Wreck Report for 'Oregon', 1886

(No. 2900.)

"OREGON" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Liverpool, on the 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd days of April 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain METHVEN, Captain KNOX, R.N., and Captain WILSON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the Steamship "OREGON," on the 14th of March 1886.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the loss of the said vessel is due to her having come into collision with some unknown schooner, by which two large holes were made in her side, one of which opened into No. 3 hold, the other into the coal bunker; and to their not having been able either to stop the said holes, or to close one of the doors in the bulkhead which separated the coal bunker from the stokehole, whereby three of the compartments became filled with water; and that William George Matthews, the chief officer, who was in charge of the deck at the time, is to blame for not having kept so vigilant a look out as under the circumstances he should have done, seeing that the vessel was at the time going at full speed, and making nearly 20 miles an hour.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 22nd day of April 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

R. METHVEN,

HENRY KNOX,

Captain R.N.,

R. WILSON,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Liverpool on the 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd days of April 1886, when Mr. Mansel Jones appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Kennedy, Q.C., and Mr. Hope for the owners, master, and officers of the "Oregon." Thirty-four witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade, and one by Mr. Kennedy, and the depositions of two witnesses taken at New York having been put in and read, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Kennedy then addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Mansel Jones having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Oregon" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Liverpool, of 7,375 tons gross and 3,529 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 2,000 horse power. She was built at Fairfield, Govan, in the county of Lanark, in the year 1883, and at the time of her loss was the property of the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited, Mr. Thomas Boumphrey, of No. 8, Water Street, Liverpool, being the manager. She left Liverpool on the 6th of March last, with a crew of 255 hands all told, 641 passengers, and a general cargo, bound to New York; and at noon of the 13th of the same month had arrived in latitude 40° 42' north and longitude 66° 30' west, which would put her, we are told, at a distance of some 346 miles from Sandy Hook. From there she proceeded on a south 85° west course, occasionally sounding, until a quarter to 6 p.m., when she was stopped to take an accurate cast of the lead; and believing himself to be on the parallel of Sandy Hook, the master then altered the course to N. 87° W., and she continued on that course till about 10 p.m., when it was altered to N. 85° W. to allow for the change of variation. Between midnight and 3.15 a.m. the master, who was frequently on and off the deck during this watch, took three observations of the pole star, at 12, 1.30, and 3.15, which gave him 40° 21', 40° 23', and 40° 25', shewing a difference of only 4 miles. At 4 a.m. the chief officer took charge, and from that time until the casualty he was on the upper bridge attending to the navigation of the vessel; the fourth officer was on the top of the midship wheel-house conning the ship; there were two men on the whale back forward, one on each bow, looking out; there was another man on the fore part of the promenade deck; there were two quartermasters in the midship wheel-house, one steering, the other standing by; and there was another quartermaster in the after wheel house under the turtle back. In accordance with Rule 18 of the Company's Regulations, that, "when nearing a port, the mails, passengers' " baggage, &c., must be got ready for immediate land- " ing," orders had been given at 2 a.m. that the mails should be got up; and accordingly at 4 a.m. the extra second officer, whose duty it would ordinarily be to assist the chief officer in keeping a look-out on the whale back forward, was at hatch No. 1, which is under the whale back, superintending the getting up of the mail bags, and placing them under the fore part of the promenade deck. We are told that at this time the night was clear but dark, but whether there was or was not more or less of haze on the water, the witnesses are not agreed; the wind was blowing a fresh breeze from about W. by N., and the vessel was proceeding at full speed, making from 17 to 18 knots, and heading about W. 1/2 N. She thus proceeded until about 4.30 a.m., when a light was suddenly observed about a point on the port bow, upon which the chief officer, who was at the time standing on the starboard side of the upper bridge, at once ordered the helm to be put hard-a-port, but within 40 or 50 seconds after the light had been seen, and before the "Oregon" had had time to answer her helm, some object or other struck them a little forward of the bridge on the port side, making two large holes in the side, one about 6 feet by 4 feet opening into No. 3 hold, and the other about 14 feet further aft, about 2 or 3 feet across, opening into the coal bunker. No time was lost by the chief officer in at once stopping the engines and sending the fourth officer down to call the captain, and the vessel continued to come round under her port helm, until she stopped, heading then about N.N.E. It seems that at the moment of the collision there was a man in the port side of the coal bunker, shovelling coals into the passage which led from the fore part of the stoke-hole through the coal bunker to No. 3 hold; and the rush of water through the side of the vessel into the coal bunker swept him into the passage, and thence into the stoke-hole, together with coals, shovels, barrows, and other articles that were lying about. Orders were at once given to close the door leading from this passage into the stoke-hole, but it was found impossible to do so; and at length they were obliged to leave the stoke-hole, having first, however, closed all the other doors in the bulk-head separating it from the coal bunker, and to cut off the communication between the stoke hole and the engine-room, to prevent the latter being flooded. In the meantime the master, having ascertained the state of affairs below, and not seeing anything of the vessel with which they had been in collision, ordered the engines to be set on ahead, giving the chief engineer directions to keep the steam going as long as possible, and put the vessel with her head to the north towards Long Island, which was distant about 24 miles, intending either to get her into shallow water, or, if necessary, to beach her. Orders were then given to shut all the bulkhead doors, and to swing out the boats and lower them down to the rail; and this was accordingly done. The captain then directed all his efforts to stop the holes in the vessel's side, but in vain, and the water continued to flow into No. 3 hold, as well as into the coal bunker, whence it found its way through the open door at the end of the passage into the stokehole. In the meantime the vessel continued her course towards Long Island until about 6.30 a.m., when the steam becoming exhausted, the engines stopped. Before this, however, steam had been got up in the donkey boiler, and in this manner they were able to keep the engine-room tolerably clear of water; the hand pumps were also rigged and set to work; but the water continued to gain, and the three compartments, which were in the forward part of the vessel, as they filled, put the vessel more and more down by the head. Towards break of day two steamers were sighted, one about 6 miles off and to the south of them, and which is supposed to have been the "City of Berlin;" the other to the northward, and a little further off, and which is believed to have been a coasting steamer. Signals were made to them, but they passed on without stopping, owing probably to their not having seen the signals. At about 7 a.m. a pilot schooner came up, upon which orders were given to lower the boats into the water, and a number of the passengers and crew were sent to her; and a coasting schooner also coming up, others were also sent to her; three rafts also, which were secured on the turtle back aft, were got into the water, and some of the crew and male passengers got on to them and pushed off. When all the passengers had been got out of her, the officers and crew proceeded to save some of the mail bags, but the vessel continuing to sink by the head it was found necessary to batten down the hatches and to close all the deck openings forward, and all hands then left her, the master and the chief officer being the last to leave. In about an hour afterwards the "Oregon" foundered, going down by the head, but righting as she sank, leaving the topmasts above water. We were told by the master that she sank in about latitude 40° 81' north and longitude 72° 44' west, and at a distance of about 16 miles from the shore. Shortly afterwards the German vessel, the "Fulda," came up, and, having taken them all on board, landed them at New York.

