Wreck Report for 'Minerva' and 'Borderer', 1887

(No. 3106.)

"MINERVA " (S. S.) AND "BORDERER" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th days of January 1887, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esq., Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains WARD and HARLAND, and Rear-Admiral MORESBY, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the casualty to the steam ship "MINERVA," of West Hartlepool, and the loss of the lives of 7 of her crew, through collision with the steamship "BORDERER," of Liverpool, off Coalhouse Point, in the River Thames, on the 28th of October last.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the said collision was due to the fault and neglect of William Monger, the pilot in charge of the "Borderer," in not having, when he was approaching the Ovens Buoy, and saw the "Minerva" coming down with the ebb tide, eased his engines, and waited until she had rounded Coalhouse Point, as required by No. 23 of "The Rules and Bye-laws " for the Regulation of the Navigation of the River " Thames;" and in having, after rounding Coalhouse Point, and when he saw that the "Borderer" was being set by the tide to the south, and across the "Minerva's" course, caused two short blasts of the "Borderer's" steam whistle to be blown, indicating thereby to the "Minerva" that he was intending to starboard his helm, and pass starboard side to starboard side, in accordance with Rule No. 17 (b) of the said Rules and Bye-laws, and at the same time kept the helm hard-a-port; and that no blame attaches to the master or officers of either of the said two vessels.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 6th day of January 1887.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

C. Y. WARD,

 

 

 

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

 

 

J. MORESBY,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th days of January instant, when Mr. Kenelm Digby appeared for the Board of Trade, Sir Walter Phillimore, Q.C., and Mr. Walton for the owners, master, and officers, and Mr. Pyke for the pilot of the "Borderer," and Mr, Charles Hall, Q,C., and Dr. Raikes for the owners, master, and officers of the "Minerva." Thirteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade, and one by Mr. Hall, Mr. Kenelm Digby handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Two witnesses having then been recalled on behalf of the "Borderer," Mr. Hall, Sir Walter Phillimore, and Mr. Pyke addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Sceales (in lieu of Mr. Kenelm Digby) having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked.

The case set up by the "Minerva" is, that she was an iron screw steamship belonging to the port of West Hartlepool, of 1588 tons gross, and 1025 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 140 horsepower. She was built at West Hartlepool in the year 1874, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. William Gray, of Dock Yard, West Hartlepool, and others, Mr. William Gray being the managing owner. She left the Surrey Commercial Docks at about 1.10 p.m. of the 28th of October last, in water ballast, with a crew of 23 hands all told, and three stowaways, bound to Sunderland; arrived off Gravesend at about 10 minutes to 4; and having there discharged her pilot, proceeded down the river with her engines going at half speed, the weather being fine and clear, with a moderate breeze from the east, and the tide about half ebb, running from 2 to 3 knots. In about 10 to 12 minutes, having cleared the shipping, the engines were put on full speed, and she proceeded down the Reach making about 9 knots an hour through the water, and from 11 to 12 knots over the ground. At the moment of clearing the shipping, and just when her engines were being put at full speed, the masts of a steamer, which afterwards proved to be the "Borderer," were observed coming up the Lower Hope, and distant about three miles. The "Minerva" continued her course, keeping a little to the south of mid-channel, with her engines still going at full speed for about five or six minutes, and had got a little below the Powder Buoys, when she observed the "Borderer" so far over towards the south shore as to make it doubtful whether it would be possible to pass to the southward of her. Accordingly orders were given to put the engines at half-speed, and at the same moment the "Borderer" gave two blasts of her whistle, by which the "Minerva" understood that she intended to pass her to the southward, or starboard side to starboard side; upon which the "Minerva" answered with two blasts of her whistle, and the helm was thereupon ordered to be put to starboard. At this time, we are told, the "Borderer" was about 2 points on the "Minerva's" port bow, but in about two or three minutes, and when she had been brought a little on the starboard bow, the "Borderer" again gave two short blasts of her whistle, which were answered by the "Minerva" with two short blasts, and the captain thereupon ordered the helm to be put hard-a-starboard, and was answered that it was hard-a-starboard. The vessels continued to approach one another, the "Borderer" getting broader upon the "Minerva's" starboard bow, and when she had got about 4 points on the bow, and was at a distance of about 400 yards from her, it was observed that the "Borderer" was coming round under a hard-a-port helm. At the same instant the "Borderer" gave one blast of her whistle, which was answered by two blasts from the "Minerva"; and, seeing that a collision was imminent, the master of the "Minerva" at once ordered the engines to be put full speed ahead, with a view, if possible, of clearing her; but shortly afterwards the two vessels came together, the stem and starboard bow of the "Borderer" striking the Minerva" on her starboard side in the way of the main rigging, cutting her down below the water's edge, and causing her to sink in about two minutes afterwards. Some of the crew of the "Minerva" took to the rigging, from which they were afterwards rescued, whilst others got on to the forecastle, and as the ship went down forwards they were washed off into the water. Six of the hands were unfortunately drowned, and one died before he could be got ashore; but the rest were saved, partly by the boat of the "Borderer" and other boats, and partly by a steam tug called the "Red Rose," which, on seeing the collision, had come down the river to their assistance. According to the witnesses from the "Minerva" the place of the collision was about a quarter of a mile below the Ovens Buoy.

