Wreck Report for 'Ben Mac Dui', 1887

(No. 3116.)

"BEN MAC DUI" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 13th of January 1887, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains RONALDSON and WILSON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "BEN MAC DUI," of Aberdeen, on the Leman Sand, in the North Sea, on the 15th of December last, whilst on a voyage from Blyth to Plymouth.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding of said vessel was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of James Reid, the master, and it accordingly suspends his certificate for three months, but recommends that during the period of the suspension of his master's certificate he should be allowed a first mate's.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 13th day of January 1887.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

R. WILSON,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 13th of January instant, when Mr. McConnell appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Nelson for the owners and master of the "Ben Mac Dui." Seven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. McConnell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Nelson then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and McConnell having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Ben Mac Dui" is an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Aberdeen, of 592 tons gross, and 377 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 72 horse-power. She was built at Aberdeen in the year 1874, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of the Davidson Steamship Company, Limited, Mr. John Birnie Adam, of Newcastle, Mr. Thomas Adam, junior, of Aberdeen, and Mr. Alexander Chievers Adam, of London, being the managers. She left Blyth, in Northumberland, at about 5.15 p.m. of the 14th of December last, with a crew of 14 hands all told, and a cargo of 700 tons of coal, bound to Plymouth. the weather at the time being dull and rainy, with a strong wind blowing from about S.E. At 8 p.m. the same day she passed Seaham Harbour, at the distance of between 8 and 9 miles, and half an hour after midnight they were off Whitby, distant approximately from 6 to 7 miles. From that time until she struck no land or lights were seen, and the vessel's position was determined by dead reckoning only. At 6 a.m. the captain, supposing that he was about 7 miles from Flamborough Head, altered the course to S.S.E. 1/2 E. by the standard compass, equivalent to S.S.E. magnetic, there being half a point deviation on that course; and allowing, as the master said, for about a point to half a point of leeway, that would make the course S. by E. to S. by E. 1/2 E. That course it was thought would take her between the Outer Dowsing and the Dudgeon Light-vessel. At this time the wind was blowing a strong breeze from the E.S.E., but during the day it increased considerably, veering round to the south. At 6 p.m. the master supposed that the Dudgeon bore W. by N., distant about 10 miles, upon which the engines, which till then had been going at full-speed, were put down to half-speed. At 8 p.m. a cast of the lead was taken, which gave 16 fathoms, but, allowing for the slack of the line and for the fact that it was then high water, the master estimated that they were then in 13 fathoms by the chart, which he thought would place her with the Dudgeon bearing N.W. distant 12 miles, and Cromer bearing S.S.W., distant also 12 miles. The course was then altered to south by the standard compass, equivalent to S. 1/2 W. magnetic, and that course was kept till 9 p.m., when it was altered to S. by W. by the standard compass, equivalent to S. by W. 1/2 W. magnetic, or allowing a point for leeway S. 1/2 W. At 10 p.m. it was again altered to S.S.W. by the standard compass, equivalent to S.W. by S. magnetic, or allowing a point to a point and a half for leeway, to S. by W. 1/2 W. It was the second mate's watch, and: he was on the bridge keeping a look-out, the master being in the chart-room, when suddenly, at about 10.50 p.m., broken water was observed on the starboard bow; upon which the second mate summoned the captain, who at once came out and ordered the helm to be put hard-a-starboard and the engines to be stopped and reversed full-speed, but before the order to stop had been given the vessel struck. After striking heavily several times the vessel came off into deep water, but with the loss of her rudder and other considerable damage, completely disabling her. In about 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour afterwards, a light was sighted, which proved to be the Leman and Ower's Light. Finding that the vessel was unmanageable owing to the loss of her rudder, the master set the main sail, and having constructed a jury rudder with spars and planks, he launched it over the stern, but they could not get it to act, owing to a portion of the rudder post sticking out at an angle of 45 degrees which caused the vessel to go off as if under a continuous starboard helm. She continued knocking about until 4 p.m. that day, when a steam vessel called the "Malvina" came up, and agreed to tow her to London, but finding that all her efforts to take hold of her were in vain, the tow ropes continually breaking, the "Malvina" at about 9 p.m. was obliged to leave her, and to proceed on her voyage. The "Ben Mac Dui" then came to an anchor, and at about 4 a.m. the next morning a steam tug came up, and having taken hold of her, towed her to Lowestoft Roads, whence she was taken into the harbour about 1.30 p.m. the same day. Having been there temporarily repaired, the vessel proceeded in tow to London, where she is now, we understand, undergoing repairs.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What " was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" The cause of the stranding of the vessel is, that the master, not knowing his true position, allowed her to get some 17 to 18 miles to the eastward of where she should have been, and where he supposed she was, and she was thus landed on the Leman Sand.

The second question which we are asked is, "What " compasses had she on board, where were they placed, " and when and by whom were they last adjusted?" We are told that she had three compasses, a pole compass, a standard compass on the bridge, and an after compass. They appear to have been adjusted by Messrs. Berry and Mackie of Aberdeen on the 8th of November last.

