Wreck Report for 'Connaught', 1887

(No. 3182.)

"CONNAUGHT" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd days of February 1887, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains WARD and RONALDSON, and Mr. J. H. HALLETT, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "CONNAUGHT" of Newcastle, on Galita Island, on the 30th of December last.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that when the said vessel last left Cardiff, as well as when she left Palermo, her engines and machinery were in good and proper working order, and that her stranding and loss were due to the engineer, when the order was given to go astern, not having been able to start the engines. The Court is further of opinion that no blame attaches to the master or to the chief officer, and that the whole blame for the casualty rests with John Prentice, the chief engineer; but under the circumstances it will not deal with his certificate.

Dated this 23rd day of February 1887.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

C. Y. WARD,

 

 

 

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

J. H. HALLETT,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd days of February instant, when Mr. Kenelm Digby appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Botterell for the owners and master of the "Connaught." The first officer and the chief engineer were present, but were not represented by either counsel or solicitor. Eleven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Kenelm Digby handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. The first officer and the chief engineer then addressed the Court, each on his own behalf, and Mr. Kenelm Digby having been heard for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Botterell on behalf of the owners and master, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Connaught" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Newcastle, of 1650 tons gross, and 1068 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 142 horse power. She was built at Howdon-on-Tyne in the year 1884, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Richard Henry Wesencraft, of Newcastle-on-Tyne, and others, Mr. Wesencraft being the managing owner. At about 5 p.m. of the 27th of December last, the "Connaught" was at Palermo with her steam up preparing to start, when some barges came alongside with some additional cargo, upon which orders were at once given to hold on; and when it had been taken on board she left, having a crew of 23 hands all told, and a cargo of about 1750 tons of fruit and sulphur, besides 300 tons of coals in her bunkers, and drawing 17 feet 3 inches forward, and 20 feet 3 inches aft, bound to Boston and New York. It was then between 7 and 8 p.m., and after proceeding for about 10 minutes, and when about a quarter of a mile outside the Mole, she stopped to let the pilot leave; and in about 3 to 5 minutes afterwards, orders were given to go ahead, when it was found that the engines would not start. As soon as the master ascertained what was the matter, the anchor was dropped, and it was not until after about two hours that they were able to start the engines, when she proceeded on her voyage with the engines going at full speed. It seems that the weather was bad from the first, the wind at that time being from the westward; but by the evening of the 29th, it had gone round to the N.W., and was blowing a whole gale, accompanied with squalls of rain, At about 5 a.m. of the following morning, the 30th, a heavy sea broke over the vessel, smashing the booby hatches, which had been constructed over the hatchways for the purpose of affording ventilation to the cargo, and breaking the windows in the fore part of the wheel house. The vessel continued her course, W.N.W, by the standard compass, or W. by N, magnetic, and at daylight Galita Island was sighted right ahead, distant about 10 miles; upon which the course was altered to pass to the northward of it. Finding, however, that they could make no way against wind and sea, the course was at about 8.30 a.m. altered so as to get under the shelter of the island; and between half past 10 and 11 o'clock they rounded the S.E. point of it. Orders were then given to keep the engines going easy ahead, and with the vessel's head pointing so as to pass midway between Galita and Galitona Islands; and when they were off the S.W. point of Galita Island, the engines were stopped, and she was allowed to drift back with the wind, until she was again abreast of the S.E. point of the island. The engines were then again put on ahead, and when she was off the S.W. point, they were again stopped, and she was allowed to drift back to her former position. According to the master, this was done about three times, but on the third occasion, and after the engines had been stopped for about ten minutes, the master, thinking that they were getting rather nearer to Galita Island than they had been, ordered a cast of the lead to be taken, which gave them from 27 to 29 fathoms, upon which he telegraphed to the engine-room to go half speed astern. Finding after a few minutes that the engines were not going astern, the master went to the engine-room skylight to repeat the order, and was then told that they could not start the engines. In the meantime the vessel had been drifting with the current towards the S.E. point of the island, and fearing that she would go upon it, the master ordered the jib and fore staysail to be set so as to cant her head off the shore, but this seems to have had no effect; and orders were thereupon given to call up all hands to get the anchor out. In about ten minutes the anchor was all ready to let go, but by that time they had got very near the point, and the master, thinking that she would clear it, gave orders to hold on, but unfortunately instead of so doing she struck forward, and the stern swinging round she went broadside on to the rocks. In the meantime orders had been given to get out the boats, and when they were in the water, finding that the water was then above the level of the deck forward, and that nothing could be done to save her, all hands got into the boats, and they pulled for the Island of Galita, where they landed, and found three fishermen, with whose assistance they succeeded in reaching Tunis, whence they have been brought to this country. The vessel and cargo have become a total loss.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether, " when the 'Connaught' left Cardiff, her engines and " machinery were in good and proper working order?" The vessel, which as I have stated, was launched in 1884, was built under special survey, and was classed A 1 * 1 in Liverpool Lloyds, which is the highest class she could have; her engines also were constructed by Messieurs Hawks, Crawshay, and Co., of Gateshead, a well-known and old established firm. In March last she was surveyed by Liverpool Lloyds, and was then continued on her class, and we may therefore fairly assume that at that time her engines and machinery were in good and proper working order. After this, whilst on a voyage from Marbella to Baltimore, and when at about a distance of 600 miles from land, the cover of the high pressure cylinder was knocked off; she managed, however, to get to Baltimore, where the damages were repaired, and according to the report of Lloyds' surveyor, who superintended the repairs at that place, she left Baltimore with her engines and machinery in a thoroughly good condition. She arrived in due course at Belfast, where the former engineer left her, and John Prentice, the late chief engineer, joined her. He tells us that on taking charge he was directed by the master to overhaul the reversing gear, which I am told is a very usual and proper thing to do after a vessel has made a long run, during which the reversing gear would not be required to be used. He also stated that he adjusted the forward bottom ends, taking out two liners, each one-sixteenth of an inch thick, so as to bring the brasses together. The vessel then left for Cardiff, and on the way it is said that the high pressure crank-pin got heated, and they had to stop for about ten minntes in order to allow it to cool, after which they proceeded on their voyage, and arrived in due course at Cardiff. At Cardiff the attention of Mr. Cooper, superintending engineer to the owners, was called by Prentice, the chief engineer, to the fact that the crank-pin had become heated on the voyage; and on examining it he found it scored; accordingly he sent two fitters on board, by whom the crank-pin was stript, the pin and brasses filed and replaced; after which we are told that the engines worked perfectly well. And we have the evidence not only of Mr. Cooper, but also of the chief engineer himself, that, when the vessel left Cardiff, her engines and machinery were in good and proper working order.