This is the account which the witnesses from the "Minerva" have given of the way in which the collision occurred, and it was confirmed in all the main particulars by a man named Haill, the mate of the steam tug "Red Rose." He told us that they were at the time attending a vessel called the "Grecian;" that they had gone after a barge which had got adrift, and were returning with her, when they heard the two first blasts from the "Borderer," and that they were then a little below the Powder Buoys, and the "Minerva" was nearly abreast of them

Now the account which the master and officers of the "Borderer" have given of the circumstances is as follows: They say that she is an iron screw steamship belonging to the port of Liverpool, of 4,740 tons gross, and 3,134 tons net register, and is fitted with 'engines of 354 horse power. She was built at Barrow-in-Furness in the year 1884, and at the time of the casualty, which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of the "Borderer" Steamship Company, Limited, Mr. Edward Dashford Glynn, of No. 20, Water Street, Liverpool, being the manager. She left Boston, in the United States, on the 16th of October last with a general cargo of about 4,200 tons and 412 head of cattle, and having on board a crew of 48 hands, 17 cattle-men, and two stowaways, bound to London. On the 28th of the same month she arrived off Dungeness, and having there taken on board a duly licensed Trinity House pilot named William Monger, she proceeded on her course, and a little before 4 p.m. of the same day arrived in the Lower Hope. At this time the master and pilot were on the port side of the upper bridge, the third officer was on the starboard side at the whistle and the telegraph, and a quartermaster was stationed at the steam steering gear amidships, whilst the chief officer was forward on the topgallant forecastle looking out. The weather, we are told, was fine and clear, the wind was blowing a moderate breeze from the east, and the vessel was proceeding at full speed, making from 9 to 10 knots an hour against a strong ebb tide. When they had arrived within about a quarter of a mile of the Ovens Buoy, which is immediately off Coalhouse Point, having the buoy a little on their starboard bow, a steamer, which afterwards proved to be the "Minerva," was observed coming down Gravesend Reach and at a distance of about two miles, and was duly reported to the pilot. The "Borderer" continued her course with her engines still going at fall speed, and as she neared the buoy, the pilot ordered the helm to be put first to port and then to hard-a-port, for the purpose of rounding the Point. As soon, however, as the nose of the vessel was abreast of the Ovens Buoy, and distant from it about half the ship's length, the ebb tide caught her on the starboard bow, canting her head to the southward. The "Minerva" was at this time about a mile off, and the captain, seeing the vessel beginning to cant, said to the pilot, "Do you see that steamer? We are not answer- " ing our helm; will it be well to pass starboard to star- " board?" The pilot made no answer, but turned to the third officer and told him to give two blasts of the whistle, which was done. The tide continued to carry the "Borderer" bodily across the river towards the south shore until she was in mid-channel, when feeling the straight tide, she began to answer her port helm. At this time, we are told, the "Minerva" was about a point on the "Borderer's" starboard bow, and the captain again said to the pilot, "What are you going to do " —steady and starboard?" The pilot answered, "No" and then turned to the quartermaster and told him to keep his helm hard-a-port. The "Borderer" continued to come round under her hard-a-port helm until she had brought the "Minerva" a little on her port bow, when it was seen for the first time that the "Minerva" was under a starboard helm; upon which, the vessels being then only about 400 yards apart, the pilot ordered the engines to be stopped and reversed full speed, but before she had entirely lost her way, the vessels came together in the manner and with the results already stated. They stated that from first to last they did not hear any signal from the "Minerva," and according to the captain and officers of the "Borderer," the place of the collision was about a quarter of a mile from the Ovens Buoy, and a little above a line drawn from that point across the river.

