Wreck Report for 'Garron Tower', 1886

(No. 3045.)

"GARRON TOWER " (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Sunderland, on the 4th of November 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains FRENCH and VAUX, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the damage sustained by the steamship "GARRON TOWER," through striking the East Pier at the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour, on the 28th of September 1886.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the damage sustained by the said vessel was due to the negligent navigation thereof by James Barnes, the master, but, under the circumstances, it will not deal with his certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 4th day of November 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. P. FRENCH,

Assessors.

 

 

C. VAUX,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Sunderland on the 4th of November 1886, when Mr. Dendy appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Roche for the owners, and Mr. Nelson for the master of the "Garron Tower." Five witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Dendy handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Nelson then produced a witness, and having addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Dendy having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Garron Tower" is an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Sunderland, of 649 tons gross, and 402 net register, and is fitted with engines of 90 horse-power. She was built in Hartlepool in the year 1876, and at the time of the casualty, which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of Mr. Samuel James Ditchfield, of the Londonderry Offices, Seaham Harbour, and others, Mr. Ditchfield being the managing owner. She left Seaham on the 27th of September last, with a crew of 14 hands all told, and a cargo of 697 tons of coal, bound to Dunkirk, and in the evening of the following day reached the Dunkirk Roads, passed the Snouw Light-vessel at about 9.45 p.m., and then steamed slowly up until she arrived off the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. Before arriving there a signal had been made by hanging a white light over the bows forward, and by occasionally showing a flare-up or torch, for a pilot to come out and take her in. The night, we are told, was dark but clear, the wind was blowing a fresh breeze from about S.W., and the sea was smooth, and she continued to lie off the entrance to the harbour with her head to the westward, steaming easily against the wind and flood tide. At about 11 o'clock, finding that no pilot came off, and it being within about an hour of high water, the master determined to run for the harbour; and he accordingly gave orders for the helm to be put hard-a-starboard and for her engines to go ahead at half-speed. At this this time they were about a 1/4 of a mile to the westward of the harbour, and having been brought round under hard-a-starboard helm, a course was laid for the entrance; the result was that, when she had cleared the end of the west pier, she would be canted across the entrance with her head towards the east pier; and fearing that she would be drifted by the wind and current on to it, the master ordered the helm to be put hard-a-port, which was done, and seeing that her head was paying off too much to the westward, he then ordered the helm hard-a-starboard; and immediately afterwards she came with her port side against the east pier, making a hole in her bottom in the way of the stoke-hole and engine room. On its being reported by the engineer that the stoke-hole was fast filling, the master directed him to keep the steam going as long as he could, so as to run her as far as possible up the harbour; but when they had got about a mile up, and were within about 100 yards of the entrance to the dock, the steam gave out, upon which orders were given to drop the anchor; owing, however, to the way the vessel had on her, and to the strong current which was setting up the harbour, the anchor failed to hold her, and she ran with her stem into the eastern pier of the dock entrance, staving in her bows, and then ran into and damaged two smacks, as well as the drawbridge crossing the entrance to the dock. Ropes having been got ashore, she was hauled clear, but shortly afterwards she went down forwards and rested on the mud. On the following day the holes were stopped up; and having been pumped out, and floated, and her cargo discharged, she was temporarily repaired, and was then taken back to Sunderland. It should be added that no lives were lost.

