Wreck Report for 'Acton', 1886

(No. 3008.)

"ACTON" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 23rd of September 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains WARD and CURLING, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "ACTON," of London, near St. Shots, Newfoundland, on the 12th ultimo, whilst on a voyage from Montreal to London.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said vessel was due to the negligent navigation thereof by Robert Gowing, the master; it accordingly suspends his certificate for three months, but recommends that during the period of the suspension of his master's certificate, a first mate's certificate should be granted to him.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 23rd day of September 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

C. Y. WARD,

WILLM. CURLING, R.N.R.,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 23rd of September instant, when Mr. Butler Aspinall appeared for the Board of Trade, and Dr. Stubbs for the master of the "Acton." Nine witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Aspinall handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Dr. Stubbs then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Aspinall having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follows:—

The "Acton" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of London, of 1,646 tons gross, and 1,065 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 200 horsepower. She was built at Low Walker on the Tyne in the year 1874, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Edmund Hannay Watts, of 85, Gracechurch Street, in the City of London, and others, Mr. Watts being the managing owner. She left Montreal on the 7th of August last, with a crew of 23 hands all told, and a cargo consisting of phosphate of copper and deals, bound to London, and on the 10th of the same month put into Sydney in Cape Breton, and having there taken in 170 tons of coals, she left again on the morning of the 11th, and at 7.30 a.m. was abreast of and about a mile from Flat Point, which is the extreme northerly point of Cape Breton. The weather was at this time fine and clear, the wind blowing a moderate breeze from about S.S.W., and the vessel was put upon an E.S.E. course to make Isle St. Pierre, with her engines going at full speed, and with all her sails set, making about 9 knots an hour. At noon they got an observation, which shewed them that she had got somewhat to the northward of her course, and accordingly the course was altered half a point to the southward, to S.E. by E. 1/2 E. At midnight it was thought that they were about 10 to 15 miles south of St. Pierre, but owing to the hazy state of the atmosphere the lights could not be seen, and accordingly the course was altered to S.E. and by E. and an hour afterwards to S.E., and that course was continued very nearly up to the moment of striking. I should here observe that the courses which I have given, are the courses by the pole compass, which we are told had a westerly deviation of 3° on all those courses; the magnetic courses therefore would be about a quarter of a point more to the northward. During the night all the sails were taken in owing to the hazy state of the weather, but at 6 a.m. the following morning they again set the fore and aft sails. At noon the haze continuing, they could get no observation, but the vessel continued her course, and at 1 p.m. a thick bank of fog was seen ahead, upon which the second officer who had charge of the deck, the captain and first officer being below at their dinners, ordered the sails to be taken in as they obstructed his view, and at the same time sounded the whistle to call the master's attention. They had taken in and stowed the fore trysail, and were in the act of hauling down the jib, when the master came up on deck, and he then ordered the course to be altered to S.E. 1/2 E. by the pole compass. A few minutes afterwards one of the hands forward reported breakers ahead, upon which the master at once ordered the helm to be put hard-a-port, and the engines to be reversed full speed; but before the vessel's way could be stopped she struck heavily forward on the rocks. On sounding it was found that the fore peak was full of water, and that there were already 8 feet of water in the main hold, upon which the master ordered the engines to be stopped, and the boats to be got out. After a time a shore boat came alongside, and they then learnt for the first time that the vessel had struck on the coast of Newfoundland some three miles to the N.W. of Cape Pine, and on the eastern promontory of St. Shots' Bay. Finding that the vessel was breaking up the master and crew left her at about 5.30 p.m., and landed in St. Shots' Bay. On the following day the captain returned to his vessel, but could not get on board her owing to the heavy sea which was running; and on the 14th the vessel broke in two and became a total wreck.

These being the facts of the case the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What was " the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" The cause of the stranding was that the vessel was kept upon too northerly a course, due allowance not having been made for the strong current which was setting her to the north.