What the pilot's case was it is not very easy to say, for the evidence which he gave, as well on this inquiry as before the Coroner, was so confused and contradictory, that we have some difficulty in making out what it is. Suffice it, however, to say that it differs in some important respects from that given by the master and officers of the "Borderer." Thus, the pilot stated that in coming up the Lower Hope they had to pass a great number of small sailing vessels, and had frequently to blow the whistle for them; and that off Cliffe Creek they passed two sailing vessels which were standing to the northward, and that, being then under a starboard helm, he gave two short blasts of the whistle. He also told us that his attention was first called to the "Minerva" when they were from 3 to 4 cables' length below the Ovens Buoy, and that the buoy was then nearly right ahead. He also stated that he then starboarded a little to bring the buoy upon his starboard bow, then steadied, and that as he neared it he first ported, and then hard-a-ported, but that the tide caught his starboard bow and canted his head to the southward. He said that he did not recollect the captain making any observation to him then; but that, seeing the "Minerva" coming down with the tide, he ordered them to give a blow of the whistle. He would not swear that he did not order two blasts to be given, but to the best of his recollection he thought he ordered only one blast, or merely told them to blow the whistle, but he admits that he heard two blasts given. He said that the tide carried the vessel across the river down to mid-channel, if not a little to the southward of it, before she began to feel her port helm; that he never heard any signal from the "Minerva," and that, when the order was given to stop and reverse, they were a very little above the Ovens Buoy.

These then being the facts of the case, so far as they have been deposed to by the witnesses on the one side and on the other, we shall, I think, have very little difficulty in answering the questions which have been put to us by the Board of Trade.