These being the facts of the case, a number of questions have been put to us by the Board of Trade; and in dealing with them I propose to follow the course taken by Mr. Mansel Jones, and to deal first with question 5. That question is as follows, "Did the " vessel, with which the ' Oregon' is said to have come " into collision, carry proper side lights in the manner " provided by the Regulations for Preventing Colli- " sions at Sea?" The question assumes that the holes in the vessel's side were caused by a collision with some other vessel; there seems, however, to have been a very strong impression in some quarters that the casualty was caused by a collision with an iceberg or ice floe, or by dynamite, or by some explosion in the engine room. It will be well therefore to examine somewhat carefully the evidence on the point, the more so as not a trace has been found of any vessel with which the "Oregon" might have been in collision, nor is there any vessel which is known to have been about the spot reported as being missing.

The evidence, then, to which I will first call attention is that of Mr. Matthews, the chief officer, who was at the time in charge of the vessel, and was, when the light was first reported, standing on the starboard side of the upper bridge. He said, "I saw a white light " one point on our port bow, which was visible for " about three seconds. I immediately ordered the " helm to be put hard-a-port. In 40 or 50 seconds " afterwards we were run into by a fore and aft rigged " schooner. I saw the sails of the vessel about eight " seconds before she struck us." "The light," he goes on to say, "was like a pilot boat's light. I saw it for " only two or three seconds, and then it disappeared." He adds that he saw no other light but a white light. Then we have Mr. McMonnies, the fourth officer, who was conning the ship, and he said, "I saw a white light " on our port bow. It just flashed up for a moment, " and disappeared. It was about one point on the port " bow. I reported it, and the first officer said, ' All " right, I see it.' I saw her distinctly standing across " our course to the northward. She was fore and aft " rigged. I cannot say what sails she had set. She " was on the port tack, heading N.W. by N. to N.N.W. " I did not see her side lights. I think fifty seconds " elapsed between my seeing the flash and the colli- " sion." The next witness is Bartelt, the look-out man stationed on the port bow. He said, "I saw a " flash light, which shewed like a flare up for a second " or two a point on our port bow. I reported it, but " I could not hear if it was answered, there was so " much wind. I saw nothing after that until a second " or two before she struck us, when I saw a green light. " It was a very poor light—just a glimpse of it I saw. " The next thing I saw was the jib and fore staysail. " They were coming right into where I was stand- " ing. The jibboom came in, and carried away the " stanchions and rails forward of the fore rigging. " She left a piece of her jibboom between the fore " swifter and the second shroud. Then I saw " another piece, abaft the fore rigging, sticking in " the topmast shroud; it was about eighteen inches " long. I never saw any but the green light;" that is to say, that he did not see the red light. The next witness is a man named Howgate, who was stationed on the starboard bow forward; he says, "I saw a flare- " up light at 4.20, a point on the port bow. I did not " report it, for the other man did so. I saw a green " light also about 1 1/2 points on the port bow. I saw a " schooner, three masted, fore and aft rigged. 1 saw " the vessel after the flare up was out. I saw her fore " sail, main sail, mizen, jib, and stay sail. Her jib- " boom struck our rail on the fore side of the fore " rigging, on the port side. I am certain it was the " jibboom. After daylight I saw about two feet of the " jibboom between our fore rigging and the break- " water." The next witness is Rogers, who was stationed on the fore part of the promenade deck; and he said, "1 saw a flash light one point on the port bow. " I was then on the port side. It was visible very few " seconds. I didn't hear it reported, but I reported it. " I saw nothing until I saw the vessel strike us on fore " part of fore rigging. I saw what I took to be her " jibboom strike us. As she passed me, I caught sight " of a red light, just a glimpse. I took her to be fore " and aft rigged." The next witness is Cunningham; he was in the after wheel-house, and seeing from the indicator that the midship wheel had been put "hard-a-port," he came out of the wheel-house, and looked over the port side, and he says, "I saw a white light, a " flare up. She was a three-masted schooner. She was " fore and aft rigged with main sail, fore sail, and mizen. " Her head sails were all gone. I saw a plain white " light, when she got astern of us. I took it to " be in her mizen rigging. I saw no other " light." The next witness is Cruise, the master-at-arms; he was under the whale-back forward, and was assisting to get up the mails; and occasionally looking out as they were expecting to get a sight of the lights. He said, "At about 4.25 I saw a white " light close under our bow—a flash light. It could " not have been a binnacle light, because it would not " have shewn the sails and masts above, which it did. " I saw two masts, and could see that she was a fore " and aft rigged vessel. I thought at first that it was a " pilot boat, and that she would come into No. 1 gang- " way." He then said, "I stood there till she passed " the gangway; and then I could see she was a three- " masted schooner." The next man is Lacey; he said, " I was carrying the mail bags to the port side of the " deck, when I saw the reflection of a light. It caused " me to turn round, and I saw a bright flare-up light. " I was under the fore part of the promenade deck. " On my way back after depositing the mail bag, " I noticed another light—a white light. The first " was a flare-up light. I made out a schooner quite " close. It was a three-masted schooner, and she had " her fore, main, and mizen sails set. I sang out that " there was a schooner coming right into us." He then says, "I ran aft, and when I got right aft, I saw " a red light, an ordinary red light, such as vessels " carry at sea. I could see her indistinctly." Code was the next witness; he also was under the whale-back arianging the mail bags, and he says, "I saw a dark " object just abreast of where I was standing. I ran " aft, and then saw a light, but I cannot say whether " it was a bright light or a red light." Then there is Whittle, the boatswain; he also was getting up the mail bags, and he says, "I felt the shock " and then went aft right on to the turtleback, and " then I saw the loom of a vessel astern, and a red " light—not a very bright one, an ordinary red light. " I watched it, and it remained in sight, while I was " there." I think I have now read the evidence of all those who saw either the vessel or the lights which she shewed; and if their evidence is to be believed, and I know no reason why it should not be, there can be no doubt whatever that it was with a vessel that the "Oregon" came into collision; that that vessel was a three-masted schooner; and that she was standing across their course, apparently close-hauled on the port tack. The nature of the damage also shews that the vessel must have been approaching in the way described by the witnesses, for we find first that some of the rails and stanchions immediately forward of the fore rigging were carried away, and that portions of the jibboom were left on board; then there was a hole a little further aft, through the side into the 'tween decks, apparently from the end of the bowsprit; and then two holes a little before the upper bridge, one opening into No. 3 hold, and caused apparently by the stem of the vessel striking stem on, the other about 14 feet further aft, caused probably by the cat head. In the direction too in which they were approaching one another, the schooner would, before the "Oregon" had crossed her bows, have had her starboard side towards them, and be shewing her green light, but after the collision, and when she had fallen astern, she would have her port side towards them, and be shewing her red light; which would account for the green light having been seen by the two look-out men before she struck, and the red light by the men, who saw her from the turtle-back, when she had dropped astern. The evidence is quite consistent throughout, and shews further that she had her coloured lights in position, the green light on the. starboard side, and the red light on the port side, for they were both seen; but whether they were burning brightly or not is a question which we shall presently have to consider.

