Court, overladen, nor undermanned, and that her loss was probably due to the cargo having shifted, owing to its not having been properly stowed.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 12th day of March 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

R. WILSON,

BENJN. S. PICKARD,

ABSM. ANDERSON,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Glasgow on the 12th day of March instant, when Mr. Donald appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Spens for the owners and master of the "Hudson Bay." Five witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Donald handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Spens then addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Donald having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Hudson Bay," which was a three-masted iron sailing ship, belonging to the port of Glasgow, of 1,642 tons gross, and 1,559 tons net register, was built at Port Glasgow in the year 1882, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. John Smith Hatfield, of No. 49, West George Street, Glasgow, and others, Mr. Hatfield being the managing owner. She left New York in December 1884 with a cargo of paraffin oil in cases, bound for Shanghai, and having there discharged her cargo, proceeded in ballast to Sourabaya, and thence to Lassem in Java, where she took in about 720 tons of sugar in baskets. From Lassem she proceeded to Samarang, and having taken in 1,812 tons more of sugar, also in baskets, she left on the 20th of November last with a crew of 25 hands all told, bound to Queenstown or Falmouth for orders. At about 9 p.m. of the 8th of January following, Cape St. Francis Light on the east coast of South Africa was sighted, bearing N. 3/4 E., distant about 16 miles, the wind at the time blowing fresh from the N.W., and the vessel on the starboard tack heading about W.S.W. During the night the wind increased, and accordingly sail was shortened, until at 4 a.m. the following morning they were under three lower topsails and fore topmast staysail. At 4.30 a.m., the wind having still further increased, the mizen topsail and fore topmast staysail were taken in, and they continued their course under lower fore and main topsails until 6,30 a.m., when a sudden squall struck the vessel, throwing her on her beam ends, and putting the lee rail under water. Seeing that she did not right herself, the captain set the two jibs, fore topmast staysail and whole foresail, with the object of getting her before the wind; but finding that this did not succeed, he took the sails in again, and, after consultation with his officers, cut away the main and mizen topmasts. The vessel, however, still continued to lie over on her port side with the lee rail under water, and during the day the two boats on the lee side were washed away. The master accordingly secured the other two boats by taking them off their chocks and lashing them to the rail on the starboard side; and as the barometer was rising, and there was a prospect of the wind and sea going down, it was agreed to remain by the ship. During the night the vessel remained in the same position, but at about 3 a.m. next day, the 10th, she suddenly began to go over, and before the crew had time to save themselves, she turned bottom upwards and went down. At the time when she began to go over there were about one-half of the crew on deck, the other half being below. Three of the hands, however, got into the lifeboat forward and cut the lashings, and as she floated off the deck they shoved her clear before the vessel went down. They then proceeded to pick up as many of the crew as remained afloat, and ultimately ten, including the master, were saved, but the remaining fifteen, including the two mates, were drowned. On the following day, the 11th, they fell in with an American vessel called the "Southern Cross," which took them on board, and landed them on the 13th at Cape Town.

These being the facts of the case, the first question on which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken by the owners of this " vessel to ascertain her stability, and to furnish the " master with such information as was necessary to the " safe and proper loading of the vessel?" In accordance with the usual and almost invariable practice of shipowners and shipbuilders no attempt was made to ascertain the stability of this vessel, or to furnish the master with any information to enable the vessel to be safely and properly laden, although the cost of so doing would probably not have exceeded some 25l. or 30l.