Now, the first question which we are asked is, " Whether the 'Borderer' complied with the regu- " lation 23 of the Rules and Bye-laws for the Regulation " of the Navigation of the River Thames, approved by " Order in Council dated March 18th, 1880; and if not, " whether there was any sufficient reason for the non. " observance of the said rule?" The rule in question, so far at it applies to the present case, is as follows:—"Steam vessels navigating against the tide shall, " before rounding the following Points, viz.: Coal. " house Point," &c., "ease their engines, and wait until " any other vessels rounding the Point with the tide " have passed clear." It was admitted by the pilot of the "Borderer" that he saw the "Minerva" when he was yet a quarter of a mile below the Ovens Buoy, coming down with the ebb tide, and that, nevertheless, he attempted to round the Coalhouse Point, with his engines going full speed, before the "Minerva" had passed clear. It is clear, therefore, that he did not comply with the 23rd regulation for the navigation of the River Thames. And what reason does he give for not doing so? At first he said that he was not aware that regulation 23 included Coalhouse Point, and that he did not think the regulation applied unless there was immediate risk of collision. He, however, admitted that he knew that as soon as they opened the Point the tide would cant her head to the southward, and would then carry the vessel bodily across the river down to mid-channel, if not to the southward of it, and consequently across the course of the "Minerva," which was coming down. I may add that the tides on that day were at their strongest, it being the first day after a new moon; and if ever there was a case in which rule 23 would apply, it is this. Mr. Pyke has, however, contended that there was nothing wrong in his rounding the Point at full speed; and he refferred us to the case of the "Libra," which is reported in the 6th volume of the Law Reports, Probate Division, page 139; and if I wanted a case in point, I could hardly have selected a better one. The clear and obvious finding in that case was that a vessel navigating against the tide shall wait, not merely until the other vessel has passed the Point, but until she has been passed by the other vessel. And Lord Justice Brett, at page 145, says, speaking of rule 23, "I think " the meaning of that rule is that she shall so far " check her speed as to prevent her coming up to the " Point, at the same time when the other vessel would " come there. The vessel going against the tide is not " only to wait until the other has passed the Point, " but to wait until the other has passed her." It appears to me that rule 23 has been made specially to meet such a case as this; and not only that it was not complied with, but that there was no justification whatever in this case for its not having been complied with.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " the 'Borderer ' gave any, and, if so, what signal or " signals to the ' Minerva'; and whether, having regard " to rules Nos. 17 and 22 of the said Bye-laws, she was " justified in giving the said signal or signals?" The master and officers of the "Borderer" say that the only signals that were made to the "Minerva" were two short blasts when the vessel had begun to cant with her head to the southward. On the other hand the "Minerva's" witnesses say that the "Borderer" gave two short blasts when she was off Cliffe Creek, which they took to mean that she intended to pass them to starboard; that soon afterwards she gave two other short blasts, and that just before the collision she gave one short blast. And their evidence is confirmed by the witness, Robert Haill, who said that he heard two short blasts given when the "Borderer" was off Cliffe Creek, that he heard other two short blasts when she was off the Ovens Buoy, and that he heard a single short blast just before the collision. And to a certain extent that evidence is corroborated by the pilot himself, who admits that when they were off Cliffe Creek he gave two short blasts, but not as a signal to the "Minerva," but as a warning to two sailing vessels which were standing across his course to the northward; and that they again gave two short blasts when the vessel's head was beginning to cant to the southward off the Ovens Buoy, but that they never gave a single short blast. The balance of the evidence would seem to be that the "Borderer" did give two short blasts when off Cliffe Creek, but that they were not intended for the "Minerva"; that she afterwards, when her head began to cant to the southward, gave two more short blasts, which were intended as a signal to the "Minerva"; and whether she afterwards gave a single short blast does not appear to us to matter very much, for, if given, it was only when the vessels were very close to one another, and when a collision was almost inevitable.

And now, was the "Borderer" justified in giving any or all of these signals, having regard to rules 17 and 22 of the said Bye-laws. Rule 17 is as follows:—"When " two steam vessels are in sight of one another, and are " approaching with risk of collision, the following " steam signals shall be intimations of the course they " intend to take:—

" (a.) One short blast of the steam whistle, of about " three seconds duration, to mean, 'I am direct- " ' ing my course to starboard, and intend to " ' pass you port side to port side.' The use of " of this signal shall be optional.

" (b.) Two short blasts of the steam whistle, each of " about three seconds duration, to mean, 'I am " ' directing my course to port, and intend to " ' pass you starboard side to starboard side.'"