I will now proceed to deal with questions 1 and 2; they are as follow:—"(1) Whether a good and proper " look-out was kept on board the 'Oregon' on the " morning of the 14th of March," and "(2) Was there " anything in the state of the weather or the position " of the vessel to render it dangerous or imprudent to " run the vessel at full speed?" This is by far the most important question which we have to decide; and unfortunately there is a discrepancy between the officers and the men as to what the state of the weather was at the time in question. According to the men it was a dark night with starlight overhead, but with a haze on the water, rendering it difficult to see vessels and even lights at any distance. According to the officers the night, though dark, was clear, without any haze on the water, and very favourable for seeing lights at all events, and according to some of them for seeing even dark objects, one of the officers going so far as to say that he could on that night have seen a vessel without lights at a distance of two miles. It appears to me, however, that we are here placed in a position of some difficulty-; if on the one hand we accept the statements of the men that there was a haze on the water, which rendered it difficult to see a vessel with or without lights at any distance, a question would arise, whether the "Oregon" would under those circumstances be justified in going at a speed of 17 to 18 knots, or. nearly 20 miles an hour. On the other hand, if the account of the officers is to be accepted, that it was a dark, clear, starlight night, very favourable for seeing vessels, it is difficult to understand why, if there had been a good and proper look-out on board the "Oregon," the schooner was not seen sooner. Objection was taken, and with some reason, by the captain to the evidence of those men, who were under the whale-back assisting to bring up the mail bags from No. 1 hatch, and who would necessarily have had lights for the purpose; but the objection hardly applies to the look-out men, who were stationed on the whale-back, or on the fore part of the promenade deck; they may, however, have had other reasons, to which we shall presently refer, for saying that it was not a good night for seeing objects at a distance. Another objection taken was that the schooner's green light must have been a bad one, for that otherwise it must have been seen by the first and fourth officers; but the fact that it was not seen by them is, as we all know, no evidence either that it was not there, or that the light was not a proper one; for that the green light was there we know from the evidence of the two look-out men, but that it was not a good one is a mere matter of inference from its not having been seen soon enough. According, however, to the master the reason why the vessel was not seen sooner was on account of the peculiar state of the atmosphere on that night; he said that there had been a slight aurora borealis, making it light towards the north, but very dark to the south and west; and under those conditions he knew from experience that, although lights could be readily seen, it would be very difficult to see a dark object until you were close upon it. His idea was that the schooner's green light was nearly out, and that in the peculiar state of the atmosphere at the time they might be quite close upon the vessel before they would see her. A question, however, would then arise whether, if the atmosphere was in such a state that a dark object, as for instance a vessel without lights, could not be seen until they were so close to it that a collision was inevitable, the "Oregon" had any right to be going at a speed of some 18 knots, or nearly 20 miles, an hour. It is said that she would have a right to assume that any vessel which she might meet would have her lights properly exhibited and properly burning, and that in that case she would have seen her in sufficient time to have avoided her. No doubt a vessel is bound to carry her lights properly exhibited and burning brightly; but it may be doubted whether you have any right to run her down if she should not have her lights properly burning. It may be that a vessel's lights might have gone out accidentally, and might have been taken in to be retrimmed, or the vessel might have been abandoned by her crew, and be lying there without lights; or she might be an overtaken vessel, and owing to the neglect of those on board might have no light exhibited over the stern. All these are quite possible cases, and apart altogether from the consequences to the vessel, which may have neglected to shew a light, the danger to the other vessel, and to the lives of all on board her has to be considered. No doubt passengers are always anxious to get to their destination with the least possible delay, but I doubt much whether they would be prepared to admit that one of the risks, which they were willing to incur, was the chance of going to the bottom, if they met with some vessel which had no lights, and which they would be unable to avoid owing to the great speed at which they are going. I doubt much whether any vessel has a right to be going at such a speed that she would be quite unable to clear a dark object if she came across it; and it appears to me that vessels have no right to be going at full speed if, owing to haze or other cause, the atmosphere is in such a condition that they cannot see a dark object in sufficient time to avoid it. That, too, seems to be the view of the owners of the vessel, for Article 2 of their Regulations is in these words:—"The captains are to remember that, " whilst they are expected to use every diligence to " secure a speedy voyage, they must run no risk which " by any possibility might result in accident to their " ships. They will ever bear in mind that the safety of " the lives and property entrusted to their care is the " ruling principle, which should govern them in the navi- " gation of their ships, and no supposed gain in expedition, " or saving of time on the voyage is to be purchased at the " risk of accident." The italics are not mine, but are' in the Company's Regulations.