The second question which we are asked is, "What " was the condition of the engines and machinery on " the arrival of the vessel at Palermo on or about " December 20th last, and whether the machinery had " been properly and efficiently repaired at the various " ports at which the vessel had touched?" From Cardiff the vessel proceeded to Venice, and thence to Odessa, Sebastopol, and Genoa. From Genoa she sailed for Girgenti, but meeting with bad weather she had to put into Palermo on the way. From Girgenti she went to Catania, thence to Messina, and lastly to Palermo. Now we are told that at all these ports something or other had to be done to the engines; but according to the chief engineer there was nothing of any importance except the heating of the high pressure crank-pin, and the leaking or fracture of the feed pipe. Now the heating of the crank-pin is by no means an unusual occurrence on board steam vessels, and it is a matter with which engineers are expected to know how to deal. The chief engineer also admitted that the fracture of the feed pipe was in the present instance of no great consequence, seeing that the boilers could readily be fed by the donkey. But both these defects, although at first imperfectly repaired at Constantinople and Sebastopol respectively, were afterwards effectually remedied, the former at Genoa, the latter at Palermo, and we were told by the chief engineer that they never afterwards gave any difficulty, and that the engines worked better whilst they were going from Palermo to Galita, between the 27th and the 30th of December, notwithstanding the tempestuous weather which they encountered, than they had done during the whole time he had been on board her. It appears to us that the defects, which shewed themselves from time to time in the engines and machinery were nothing more than might reasonably be expected, and that they were properly and efficiently repaired at the various ports at which she touched: and that the condition of the engines and machinery was good, both when she arrived at, and when she left Palermo.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper and efficient steps had been taken by the " chief engineer to keep or put the engines and " machinery in a proper state of repair and efficiency, " and whether he duly reported the condition of the " engines and machinery?" We have no reason to think that the chief engineer did not take all proper means to keep his engines in a proper state of repair, and that when anything occurred he duly reported their condition from time to time to the captain. Indeed, judging from the numerous telegrams which were sent to the owner, it would rather appear that the chief engineer was somewhat more inclined to exaggerate any little defects that might shew themselves than to conceal them; and so nervous does he appear to have been about crossing the Atlantic, owing mainly to the heating of the crank-pin and the fracture of the feed pipe, that both he and the 2nd engineer applied for their discharges, and the master thereupon agreed to put into Gibraltar to have the engines overhauled, and to land them, the owner having sent out two engineers to take their places.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the engines refusing to act on leaving " Palermo?" According to Mr. Botterell, it was in all probability due to the condenser having become heated, it being, it is said, impossible to prevent the escape of steam into the condenser when steam is up and the engines are not working. That the condenser would have a tendency to heat under such conditions appears to be not unlikely from a fact mentioned by the chief engineer that, when they were in the Dardanelles on the way from Venice to Odessa, and had occasion to stop, they found that, when they wanted to go on again they could not start the engines, and that it was about two hours before they could make them move; and he told us that on subsequently examining the condenser they found the tubes loose and the ferules slack, which Mr. Hallett tells us is exactly the result that would be produced by the overheating of the condenser. Now, in the present case, very much the same thing seems to have occurred, the engines were stopped for between two and three hours whilst they were taking in the cargo, which had been brought alongside, a full head of steam being kept up all the time; then they went ahead for some few minutes, and then stopped for from three to five minutes, and it is suggested that during that time steam might have escaped into the condenser, which might previously have become somewhat heated by the steam which had got into it whilst they were taking in the cargo. And now let us see what steps the chief engineer took to prevent the accumulation of steam in, and the consequent heating of the condenser. He told us that what he did was to put on the ballast donkey, by which he hoped to keep a current of cold water passing through the condenser; but he admitted that he had not closed the main injection; and as the main injection pipe, and the pipe from the donkey, both led to a common chamber before arriving at the condenser, it is obvious that any water pumped by the donkey would, so long as the main injection was left open, pass, not through the condenser and out at the discharge pipe, but down through the main injection. The pumping therefore of water by the donkey, with