And it is added, "This latter signal shall not be used " in a case provided by Rule 22, where that Rule can " be obeyed, but it shall be compulsory to use this " signal when a departure from that Rule is necessary " to avoid immediate danger." Then rule 22 stands thus, "When two steam vessels proceeding in opposite " directions, the one up and the other down the River, " are approaching one another so as to involve risk of " collision, they shall pass one another port side to " port side." Now it was contended that it was the duty of these two vessels, under rule 22, to pass one another port side to port side, and the Court is ready to admit that, in general, vessels navigating the Thames ought to pass always port side to port side, but the rules distinctly recognise that there are cases in which a deviation from that rule may become necessary, namely, when it is done to avoid immediate danger; and the question which we have to consider is, whether such a deviation was necessary in the present case. Here is a vessel which, in attempting to round the Point within half a ship's length of the Ovens Buoy, finds herself caught by the strong ebb tide, which cants her head to the southward and carries her bodily across the river into mid-channel, and possibly even to the southward of it, and consequently across the course of a vessel which is coming down the river. At the instant, too, of canting she makes the signal that she intends to starboard her helm, and to pass starboard side to starboard side. Was it unreasonable or improper of her to make that signal? In our opinion it was not, for in the position in which she was it would have been easier for her to have eased her helm, and so passed to the southward of the "Minerva," instead of attempting, as she did, to pass to the northward of her by keeping her helm hard-a-port. The captain admits that it would have been, and twice suggested to the pilot that he should do so. The pilot also was obliged to admit that, in the position in which the two vessels were, it would have been easier to have passed starboard side to starboard side, and that the slightest easing of the helm would have taken him well clear to the southward of the "Minerva." In our opinion, not only was the "Borderer" justified in giving the starboard helm signal, but it was the only proper signal under the circumstances.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether, " assuming the 'Borderer' to have given a signal or " signals to the Minerva,' the 'Borderer' shaped her " course in accordance with the signal or signals given, " and if not, whether there were any and what sufficienit " reasons for her not shaping her course in accordance: " with the signal or signals given?" The "Borderer" admits that she gave the starboard helm signal of two blasts once at all events to the "Minerva;" she ought therefore, in accordance therewith, to have starboarded her helm, instead of which she kept her helm all the time hard-a-port; she did not, therefore, shape her course in accordance with the signal which she had given; and Mr. Hall has justly remarked that either the signal was right and the helm was wrong, or the helm was right and the signal wrong. And now, was there any sufficient reason for her not shaping her course in accordance with the signal given? The only reason given by the pilot of the "Borderer" is that his two blast signal was not answered by the "Minerva;" that it was answered by her with a two blast signal is, as we shall presently shew, distinctly proved; but, assuming that it was not answered, the pilot gave no intimation to the other vessel by a single short blast that they had altered their intention, and were keeping their helm hard-a-port, as they should have done, if that was their intention. There was, however, another reason urged, not by the pilot, but his counsel Mr. Pyke, for keeping his helm aport, even after the starboard helm signal had been given, namely, that it was the duty of the two vessels, under rule 22, to pass port side to port side; and he referred us to the case of the "Odessa," reported in the Maritime Law Cases, Vol. IV., p. 493, where it was held that two steamers, the one going up and the other going down the river, and each seeing the green light of the other about a point on the starboard bow, and at the distance of only a quarter of a mile, were bound to port their helms; but that if the green light is as much as three points on the starboard, they would be justified in starboarding. I do not, however, apprehend that their Lordships intended to lay it down as a rule, even for the River Thames, that in all cases, when a vessel sees the green light of another only one point on her starboard, and at the distance of a 1/4 of a mile, she is to port, but that, if she sees it as much as three points on the bow, she may starboard; for if so, I could hardly imagine a rule which would be more conducive to collisions than such a rule would be. It is obvious that it might very easily happen that the courses