And now let me state what is the- view which the assessors take of this case. They think that we must accept the account which the master and officers have given us, that it was a dark, clear night, with starlight overhead, and without any haze on the water; and in which, therefore, it would not be either dangerous or imprudent to run the vessel at full spoed; and they are induced to think so from the fact that the master seems to have got three good observations of the pole star that morning, which he would hardly have done if there had been any haze on the horizon. The assessors also agree in thinking that it is quite possible that the schooner's green light may not have been burning very brightly, it being an hour of the night when the lights are apt to become dim, although there is no evidence that it was not a proper light, except the fact that it was not seen sooner. Assuming, however, that the green light was dim, ought she, or ought she not, to have been seen sooner, and in sufficient time for them to have cleared her. Captain Methven thinks that on such a night as the captain and officers describe, it is quite possible that they might not have been able to see the schooner until they were close upon her, however good the look-out might have been. On the other hand, Captain Knox and Captain Wilson think that the schooner ought on such a night to have been seen at a greater distance and in sufficient time for them to go clear of her. It appears to me, however, for the reasons already stated, that whichever view we take we must find the "Oregon" to blame; for if the night was so dark that it would not be possible to see the schooner without lights until she was close upon her, the "Oregon" ought not to have been going at such a rate; if, on the other hand, the schooner might and ought to have been seen sooner, the failure to see her must be due to the want of a good and proper lookout. For myself I am of course quite incompetent to form any opinion on the point, and I must therefore accept the decision of the majority of the assessors, that she was not seen as soon as she might and ought to have been, and that this was owing to the want of a good and proper look-out.