These being the facts of the case, the first question on which our opinion has been asked is, "What was the " cause of the stranding of the vessel?" This question will be more conveniently answered when we come to deal with question 6.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " when the vessel left Seaham her steering gear was in " good working order?" Mr. James Graham Richardson, foreman shipwright in the employ of the owners of the "Garron Tower," has told us that about a fortnight before she sailed from Seaham on the voyage in question he unshipped, and thoroughly overhauled and repaired, her wheel chains; and having replaced them he tried them, and found them to be in perfect order; and we have no doubt that they were so when she left Seaham Harbour.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper signals were made for a pilot; and whether " the master was justified in attempting to enter " Dunkirk Harbour at about 11.15 p.m. on the 28th of " September without a pilot?" At page 186 of Part IV. of the North Sea Pilot it is stated that by an arrangement made between the Governments of England, Germany, and Holland, the proper signals for a pilot at night are, "(1) a blue light every 15 minutes, or (2) " a bright white light shown at intervals immediately " above the bulwarks, and visible each time about a " minute." What, however, the master did, was to hang a white light over the bows, and to shew occasionally a torch or flare-up, which can hardly be called a compliance with the terms of the arrangement. It seems that Captain Barnes, who holds an only mate's certificate of competency, had been in the "Garron Tower" for 4 years last June, but as chief officer, and that he had been acting for a month only as the master during the temporary illness of her regular master, Captain Lonsdale. Now Captain Lonsdale, it seems, had been master of the vessel for about 7 years, and during that time he had taken the vessel, he told us, something like 200 times into Dunkirk; he was therefore thoroughly well acquainted with the harbour, and could, he said, take her in as well as any of the pilots. The consequence was that he never signalled for a pilot, but always took the vessel in himself; and this, it seems, was very well known to the pilots at Dunkirk. This then will perhaps explain why it was that no pilot came out to the ship, and why also Captain Barnes did not know what were the proper signals to make for a pilot, Captain Lonsdale not being in the habit of signalling them. The question however remains, Was Captain Barnes justified in taking the vessel in, when he found that no pilot came out to him? Captain Barnes told us that he had often seen the vessel taken in by Captain Lonsdale when the tide was, as it was on that night, within one hour of high water, that he knew that at that time of tide there would be a strong current setting to the eastward across the entrance to the harbour, and that that current ceased at high water; but he said that he feared to delay entering the harbour until after high water, lest, when he got up the harbour, he should find the dock gates closed, as in that case the vessel would ground at low water; he preferred therefore to run the risk of going in then. But although Captain Lonsdale with his large experience might be fully justified in taking the vessel into the harbour under such circumstances, we are not prepared to say that Captain Barnes was justified in doing so; it may be that there were good reasons for his not attempting to enter the harbour at high water when the current had slackened, lest she should have to take the ground, but there seems no reason why he should not have remained outside in the Roads until the following morning, there being only a moderate breeze from the S.W., which was an off-shore wind, and the sea quite smooth. We think then that Captain Barnes was not justified under the circumstances in taking the vessel in.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " safe and proper courses were set and steered for the " harbour; and whether due and proper allowance was " made for tide?" It seems that when the captain determined to make for the harbour the vessel was to the westward of, and about a 1/4 of a mile from, the entrance,#151;1and he accordingly ordered the helm to be put hard-a-starboard, and with his engines going at half-speed he brought her round with her head pointing to the west pier; the result was that on clearing the end of that pier the vessel would be across the entrance to the harbour, and finding that, with the wind and the current setting him to the eastward, he was in danger of coming against the east pier he hard-a-ported the helm, but not in sufficient time to avoid her coming against she pier. What the master should have done was to have dropped up with the current until he was abreast of the entrance to the harbour, and then have brought her round under a starboard helm, heading straight up the channel, keeping her well under the shelter of the west pier. But to hard-a-starboard' his helm when he was yet to the eastward of the entrance, and thus approach it at an angle, and then, when he found himself being drifted over towards the east pier, to hard-a-port the helm was, according to Captain Lonsdale, neither a safe nor a proper course to pursue.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the wheel chains of the steam steering gear fouled; " and, if so, what was the cause?" There is not the slightest pretence for saying that the wheel chain fouled. The master indeed seems to have thought at the time of the casualty that they had fouled for an instant but he is not now prepared to say that they did so, and a most careful examination of them after the casualty failed to shew any defect.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" We have already said that she was not, and that the cause of the casualty was bringing her at an angle across the entrance to the harbour under a hard-a-starboard helm, and then hard-a-porting when it was too late to avoid coming into collision with the east pier.

The last question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and officers, or either of them, is in " default?" and it is added that "in the opinion of the " Board of Trade the certificate of James Barnes, the " master, should be dealt with." No doubt the whole blame for this casualty rests with the master, and with the master alone, and the question which we have to consider is whether we ought to deal with his certificate. It is clear that the master was not justified, with the imperfect knowledge which he seems to have had of the currents, in attempting to enter the harbour, and he did so in a very improper and unseamanlike way. At the same time there was no wilful default or neglect of duty on his part; it was rather a want of skill in the management of the vessel. He seems to have acted to the best of his ability, and although we are not prepared to say with Mr. Nelson that it was a mere error of judgment, we shall not under the circumstances deal with his certificate.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. P. FRENCH,

Assessors.

 

 

C. VAUX,

 

L 367. 2826. 200.—11/86 Wt. 12. E. & S.