Wreck Report for 'Ocean Bride', 1886

(No. 3069.)

"OCEAN BRIDE."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster on the 26th of November and the 1st of December 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esq., Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains VAUX and PATTISON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the sailing ship "OCEAN BRIDE," on the West Sunk Sand, in the Thames Estuary, on the 5th of November 1886.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said ship was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of Peter Dreland, the master. The Court accordingly suspends his certificate for 12 months, but recommends that during the period of the suspension of his master's certificate, a first mate's be granted to him.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 1st day of December 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

C. VAUX,

Assessors.

 

 

JOHN L. PATTISON,

 

Annex to Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 26th of November and 1st of December 1886, when Mr. Sceales appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Aldous for the master and part owner of the "Ocean Bride." Four witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Sceales handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Aldous then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Sceales having been heard in reply, the Court pro. ceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Ocean Bride," which was a wooden three-masted brigantine, belonging to the port of Guernsey, of 302 tons gross, and 284 tons net register, was built at Jersey in the year 1854, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Peter Dreland, of No. 26, Queen Street, St. Heliers, Jersey, and of Mr. John Winter Nicolle, Mr. Dreland being the master as well as managing owner. She left Shields on the 29th of October last with a crew of nine hands, and a cargo of 487 tons of coal bound to Granville in France; and at 4 p.m. of the 3rd of November following she was close hauled to the wind on the port tack heading about W. by N., the wind at the time blowing a gale from about S.W., when the Galloper Light was observed nearly right ahead, distant about 4 miles, upon which she was put before the wind to clear, I presume, the "Galloper." Having taken in most of her sail, and when about six miles to the northward of the "Galloper," she was again brought to the wind on the port tack under double-reefed mainsail and fore-topmast staysail, and from that time she continued to drift to the northward at the rate of about 2 knots an hour, until about 3 a.m., when the wind suddenly dropped, and having shifted to the N.W., sail was set, and she was laid with her head to the W.S.W. At about 8 a.m. the breeze freshened, and during the day it backed round more to the southward, so that it was found impossible to keep a W.S.W. course, and she gradually broke off, first to S.W., and ultimately to South and S. by E. She continued during the day close hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, making about 4 to 5 knots, until about 6 p.m., when a light was seen, which the master took to be the North Hinder Light, upon which, thinking that she had got sufficiently far over to the French, or rather to the Belgian coast, she was put about, and laid with her head to the N.W., the wind at that time blowing a strong breeze from the S.W. At midnight the master came on deck to take his watch, and before the chief officer went below, the master ordered him and the boatswain to go aloft to see if they could see any lights. On doing so they observed a red revolving light on the lee or starboard bow, and two lights, a red light and a white light, to windward on the port bow. On being informed of this the master said that the former was the Varne Light and the latter were the Calais Lights. The same course was continued, and suddenly at about 3 a.m. the vessel struck and became fast, and on sounding round the vessel, they found she was in 2 1/2 fathoms. It was then high water, and as the tide fell, she heeled over on to her starboard side. At about 1 p.m. some fishing boats came to her and offered their services, but the master declined them, and on being asked where the vessel was, they refused to tell him. Shortly afterwards a steam tug came up, and anchored at no great distance off, followed by the Clacton-on-Sea life boat, when they learnt for the first time that they were on the West Sunk. The life boat people told them that they were in a very dangerous position, but the master refused to leave, and no attempt was made to obtain the services of the steam tug. At about 3 o'clock it was found that she had about 3 feet of water in her, the pumps, however, were not manned, and at about half-past 3 on the life boat people saying that if they would not leave the ship they should be obliged to go away, the master consented to abandon her, and they all got into the life boat, and were safely landed the same evening at Clacton-on-Sea.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify " the position of the vessel at or about 4 p.m. of the " 3rd of November, and from time to time thereafter?" We are told that at about 4 p.m. of the 3rd of November they sighted the Galloper Light nearly right ahead, bearing about W. by N., and distant about four miles, and that they thereupon stood away before the wind until they had got about 6 miles to the northward of the light, when she was again brought to, and from that time she continued to drift to the northward at the rate of about 2 knots an hour until about 3 a.m. the following morning, when, the wind having fallen, she resumed her course to the southward. Now Mr. Sceales has said that the master ought then to have endeavoured to pick up the Galloper Lightship again, so as to obtain a fresh point of departure, and failing that he should have attempted to get an observation at midday. We were told by the mate as well as by the boatswain that the sun was shining, and that an observation could have been taken at midday of the 4th; but it is admitted that the master did not take one, and that he made no preparations for doing so. His excuse is that it was the usual practice on board his vessel for the mate, if he was on deck, to call him when midday approached if there was a chance of getting an observation, but that he had not done so on this occasion, and that the master was consequently below when the observation should have been taken. Seeing, however, that the vessel had been drifting about at the mercy of the winds and tides for many hours, so that it would be quite impossible for anyone to say what was her exact position, the master, if he had been properly attentive to his duties, would have taken care to have been on deck before the sun had attained its highest elevation so as to have obtained an observation for latitude. It appears to us that after losing sight of the Galloper, on the evening of the 3rd, no attempt whatever was made to ascertain the vessel's true position beyond taking some casts of the lead, as to which I shall presently have to say a few words.