And now let us see how we are to account for the look-out being defective, when there were no less than five people so stationed as to be likely to see the approaching vessel, namely, the chief officer on the bridge, the fourth officer at the con, two seamen forward on the whale back, and one on the front of the promenade deck. And, first, as regards Mr. Matthews, who has given his evidence in a very straightforward manner; he told us that at the time of the collision his attention was-principally directed to the north, looking out for Shinnecock and Fire Island Lights on Long Island, which are the first seen on approaching Sandy Hook, and which it is important to keep in view to prevent the vessel getting too far to the northward of her course. This was how the chief officer was engaged, and his attention seems to have been first called to the light by Mr. McMonnies, the fourth officer, who said to him, "Do you see that light on the port bow," upon which Mr. Matthews replied, "Yes, I see it." As to Mr. McMonnies, he was at the con, and I am told by the assessors that, although he might occasionally be looking, out ahead, it would not be his duty to do so, his special duty being to attend to the steering of the vessel. Unfortunately, too, Mr. Ewing, the extra second officer, who would ordinarily be, as Mr. Matthews has told us, looking out from the whale back forward, and seeing that the two look-out men there were doing their duty, was engaged getting up the mail bags preparatory to their arrival at New York. Not only therefore was there no officer on the look-out forward, but the two look-out men on the whale back would be without that supervision which they would ordinarily have had. Now as regards the two look-out men forward they told us that the light was reported by them as soon as they saw it, which was some 40 or 50 seconds before the collision. Rogers, however, the man on the look-out on the fore part of the promenade deck, says that he did not hear the report from forward, but that he himself reported the light, but neither Mr. Matthews nor Mr. McMonnies appear to have heard it. All three men say that they reported the light, but their report was not heard by anyone. Now they have told us that there was a haze on the water, whereas the assessors have come to the conclusion that there could not have been any haze on the water, for, if there had been, the master would not have been able to get a good horizon to get such correct observations of the pole star as he seems to have done; and it has occurred to us that possibly the men may have invented the haze to account for their not having seen the vessel as soon as they ought to have done. Under all the circumstances of the case the conclusion to which the Court has come is, that the vessel might and ought to have been seen sooner than she was, that there was nothing in the state of the weather to prevent their doing so, and that the reason why she was not seen sooner was because there was not such a look-out on board the "Oregon" as there ought to have been. If vessels will go at the great speed at which this vessel was going, it is absolutely necessary that they should have the most vigilant and careful look-out possible, and this in our opinion she had not.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master was on deck at a time when the safe " navigation of the ship required his personal supervision?" The master has told us that during the preceding watch, when the second officer was in charge, he was continually up and down, and that between midnight and 3.15 a.m. he took three observations of the pole star for the purpose of fixing the vessel's position. He told us that he did not go upon the bridge, and he gave a very good reason for not doing so. He said that he wished that the officer in charge should feel that the sole responsibility for the safe navigation of the vessel depended upon his vigilance, although of course he took care to see that they were attending to their duties. He said also that he was anxious that they should not know when he came on deck, so that they might be always attentive to their duties. In our opinion the master appears to have been on deck at a time when the sefe navigation of the vessel required his supervision, and that there is no blame attaching to him for not having been there, when the casualty occurred.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "When a " light was sighted on the port bow, did the chief " officer take proper precautions to avoid a collision?" As soon as the chief officer saw the light on the port bow, he at once ordered the helm to be put hard-a-port ; and that that was done is proved by the evidence of the quartermaster in the after wheel house, who told us that there was an indicator there to shew any alteration that might be made in the midship wheel; and,, that, seeing that the wheel had been put hard-a-port, he went out of the wheel house to see what was the matter, and looking over the port quarter, saw the schooner come into them. The chief officer also told us that immediately on the collision occurring he stopped the engines, as it was his duty to do, and sent for the captain.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Did the " master comply with the provisions of Section 16 of " the Merchant Shipping Act, 1873, and, if not, was he " justified in neglecting to do so "The 16th Article of the Act of 1873 is in these words:—"In every case " of collision between two vessels, it shall be the duty " of the master or person in charge of each vessel, if " and so far as he can do so without danger to his own " vessel, crew, and passengers, if any, to stay by the " other vessel until he has ascertained that she has no " need of further assistance, and to render to the other " vessel, her master, crew, and passengers, if any, " such assistance as may be practicable, and as may be " necessary, in order to save them from any danger " caused by the collision," &c. On coming on deck, and assuming charge, the master at once looked aft, to see if he could discover the vessel with which they had been in collision. He did not lower a boat, and he gave a very good reason for not doing so, for he said that they could see better from the vessel than from a boat, and that, if they had seen her, they could have approached her more easily and more quickly with the ship. As soon, however, as he was informed of the state of affairs below—that No. 3 hold, as well as the coal bunker and stokehole. were fast filling with water, and that there was no means of preventing it—he put the vessel's head for Long Island, with a view, if possible, of getting her into shallow water, and, if necessary, of beaching her, before she sank; and we think that he was quite justified in doing so.