of the two vessels might be such that whilst the one might see the green light of the other one point on her starboard bow, the other might see the green light of the approaching vessel three points on her starboard bow, and if in that case it was the duty of the former to port, and of the latter to starboard, a collision would be inevitable. I should have thought, however, that the best and safest course, even in the River Thames, when each vessel has the green light of the other on her starboard bow, is that each should starboard, and at the same time make the starboard helm signal of two blasts, as an indication to the other that she intended to depart from the usual rule of passing port side to port side. And in the case of the "Odessa." I find Sir Robert Phillimore, whilst declaring that the two vessels ought under the circumstances of that case to have ported their helms, saying, "if she intended to starboard her " helm, the whistle ought to have been used, but it was " not." In the present case, however, the whistle was used, and was so used as to indicate to the "Minerva" that the "Borderer" intended to starboard her helm The case of the "Odessa" has, in my opinion, no bearing whatever upon the present case.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the speed at which the 'Borderer' was proceeding " prior to her stopping and reversing her engines, was " under the circumstances improper and dangerous?" It is admitted that from the time of leaving Dangeness, until she had got within some 400 yards of the "Minerva," and a collision was imminent, the "Borderer's" engines were kept going at fall speed; so much so that it seems to have struck the master that it was rather dangerous, owing to the quantity of shipping about; and in coming up the Lower Hope he twice asked the pilot whether it was not so. Bat, however this may be, it is in our opinion quite clear that she. was not justified in attempting to round Coalhouse Point with her engines going at full speed, when she saw the "Minerva" coming down with the strong ebb tide.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " previously to any signal from the 'Borderer' the " 'Minerva' was steering a proper course down the. " river?" The "Minerva," previous to hearing any signal from the "Borderer," appears to have been steering a little to the south of mid-channel, which, in the opinion of the assessors, was a very safe and proper course for her to take.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " or not the 'Minerva' acted properly upon the signal " or signals, if any, made to her by the 'Borderer,' " and, if not, in what respect?" The "Minerva," when she heard the two short blasts from the "Borderer," and saw her being carried across the river to the southward, had, in our opinion, no. option but to starboard her helm, and that is what she did.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " the 'Minerva' answered the signal or signals of the " 'Borderer,' and whether such answers, if any, were " heard on board the ' Borderer'?" We have no doubt, on the evidence before us, that the "Minerva" did answer the signals which she heard from the "Borderer;" that she gave two short blasts in answer to the first two short blasts which the "Borderer" gave when off Cliffe Creek; that she also gave two short blasts in answer to the short blasts which, it is admitted, that the "Borderer" gave when she found that she was beginning to cant to the southward; and we have also no reason to doubt, although they seem not to have been heard by Haill, the mate of the tug "Red Rose," that she gave two short blasts in answer to the single blast which the "Borderer" seems to have given very shortly before the collision. We have equally no reason to think that the "Minerva's" signals were heard by those on board the "Borderer," for the master and officers, as well as the pilot, of that vessel have all sworn positively that they did not hear any; and we are not disposed to charge them with wilful and deliberate perjury. Why it was that the "Minerva's" signals were not heard, and that no puffs of steam were observed, it is impossible to say. It must be remembered that the wind was blowing a moderate breeze from the eastward, which would make it much easier for the "Minerva's" people to hear the "Borderer's" signals than for the "Borderer's" people to hear those from the "Minerva." It was suggested by Sir Walter Phillimore that possibly the "Minerva's " whistle might have been somewhat below the level of the top of the chart house, and the vessel being 3 feet by the stern, both the sound of the whistle, as well as the sight of the steam, might to a certain extent have heen obstructed; but neither of these reasons is, in our opinion, sufficient to account for the "Minerva's" whistles not having been heard on board the "Borderer;" but that the "Minerva" did blow her whistle we have no doubt whatever, not only from the evidence from the "Minerva" herself, but from that of Haill, the mate of the "Red Rose."