The third question which we are asked is, "Did the " master ascertain the deviation of his compasses by " observation from time to time? Were the errors of " the compasses correctly estimated and the proper cor- " rections to the courses applied?" The master has told us that from the day the compasses were adjusted he had no opportunity of testing them by observation, but that he assumed that the deviation cards with which he had been supplied were accurate, and that he worked from them. The chief officer, indeed, said that on one occasion he had thought that the compasses were not correct, but the master stated that he never had had any reason to think so; and Mr. Nelson has stated that he does not attribute the loss of this vessel to any error in her compasses. And in that opinion we entirely concur.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " safe and proper courses were set and steered after " passing Whitby, and whether due and proper allow- " ance was made for tide, currents, and leeway?" What were the courses actually steered, and whether the master was justified in allowing now half a point, now a point, and now a point and a half for leeway, it is quite impossible for us to say. It is clear, however, that they could not have been safe and proper courses, or they would not have landed him on the Leman Sand.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify " the position of the vessel at and after 8 p.m. on the " 15th of December last?" It was at 8 p.m. of the 15th that the first and only sounding was taken, which gave them 16 fathoms, and allowing for the slack of the line and the fact that it was high water, the master estimated that it would give him 13 fathoms by the chart; and from this, and from the distance shewn by the log, he seems to have come to the conclusion that the Dudgeon bore N.W., distant 12 miles, and Cromer S.S.W., also distant 12 miles. But it is clear that it was most unsafe to rely upon a single cast of the lead to determine his position, on which, of course, would depend the course to be steered. After this it is not pretended that he took any steps whatever to ascertain or verify his position.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " safe and proper alterations were then and thereafter " made in the course, and whether due and proper " allowance was made for tide, currents, and leeway?" Whether the alterations were safe and proper would, of course, depend on the position of the vessel at the time, and of this the master was ignorant; but that they were not safe and proper alterations is clear from the fact of the vessel having got on the Leman Sand.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " the lead was used with sufficient frequency?" They passed Whitby at 0.30 a.m. of the 15th and from that time until 10.50 p.m. when she struck, neither land nor light was seen, so that the only mode of ascertaining and verifying their position was by taking frequent casts of the lead, and yet during all this time only one cast was taken, namely at 8 p.m. It is obvious that this was not sufficient. The master told us that he supposed that at 6 a.m. he was off Flamborough Head and about 7 miles from it, but he took no steps to verify that position, although a cast of the lead would have given him a fair idea, whether his assumption was correct, and it was important that he should do so, as this was his point of departure. When, too, he knew from the distance run that he was getting into the neighbourhood of these dangerous sands, he ought to have had the lead almost constantly going, until he had ascertained with certainty his true position.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whe- " ther a good and proper look-out was kept?" We are told that the second officer was on the bridge keeping a good look-out, and that as soon as he saw the breakers he immediately summoned the master, who came out of the chart-room, where he then was, and at once ordered the helm to be starboarded and the engines to be stopped and reversed full-speed. At the same time it is clear, from the evidence of the second engineer, that the vessel struck before he got the order to stop, and that it was after that that he got the order to go astern. But if the second officer and the look-out man, who was also on the bridge, it being impossible to station him forward, had been keeping a good look-out, it seems strange that they should not have seen the breakers in time for the order to stop and reverse before the vessel struck. We have, however, no evidence that they were not keeping a good look-out.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" in our opinion she was not. The master has told us that he has been hundreds of times up and down this coast, and felt confident of his position; it is a case of over-confidence. A less confident man would have hesitated to go amongst these dangerous sands until he was certain of his position, and that this master should have done.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and officers are, or either of them is, in " default?" and it added that, "In the opinion of the " Board of Trade, the certificates of the master and " officers should be dealt with." It is clear that the blame for this casualty rests with the master, and with the master alone. The chief officer has generously endeavoured to take upon himself a share of the blame for not having taken a cast of the lead at 4 p.m., when he went off watch. But we cannot shift the responsibility for not taking more frequent casts of the lead from the master on to the chief officer; it is the duty of the master and not of the officer to say when a cast of the lead is to be taken. It seems that this gentleman has been in the service of the owners of the "Ben Mac Dui" for the last 8 1/2 years, for the last six of which he has been in the "Ben Mac Dui," the greater part of the time in command of her, and before that he was for about eight years in the employ of Messrs. Knox, of Aberdeen; and during all that time we are told that he has had but one accident, when his ship was nipped by the ice in the White Sea. He seems to have always conducted himself well, and to have been, as Mr. Nelson said, an upright, steady, sober man. Still we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that, by his reckless navigation in going ahead in thick weather, without taking those means which were open to him to ascertain his position, he has risked the loss of his vessel and the lives of all on board, for if she had not at once come off she would, there can be little doubt, soon have gone to pieces. Looking, however, at his long and meritorious services, the assessors are disposed to take a lenient view of the case, and we shall therefore suspend his certificate for only three months.

The Court, at the request of the solicitor for the the master, agreed to recommend to the Board of Trade that, during the suspension of his master's certificate, he should be allowed a chief mate's.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

R. WILSON,

 

50022—27. 200.—1/87. Wt. 12. E. & S.