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" Except in regard to the look-out, we think that the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the water-tight doors in the bulkhead were properly " and efficiently constructed, and were the best means " adopted for closing them efficiently in cases of emer- " gency?" A plan of the bulkhead separating the fore part of the stoke hole from the coal bunker has been brought in, and shows that there were in the lower hold three bunker slides, one in the centre and one on each side, each 4 feet 6 high by 2 feet 9 inches wide. and closed by slide-up doors. In addition to these there were two doorways, one on each side of the centre slide-up, opening into passages, which led from the fore part of the stoke hole through the coal bunker to No. 3 hold; they were each 6 feet high by 2 feet 9 wide, and were closed by doors moving horizontally to the centre. The object of these passages was to connect the stoke hole with No. 3 hold, which was used as a spare bunker, care being taken to empty it on the voyage out, so that it might be available for cargo on the homeward voyage. It was necessary to have a large number of openings between the bunkers and the stoke hole, the daily consumption of coal being about 280 tons, and the passages therefore were useful, even when No. 3 hold was empty, as it enabled them to remove coal from the further end of the bunker, and wheel it along the passages into the stoke hole; and this was what one of the coal trimmers was doing when the collision occurred. The way in which the doors at the end of the passages were closed and opened was by means of pinions fixed on spindles, which gear on racks bolted to the doors, the spindle being worked by a wheel in the upper part of the stokehole, which could be got at even when the stokehole was flooded; and to facilitate their horizontal movement the bottom of each door was fitted with two wheels or rollers. Now we were told that no sooner had the hole been made in the ship's side than the water rushed into -the coal bunker, and thence into the passage, and through it into the stokehole, carrying with it shovels, barrows, coal, and other debris, and at the same time blocking up the doorway; and the witnesses think that some of the small coal must have got between the door and the bulkhead, and falling to the bottom have clogged the wheels, and prevented the door from closing. The fact that the door could not be closed was not, in our opinion, due to any defect in the construction of the door, but simply to the small coal and other debris having got behind and under the door, and clogged the wheels. But although such a door is liable to be blocked by an accident such as this, it is, we are told, a form of door which is frequently found on board first-class passenger steamers, and even in Her Majesty's ships; and it has this advantage, that, being on rollers, it can ordinarily be more readily closed and opened, and moving horizontally the door has only to travel over a space of 2 feet 9 inches, whereas if it moved vertically it would have to travel over a space of about six feet. At the same time it is open to the very serious objection that the wheels may become clogged, and the door be thus prevented from closing, and in that case the loss of the vessel is almost inevitable; and it may be a matter for consideration whether it would not be better that the doors shoold in future be made to move vertically, there being, as we are informed by Mr. Bain, the superintending engineer to the Company, nothing to prevent their doing so; it would be safer. As shewing, too, the advantages of such a door, it may be mentioned that the chief engineer told us that, before he left the stokehole, he ordered all the slide-up doors to be closed, and finding that the centre one was not quite shut down, owing to something having got into it, he told one of the men to go and lift it, and then let it drop down, and it then closed perfectly.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Were " proper means taken to stop the leaks and save the " vessel?" The master, knowing that the chief danger to the vessel arose from the water that was coming into the coal bunker, and thence flowing through the passage into the stokehole, directed his attention first to the aftermost of the two holes, although it was the smaller; and with the view of stopping it a man named Houston was let down over the side, and mattresses having been lowered down to him he succeeded in putting three in succession over the hole, but they were immediately sucked into it, and on attempting to put a fourth over the hole, it was washed out of his hands, and at the same time his leg was sucked into the hole, and coming in contact with the jagged edges of the plates, he sustained so much injury, that it was found necessary to haul him up. The captain then endeavoured to plug the hole with a wooden platform, and with that view Mr. Hood, the second officer, and a seaman, were lowered over the side, and they succeeded in getting a handspike into the hole with a rope attached to the middle of it. In the meantime the carpenter had constructed a kind of platform with a hole through the centre to allow a rope to pass through, and it was lowered over the side, and an attempt was made to get it over the hole, hoping that the pressure of the water from the outside would keep it there. By the the time, however, that the platform was made, the vessel which had before had a list to starboard, had righted herself, thus putting the hole below the surface of the water, and it was found impossible to get it over the hole. This plan therefore, had to be abandoned, and a sail, weighted at the bottom with a piece of iron and a heavy iron block, was put over the side, but from some cause or other, owing probably to the holds being then nearly full of water, the sail could not be got close up to the side of the ship, and was therefore practically of no use. It appears to us that all proper means were taken to stop the leaks and save the vessel.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was supplied with boats in accordance " with the provisions of the Passenger Acts; and " whether they were in good condition and ready for " lowering?" According to the provisions of the Passengers Act the "Oregon" was required to have 7 boats, with a cubical capacity of 2160 cubic feet; as a fact she had 10 boats, with a cubical capacity of 3611 feet. She had, therefore, both in number and in the capacity of the boats, considerably more than she was required to have by the Passengers Act. She had also three rafts in addition. It is true that the boats and rafts together would have been very far from sufficient to take the whole of the crew and passengers, but, as was properly observed, you must regulate the number of your boats by the number of men on board who are capable of taking charge of them. And we can hardly have a better instance of the inutility of lowering boats without persons properly qualified to take charge of them, than that afforded by No. 2 boat, which put off with only some firemen and male passengers in her, and without a single seaman; the result being that it lay drifting about for between 4 and 5 hours before it could discharge its freight. But although the vessel seems to have been supplied with boats above the requirements of the Passengers Act, the assessors are of opinion that it would have been well if amongst her boats she had had a small steam launch, such as are now frequently found on board passenger vessels, and even on yachts. They think that such a boat would have been especially useful on the present occasion, not only to cut off one of the steamers which were sighted at daybreak, but to tow the boats with the passengers, mails, and crew to the pilot and coasting schooners. All the boats seem to have been in good condition, and ready for lowering; it was, indeed, suggested that the rudder of No. 2 boat was damaged, but we have no doubt that it was merely that the people who were in her did not know how to ship the rudder, and that it was, like the rest, in perfectly good order.