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether the 'Minerva' was justified in starboard- " ing her helm as and when she did; and whether " or not her helm ought to have been starboarded " at an earlier period?" The evidence is that the "Minerva" starboarded her helm as soon as she heard the signal from the "Borderer," and we have no reason to think that she unduly delayed doing so.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether " at any time prior to the collision, the 'Minerva' was " improperly steered?" We have no reason to think that she was.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " at any time previous to the collision the 'Minetva' " was proceeding at an improper and dangerous rate of " speed; and whether at any time prior to the col- " lision she ought to have slackened speed and stopped " and reversed her engines?" The only question upon which we have had any doubt is, whether the "Minerva" ought not to have stopped and reversed her engines as soon as she saw that the "Borderer" was under a hard-a-port helm, and when the two vessels were at a distance of only 400 yards from one another. It must be remembered, however, that the "Borderer" was at that time 4 points on her starboard bow, and that, had she then stopped and reversed, there was a danger that she might be struck amidships by this large vessel and run over. On the whole, the assessors are of opinion that she exercised a wise discretion under the circumstances in putting her engines on full speed ahead with the view of clearing the "Borderer."

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the casualty?" The cause of the casualty, in our opinion, does not admit of a doubt. It was due partly to the pilot of the "Borderer," when he saw the "Minerva" coming down with a strong ebb tide, not easing his engines and allowing her to pass before he attempted to round the Point; partly to his having kept his helm hard-a-port after the starboard helm signal of two short blasts had been given; and partly to his not having eased his helm so as to pass to the southward of the "Minerva " starboard side to starboard side.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "Whe- " ther every possible effort was made by those on board " the 'Borderer' to save life?" it is not pretended that the "Borderer's" people did not do everything in their power to save life.

The thirteenth question which we are asked is, " Whether the master and officers of the ' Minerva,' " and the master of the 'Borderer' are, or any of " which of them is, in default; and whether blame " attaches to the pilot of the 'Borderer'?" And it is added, that "the Board of Trade are of opinion that " the certificates of the masters of the 'Minerva' and " the 'Borderer' should be dealt with." So far as we can see, no blame attaches to the master and officers of the "Minerva," or to the master of the "Borderer," and we shall, therefore, not deal with their certificates. The master of the "Minerva," it appears to us, navigated his ship in every respect in a proper way; and the master and officers of the "Borderer" carried out all the orders which they received from the pilot. It was suggested at one time that the master of the "Borderer" had shewn a tendency to interfere with the pilot, and that as it was he who suggested to the pilot that he should pass the "Minerva" starboard side to starboard side, it is probable that he gave the order for the starboard helm signal. On the other hand, it was said that the master of the "Borderer" was to blame for not having interfered with the pilot when he saw that he was doing wrong in keeping his helm hard-a-port at the same time that the signal had been given to starboard the helm, and that he should then have taken the control of the vessel out of his hands. The circumstances, however, in which a master would be justified in interfering with a pilot in the navigation of a vessel are extremely rare, and a master who did so would incur a very serious responsibility. On the other hand, for the master to suggest to the pilot what he ought to do is not only right, but it is his duty; and in suggesting to the pilot that he should pass on the starboard side of the "Minerva," he suggested that which, it is now admitted, was the only proper course to take; there is a great difference between suggesting what should be done and taking the charge out of the pilot's hands. In our opinion, the whole blame for this collision rests with the pilot and with the pilot alone. He had no right to attempt to go round Coalhouse Point and the Ovens Buoy at full-speed, as he did, when he saw the "Minerva" coming down, until after she had passed clear; and he had no right to keep his helm hard-a-port after the starboard helm signal of two blasts had been given, intimating to the "Minerva" that they intended to starboard their helm, but he should have eased his helm and passed to the southward of the "Minerva," starboard side to starboard side. It seems that this man has been a duly licensed Trinity House pilot for the last 28 years, and that during that time he has navigated a large number of vessels, both small and great, up and down the River Thames. At the same time, he admitted that he had only once read the Rules for the Navigation of the River Thames, and that was some 6 years ago, when they first came out; since which time he had not troubled himself to look at them. As a matter of fact, too, it is clear that he was but imperfectly acquainted with them. That a man should presume to navigate large vessels of some 4 to 5,000 tons, up and down the River Thames at full-speed, without taking the precaution to make himself thoroughly coversant with the Rules and Regulations for the Navigation of the River, is to us utterly inconceivable. We have, however, no power to deal with his certificate, and whether he should continue to hold that certificate or not, is a question for the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House to decide.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

C. Y. WARD,

 

 

 

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

 

 

J. MORESBY,

 

50022—17. 200.—1/87. Wt. 12. E. & S.