The second question which we are asked is, "What " number of compasses had she on board, where were " they placed, and when and by whom were they last " adjusted?" She had four compasses, a pole compass just forward of the bridge, a steering compass on the bridge immediately before the midship wheel, a compass upon the turtle back, and another under it and just before the after wheel. We are told that they had been adjusted in May last.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " safe and proper courses were set and steered after " passing Flat Point, and whether due and proper " allowance was made for tide, currents, and lee-way?" The captain told us that he expected that the course on which he put her from Flat Point would take her from 10 to 15 miles south of St. Pierre, but that at noon finding from an observation which he got that the vessel was being set to the northward of her course, he altered it half a point to the southward, which he thought would about compensate for the northerly set of the current. At midnight he supposed that he was from 10 to 15 miles south of St. Pierre, but thought that it was owing to the hazy state of the atmosphere that he did not see the light, and he then put the vessel on a course which he expected would take him some 30 miles to the south of Cape Pine, and so no doubt it would have done had there been as the master expected no current setting the vessel to the north. The master has told us that he did not know of the existence of this current, until after the shipwreck, and until after their arrival at St. John's, when they heard of it from the fishermen. He said that in the Book of Directions which he had, there was no mention of this current, but he did not know whose Book of Directions it was. If however he had had the "Newfoundland Pilot," which is issued under the authority of the Lords of the Admiralty, he would have found it said at page 9 that "there is " generally a strong indraught into Placentia and " St. Mary's Bays, the latter has been the cause of many " shipwrecks between Cape English and St. Shots." And then at page 17 we find the following passage, " St. Shots' Cove, 3 miles N.W. of Cape Pine, is open " and exposed. A melancholy interest is attached to " St. Shots on account of the many shipwrecks which " have taken place in its vicinity, and principally on " the Eastern Head, from which a ledge of slate rocks " extends a cable to the S.W.—It was upon this reef " that H.M. brig "Drake" was lost in 1882, and even " now seldom a year passes without a wreck taking " place in the neighbourhood.—In most cases these " wrecks have occurred during fog, and too often there " has been a neglect of sounding, and a want of " attention to the ordinary set of the currents." That it was neither a safe nor a proper course to steer is sufficiently proved by the fact that instead of being as he thought he was some 30 miles to the south of Cape Pine, this well-known current had set him 3 miles to the north of it.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether, when the master failed to sight St. Pierre " Lights at or about midnight of the 11th-12th August, " he took proper measures to ascertain and verify the " position of the vessel?" He admits that he took no measures to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at that time.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether, when the weather became thick, the speed " of the vessel was promptly and sufficiently reduced?" There is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to the nature of the haziness which prevailed. According to the officers it was merely hazy during the whole of the forenoon of the 12th, and objects could be seen at the distance of one to two miles off; according to some of the seamen there was even then a thick fog. All, however, admit that at about 1 o'clock they entered a dense fog, in which they could see but a very short distance ahead; it does not however appear that even then any steps were taken to reduce the speed of the vessel beyond taking in the sails, and that was done not so much to reduce the speed, for there was then we are told only a light breeze, but because the jib and fore trysail prevented the officer of the watch from seeing ahead. No orders of any kind were however given to the engineer to reduce the speed, but we are told that, owing to the badness of the coals they were not going more than 7 to 7 1/2 knots.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether at noon on the 12th of August the master " was justified in assuming that the vessel was thirty " miles to the southward of Cape Pine, and whether " he then took proper and sufficient measures to ascer- " tain and verify the position of the vessel?" The master had no right to assume that he was at noon of the 12th some 30 miles to the southward of Cape Pine, for on the courses steered he could only have been there on the assumption that there was no current setting him to the northward of his course. He knew from the observation, which he got at noon of the 11th, that he was then being set to the northward of his course, and he altered the course 1/2 a point to counteract that set; but after passing St. Pierre he made no allowance whatever for the current, although, as we have seen it is an ordinary and well-known current. The master says that he did not know of its existence, but the question is whether he ought not to have known of it. Be this however as it may, he took no steps whatever to ascertain or verify the position of his vessel at that time.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " a good and proper look-out was kept?" It seems that there was a look-out during the night, as is usual on board these trading vessels, but that from 6 a.m. of the 12th there was no look-out set. The assessors are, however, of opinion, that, looking at the state of the atmosphere and that they were approaching the fishing grounds on the Newfoundland Banks, it would have been a wise precaution on the part of the master to have set one of the watch forward on the look-out when the weather set in thick, the more so as the jib and fore trysail would necessarily obstruct the view from the bridge.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the lead was used, and, if not, whether such neglect " was justifiable, especially having regard to the thick " state of the weather?" In our opinion the master should have taken a cast of the lead at midnight of the 11th, when he supposed that he was off St. Pierre, as it would have shewn him whether he was, as he supposed, within 10 or 15 miles to the south of it, and whether he was in a proper position to lay a course to pass Cape Pine. Again at mid-day of the 12th, when he thought that he was passing Cape Pine, and that he was 30 miles to the south of it, it was especially incumbent upon him to take a cast of the lead, for at that time he had had no observation for 24 hours, and no sight of land; and if he had been set out of his course to the northward by the current, as we have seen was most natural and probable, the vessel might have run ashore. Dr. Stubbs contended that even if he had taken a cast of the lead it would not have warned him of his danger, but we do not concur in that opinion, for if he had been, as he supposed he was, some 30 miles to the south of Cape Pine, he would have got 80 fathoms of water, whereas a cast of the lead at mid-day and for an hour or two before would have given him only from 20 to 30 fathoms, and would have shewn him that he had been set to the northward of his course. The neglect, therefore, to take a cast of the lead was, in our opinion, quite unjustifiable.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seaman- " like care?" In our opinion she was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and officers are or either of them is in " default?" It is clear that the blame for this casualty rests with the master and with the master alone, and the question therefore which we have now to consider is, whether we shall accede to the application of the Board of Trade that his certificate should be dealt with. Dr. Stubbs has said that it will be a very serious thing for the master if we deal with his certificate, and that it will probably injure him for life. But it is a still more serious thing that this vessel, worth, we are told, some 10,000l. to 12,000l., should have been lost, together with her valuable cargo, and that the lives of all on board should have been placed in jeopardy, owing to the negligence and default of the master. We are told that he has never before met with any casualty, and he has produced a number of certificates speaking to his general good conduct and sobriety from his present and past employers. It is, however, a case which we cannot overlook, but on the whole the assessors are disposed to take a lenient view of it, and we shall therefore suspend his certificate for only three months.

The Court further, on the application of Dr. Stubbs, agreed to recommend to the Board of Trade that, during the suspension of his master's certificate, he be allowed a first mate's.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

C. Y. WARD,

WILLM. CURLING,

R.N.R.,

Assessors.

L 367. 2789. 200.—9/86. Wt. 12. E. & S.