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Was " there any want of discipline on the part of the " crew?" We are told that the crew of the "Oregon" consisted of a master, six officers, a carpenter, a joiner, a boatswain, a boatswain's mate, six quarter-masters, a lamp trimmer, and 35 A.B's, which would give 53 deck hands altogether; in addition to which she had eleven engineers and 111 firemen and trimmers, and these, with the stewards and other persons belonging to the passenger department, would make up the crew of 255 hands. The vessel then was, in our opinion, very well and fully manned, and was exceptionally well officered; five out of the six officers, which she had in addition to her master, holding master's certificates of competency. Now there was hardly any point on which the judgment of the Court, in the case of the "Austral," was more severely criticized than where it said that such a vessel ought in its opinion to have had six officers. It is true that the "Oregon" was a somewhat larger vessel than the "Austral," but I hold in my hand a list of ten vessels belonging to the Cunard Company, two of them about the same size, and four considerably smaller than the "Austral;" and all of these vessels, we are told, carry six officers. It was said, indeed, that the "Austral" had some quarter-masters on board who would be better than junior officers; but the "Oregon" had also six quarter-masters and her two extra officers were not junior officers, but extra second and extra third officers. Moreover, whereas the "Austral" when at sea had only one officer on watch, the "Oregon" had three officers, as well as three quarter-masters. I mention these facts to shew how exceptionally well manned and officered the "Oregon" was. Other facts must also be mentioned to shew the great care taken by the Company to prevent confusion in case of any accident occurring. It seems that every officer and man on board had each his special boat, to which he was to go in case of need; and a list of the boats with the names of the officers and men belonging to the sailing, engine room, and steward's departments which were assigned to each, with their fire and pumping stations, was hung up both in the fore and in the after part of the vessel; special men being also told off to attend to the closing of the iron doors in the water-tight bulkheads. To insure also that every man should know his post, it was the practice, on the day before the vessel sailed, to summon all hands to swing out and lower the boats, and to close the bulkhead doors; and whilst the vessel was at sea all the bulkhead doors were closed and opened every day before noon, to see that they were in perfect working order. Nothing, in fact, could have been more admirable than the regulations for the conduct of the officers and men, to insure discipline on board, or more calculated to prevent confusion or difficulty in case of emergency. It must, however, always happen that amongst a large body of men there will always be some, who from physical or mental weakness, are incapable of exercising that amount of self control, and of showing that regard for others which is so essential to prevent confusion in time of danger; and this would be all the more likely to occur in a case of this kind, where considerably more than two-thirds of those on board were passengers and of various nationalities, some of them, perhaps, ignorant of the language, and all, or almost all, ignorant of the extent of danger in which the vessel was. What happened then was what we might reasonably expect, namely, that there was some confusion at first, some eagerness to get into the boats as soon as the order was given to lower them into the water; and accordingly we find that one of the boats, No. 2, put off with only male passengers and firemen in her; and Mr. McMonnies, the fourth officer, told us that when he went to take charge of his boat he found several firemen and male passengers already in it, and that he thought it would be a saving of time to pull off with them rather than to force them to get out of it. These were, however, the only two instances of want of discipline which were brought to our notice; and after the first rush there seems to have been no confusion whatever; the women and children being the first to be passed into the boats and sent off to the pilot and coasting schooners. One fact, too, must not be omitted, as it reflects great credit on the lady concerned in it. It seems that the men were pressing about the rail trying to get into the boats, when one of the officers asked the lady to get in, but she said. "I am " in no hurry, I can wait," and immediately we are told the men retired, and allowed the women and children to get in. It should also be mentioned that the only portion of the crew who showed any want of discipline were a few of the hands belonging to the engine room department, and that not a single officer or seaman was shewn to have been otherwise than most anxious to perform his duty. As a proof of the discipline which prevailed generally on board the vessel, I may mention that, shortly before the vessel foundered, and before the "Fulda" had come up, the captain, thinking that there would not be sufficient provisions on board the schooners for the passengers and crew, sent for twelve firemen and twelve sailors to come on board to get up some more; they came immediately, but when they arrived it was found absolutely necessary to abandon the vessel. It appears to us that, except as to a very few, and those firemen and passengers, there was no want of discipline on board.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "Were " all the passengers and crew saved?" It seems that 641 passengers left Liverpool in her, but of these, one, a clergyman I think, threw himself overboard some days before, leaving 640 on board at the time of the casualty. We are told that it was difficult to count them, whilst they were on board the "Fulda," but that on the arrival of that vessel at New York, the people belonging to the "Oregon" were asked to pass out by the after gangway, and were counted as they went ashore, and that it was then found that all the 640 passengers, as well as the crew of 255 hands, had been saved.