The second and third questions which we are asked are, (2) "Whether a safe and proper course was then " set and steered, and whether due and proper allow- " ance was made for tide, currents, and lee way?" and (3) "Whether safe and proper alterations were " made in the course at or about 3 a.m. of the " 4th November, and from time to time thereafter, " and whether due and proper allowance was made " for tide, currents, and lee way?" When the master found that he was heading directly for the Galloper he did no doubt quite right to bear away and run to the northward, and when he had got quite clear of the Galloper bring the vessel to again until the gale had moderated. He was also no doubt quite right, when the wind fell, to resume his course to the southward. But assuming that the light, which they saw at 6 p.m. of the 4th was, as the master supposed, the North Hinder, it was neither safe nor proper to keep the vessel on a N. W. course from 6 p.m. till 3 the following morning, a period of 9 hours, during which she could make some 40 miles or more, and which would be quite sufficient to carry her on to one or other of the sands at the entrance of the Thames.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "What " was the-light sighted at 6 p.m., and whether the " master was justified in taking it for the North " Hinder?" There is every reason to think that the light seen by them at 6 p.m. of the 4th was the North Hinder; for a N.W. course from off the North Hinder, if continued for 9 hours, would very probably have taken her to the Sunk Sand, where she was wrecked.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "What " were the lights sighted at or about midnight of the " 4/5th November, and whether the master was justi- " fied in taking them for the Varne and Calais Lights " respectively?" There seems to be little doubt that the red light, which was on the starboard bow, must have been the Gunfleet Light, and the white and red lights on the port bow the Middle Swin and Maplin respectively. That the master should have mistaken them for the Varne and the Calais Lights is to us inconceivable. In the first place, it is difficult to understand how, if the light, which was seen at 6 p.m., was the North Hinder Light, and that from that time the vessel had been kept continually on a N.W. course, the master should have thought that they could by any possibility have got anywhere near either the Varne or the Calais Lights. Again, if the light on his starboard bow had been the Varne, and the vessel was heading to the N.W., it would be impossible for him to have had the Calais Lights on his port bow. The whole thing is a mystery, how it was possible for him to mistake them for the Varne and Calais Lights.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the lead was properly used and with sufficient " frequency?" The mate told us that he used the lead several times during his watch from 8 to 12 o'clock, and that he took a cast at 2 a.m. just before going below. The master also said that he took a cast of the lead once during his watch. They told us that it was the hand lead with 20 fathoms of line attached, and that on each occasion they paid out about 15 or 16 fathoms of it, but without finding any bottom. It is clear, however, that they must have had very much less water than that, having had to cross the Long Sands before they would reach the Sunk; so that, if the lead had been used as often as they say, and properly used, they must have obtained soundings. It has been suggested to me by the assessors that possibly they may have been in such shallow water that the lead was on the bottom before the strain came, and that that is why they felt no bottom. In our opinion either the lead was not used sufficiently often or was not used properly.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whe- " ther a good and proper look-out was kept?" There is no reason to think that a look-out was not being kept, but that is not the question in the case.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" In the whole of our experience we have never met with a case in which a vessel has been navigated in so extraordinary a manner. That the master should, after sighting the North Hinder, have kept the vessel on a N.W. course for 9 hours, when his destination was Granville, and that he should have been so completely out of his reckoning as to have mistaken the Gunfleet, the Middle Swin, and the Maplin, for the Varne and the Calais Lights is inconceivable.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the casualty?" The cause of the casualty was that the master kept the vessel from off the North Hinder on a N.W. course, heading straight for the estuary of the Thames, until he ran her on the Sunk Sand.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and mate are, or either of them is, in " default?" We think that they are both to blame. The mate is to blame for not having taken proper casts of the lead; and the master is to blame principally for having kept the vessel on a N.W. course for so many hours after sighting the North Hinder, as well as for having neglected to take a proper cast of the lead.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "What " was the cost of the vessel to her owners?" We were told by the master that he purchased her about ten years ago, in conjunction with a Mr. Nicolle, of Jersey, for 1,500l., Mr. Nicolle taking 2/3rds, and he 1/3rd of her; that about four months ago he purchased from Mr. Nicolle another third of her for 325l., so that at the time of her loss, the master owned 2/3rds and Mr. Nicolle 1/3rd of her.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "What " was her value at the time she last left Shields?" The master stated that she was worth at that time about 1,000l., and assuming that the sum which the master says he gave four months ago to Mr. Nicolle for 1/3rd of her, was 325l., that would seem to make her worth at that time about 975l. He also stated that about four months ago they were offered 1,050l. for her, but that the offer was refused, as Mr. Nicolle wanted 1,100l. for her. It certainly appears to the assessors very extraordinary that an old vessel built 32 years ago, and without a class, should now in the present depreciated condition of the shipping trade be worth 1,000l., but there is no evidence before us to contradict the master's statement that four months ago he gave 325l. for 1/3rd of her.

The 13th question which we are asked is, "What were the insurances effected, and how were they apportioned?" The master has told us that the vessel was insured in the Shoreham Club for 600l., and in a Newcastle Club for 300l., and that the freight, which was worth 142l. 10s., and of which no part had been advanced, was insured for 100l.

Lastly, it is said that, "in the opinion of the Board " of Trade, the certificate of the master should be dealt " with." Now no defence, or practically none, has been or could have been made by the learned counsel who has appeared for the master. His conduct in navigating her as he did is, as we have said, utterly unjustifiable; nor has there been any explanation offered why he did not attempt to pump the vessel, or why he did not accept the assistance offered him, or engage the tug, which was lying close to him. The case is not altogether free from suspicion, and had he been a younger man, it is possible that the Court might have cancelled his certificate, and left him to the chance of regaining his certificate if he showed by his future conduct that he was entitled to one. It seems, however, that this master has been 52 years at sea, and 25 years a master, and under all the circumstances the assessors are disposed to take a more lenient view of the case, and to order that his certificate should be suspended for 12 months only.

The Court, on the application of Mr. Aldous, agreed to recommend that during the suspension of his master's certificate he should have a first mate's.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

C. VAUX,

Assessors.

 

 

JOHN L. PATTISON,

 

L 367. 2850. 200.—12/86. Wt. 12. E. & S.