The second question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether the master was justified in " discharging all the ballast before taking in the cargo " of sugar?" This question seems to have been put under a misconception of the evidence which would be given. We are not aware that the ballast was discharged before the cargo was taken in. No doubt the ballast was all discharged at Lassen, but as we understand only as the cargo which was there shipped was put into her.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " the cargo was properly stowed and secured from " shifting?" We were told that at Lassen, where they had plenty of time, the cargo was well stowed, but that at Samarang there was rather more haste. But whether this be so or not, it appears clear that the way in which they stowed the cargo, placing the baskets in with books without applying any pressure, was hardly calculated to secure it from shifting.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether, " when the vessel left Samarang, she was in all respects " in good and seaworthy condition, and whether she " was then overladen?" The vessel was built in 1882 under special survey, and was classed 100 A 1 at Lloyd's, and seems to have been well kept up ever since. She was put into dry dock at New York in December 1884, and surveyed, and was again examined by Lloyd's agent at Sourabaya shortly before she commenced taking in her cargo of sugar, and was continued in her class. There can therefore be little doubt that when she left Samarang, she was, so far as her hull and equipments were concerned, in good and seaworthy condition. We are also asked whether she was overladen. No evidence, however, has been laid before us on the subject, further than that on leaving Samarang she drew 21 feet on an even keel, and had a freeboard of 4 feet 10 inches, but whether that was or was not as much as she should have had under Lloyd's last rules, there is nothing to show. The assessors are, however, of opinion that it was sufficient.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether, " as laden, the vessel had sufficient stability?" I have already stated that the vessel was never inclined, and that no calculations were ever made as to her stability. We were told, however, by Mr. Lithgow, a partner in the firm of Messrs. Russel & Co., the builders, that about a year since they built an almost sister ship to her, the "River Falloch," and that they did incline that vessel, and did calculate her stability, and although he is not prepared to say that they were identical in all respects, he stated that for all practical purposes the two vessels would give the same results. He also told us that in the "River Falloch" the position of the metacentre when she was empty was 19.7 feet above the bottom of the keel, and her centre of gravity 17.85 feet, giving her a metacentric height of 1.85 feet. He said also that they had made calculations in his office as to what would be the vessel's metacentric height laden as the "Hudson Bay" was with a cargo of 2,532 tons of sugar, and they had found that the position of the metacentre would be 18.3 feet above the bottom of the keel, and of the centre of gravity 16.4 feet, giving a metacentric height of 1.9 feet. The conclusion then to which he came was, that the "Hudson Bay" would, laden as she was, have had a metacentric height of a little under 2 feet, which he considered would be a very fair allowance, making her neither too stiff nor too tender. I should add that Mr. Lithgow's evidence is in a measure confirmed by that of the master, who told us that on one voyage she had carried a cargo of 2,550 tons of sugar in mats from the Philippine Islands to New York, and that she had on that occasion behaved perfectly well; that he had also brought a full cargo of rice from Rangoon to Liverpool, and that on that occasion also she behaved well, and showed no tendency either to instability or to excessive stiffness. Under these circumstances, and there being no other evidence on the point before us, we have no option but to hold that the vessel as laden had sufficient stability.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " shortly after leaving Samarang the vessel had a list " to port, and subsequently to starboard, whether the " cargo shifted from side to side, and if so, whether " proper measures were taken to remedy it?" This question also seems to have been put under a misapprehension, for there is no evidence that the cargo shifted from side to side. It is true that on leaving Samarang the vessel had a slight list to port, and that, owing to her having had the wind constantly on that side, she got a slight list to starboard; but we were told that it was advisable that she should on leaving Samarang have a slight list to port, for that they knew that they would have the trade winds on that side in going through the Indian Ocean, and that this would, as it in fact did, cause the cargo to settle over to starboard, and thus give her a slight list to that side.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the vessel going over on her beam " ends on the morning of the 9th January, and whether " proper and sufficient measures were adopted during " the day to get the vessel upright?" It has been suggested that the cause of her going over was that the cargo not having been securely stowed in the hold, shifted over to port when she was thrown upon her beam ends, and this added to the water upon the lee side of the deck kept her down. And that in our opinion was no doubt the cause of the list which she got. Every effort was however made by the master and crew to right her again, first by setting the head sails so as to get her before the wind, and finding that that did not succeed, by cutting away the main and mizen topmasts, but unfortunately without success.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was sufficiently manned, and if she was " not sufficiently manned, whether this had any bearing " upon the casualty, i.e., whether the crew were " able to shorten sail in time, and take all other " reasonable precautions for the safety of the ship?" The vessel had a crew of 25 hands all told, consisting of a master, two mates, boatswain, carpenter, cook, steward, 15 able seamen, and 3 ordinary seamen. In the opinion of the assessors that was a sufficient crew for her; but whether it was or not, it had nothing whatever to do with the casualty, for when it occurred the vessel was under only lower fore and main topsails, and it does not appear that there had been any difficulty in shortening sail.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken on the night of the " 9/10th January to ensure the safety of the lives of " the crew?" It appears to us that no steps could have been taken other than those that were taken. The master very properly consulted his officers and his crew as to whether they would prefer to remain by the ship or to take to the boats, and they unanimously decided that it would be better to remain by the ship as long as they could do so.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the vessel capsizing and foundering " on the morning of the 10th of January?" The cause of the vessel capsizing and foundering on the morning of the 10th January was that she had gone so far over that she had no righting moment left, and as a necessary consequence she must ultimately go down.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, " Whether the master is in default, and whether " blame attaches to the owner?" In our opinion no blame whatever attaches to the master, who appears to have done his duty throughout. Nor indeed can we attribute blame to the owners. At the same time it does appear to us to be a matter for the serious consideration of all owners whether they are justified in sending vessels to sea, and thus risking the lives of those on board, without first ascertaining what amount of stability they have and how they can best be laden.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cost of the vessel to her owners?" According to Mr. Hatfield, the contract price for the vessel was 20,000l., but he tells us that before she was completed the value of shipping had risen, so that she was well worth at that time 22,000l.

The thirteenth question which we are asked is "What " was her value when she last left the United King- " dom?" The vessel had been running for three years, during which time vessels have fallen very considerably in value; and the assessors are of opinion that a new vessel equally good in all respects could then have been bought for 10l. a ton on the gross tonnage, or for 16,420l.

The fourteenth question which we are asked is "What " were the insurances effected, and how were they " apportioned?" The vessel, we are told, was insured for 19,000l., and the freight for 5,000l. The freight it seems was 40s. a ton, and would have amounted to a little less than 5,000l., but of this 500l. had been advanced.

Lastly, it is said that "in the opinion of the Board of " Trade the certificate of the master should be dealt " with." That, however, does not appear to be the opinion of Mr. Donald, who represents the Board of Trade on this occasion; and we quite concur with him in thinking that there is not a particle of evidence which would justify us in dealing with this master's certificate.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

R. WILSON,

BENJ. S. PICKARD,

ABSM. ANDERSON,

Assessors.

L 367. 2627, 180.—3/86. Wt. 408. E. & S.