The thirteenth question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the loss of the 'Oregon'?" The primary cause, no doubt, of the casualty was the collision with the unknown schooner; but even with those two large holes in her side opening into No. 3 hold and the coal bunker, we have no doubt that the vessel would have been saved and taken to New York, had they been able to close the door between the stokehole and the coal bunker. Strictly speaking, therefore, the loss of the vessel may be said to have been due to their inability to close that door.

The last question which we are asked is, "Were the " master and officers, or any of them, and if so, which " of them, in default?" And it is added that "the " Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificates of " the master, the chief officer, and the fourth officer " should be dealt with." According to the view taken by the assessors that it was a clear starlight night, without any haze on the water, and that they were justified in going at full speed, no blame would attach to Captain Cottier for having allowed her to do so. As regards the fourth officer, Mr. McMonnies, the assessors tell me that there was no special obligation upon him to keep a look-out; his duties were to con the ship, and to see that she was properly steered. The responsibility for keeping a good look-out rested with the chief officer, and with him alone. Unfortunately the extra second officer, who was in his watch, and whose duty it would ordinarily be to keep the look-out from the whale-back, was engaged seeing that the mail bags were being brought up on deck ready for landing. The chief officer himself was standing on the starboard side of the bridge looking out for Shinnecock and Fire Island Lights, trusting no doubt that the look-out men forward would be attending to their duties, and would warn him of the approach of any vessel in time to avoid her. This however they seem not to have done, for the chief and fourth officers said that they heard no report of the vessel from forward, and the chief officer's attention appears to have been called to her first by the fourth officer asking him if he saw that light. It is clear in our opinion that there was not a good and proper look-out on board, the blame for which must rest with the chief officer, who was in charge of the deck. Serious, however, as the loss has been to the owners of the "Oregon," as well as to the persons interested in the unfortunate schooner, it is not in our opinion a case in which we ought to deal with the chief officer's certificate. He has given his evidence in a very clear straightforward way, and although no doubt he was somewhat remiss in not keeping so vigilant a look-out ahead as the circumstances required, and was not perhaps sufficiently alive to the fact that he had not the assistance of the extra second officer to look-out from the whale-back ahead, it is hardly a case in which we should be disposed to deprive him of his certificate, thus stamping him as a person incompetent to take charge of a vessel.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

R. METHVEN,

HENRY KNOX,

Captain R.N.

R. WILSON,

Assessors.

L 367. 2679. 50.—5/86. Wt. E. & S.