the main injection open, would have literally no effect towards cooling the condenser. But there was in our opinion another and perhaps a better reason for the engines not starting, when the steam was turned on, and it is this. We are told that when they attempted to set the engines on, both the cranks were on the bottom centres, so that it would require a little manipulation to move them, and to lift the piston from the bottom. Now what did the chief engineer do to get over this difficulty? He says, "I took down the high pressure " starting valve, as I thought that the nuts had slacked " down, but I found that they had not. I then filed up " the face of the valve a bit, and then I put it together " again. And I slacked back the screws of the high " pressure slide valve casing; and that is all I did." He now admits that the taking down the high pressure starting valve to see whether the nuts had slacked down, was of no use, for he says that he found that the nuts had not slacked down. And as to the slacking back of the screws of the high pressure slide valve casing, I am told by Mr. Hallett that the only effect of doing so, would be to lift the slide valve off the face, and allow an escape of steam to both sides of the piston, and thus stop its action. What, therefore, the chief engineer did was absolutely of no use. What he should have done was to have cleared the cylinders by opening the drain cocks, and then to have worked the reversing gear backwards and forwards for a short time, until he had freed the cylinders, and the engines would then in all probability have worked. That there was nothing radically bad or defective in the engines, is in our opinion abundantly proved by the fact that, after they had started, they continued to work from the evening of the 27th until about mid-day of the 30th, and to work, according to the chief engineer, better than they had ever done before, notwithstanding the violence of the gale which she encountered. In our opinion, the refusal of the engines to act was due, partly, perhaps to the condenser having become heated, and partly to the cranks being on their bottom centres when they attempted to move them, and to the chief engineer not having taken the proper steps to start them.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master was justified, having regard to the con- " dition of the engines and machinery, in sailing from " Palermo; or whether he ought, before sailing, to have " taken any and what steps to ascertain and remedy the " defects, if any, in the engines and machinery? We think that the master was quite justified in leaving Palermo as and when he did; he seems never to have refused any application made to him by the chief engineer, and if the chief engineer thought it quite safe to leave, as he seems to have done, the master could have no ground for thinking otherwise. Nor do we think that there were any defects in the engines and machinery which should have prevented her leaving; a fact, which is, in our opinion, clearly established by the manner in which they worked on the voyage from Palermo to Galita.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " on or about December 30th last the master kept the " vessel at a proper distance from the' Island of Galita, " and whether the vessel was navigated with due care " and skill, and if not, in what respects?" With a gale such as is described, the wind blowing with a force of 10, and the vessel at her best making only 8 knots an hour in smooth water, the master was, in our opinion, quite justified in getting under the shelter of Galita Island. Seeing also that the bottom there was composed of nothing but rock and coral, we think that he was quite right in not coming to an anchor, and in dodging about under the shelter of the island between the S.E. and the S.W. points. The distance at which he seems to have kept her from Galita Island was about three-quarters of a mile, which would seem to be a very proper distance, and it was only when he found she was getting rather nearer than that to the shore that he ordered the engines to be turned astern, and when they failed to act. There is nothing, in our opinion, in the way in which this vessel was handled which showed any want of due care and skill on his part.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the engineers being unable to move " the engines astern, when ordered to do so on the 30th " December last, and whether every possible effort was " made by them to carry out this order?" The same causes which prevented the engines from starting when they were off Palermo, probably also prevented their starting when they were off Galita Island. There was, perhaps, at first, some escape of steam into, and some heating of the condenser, whilst the engines were stopped, and a full head of steam was kept up; and we are also told that, when they attempted to start the engines, both the cranks were on their bottom centres. And all that the chief engineer seems to have done to get them to move was to put on the donkey, leaving the main injection open, and to slack back the screws of the high pressure slide valve casing; all of which would, as we have seen, be absolutely of no use. Working the reversing gear backwards and forwards, after draining the steam from the cylinders, would probably have enabled them to start the engines without difficulty.

The eighth and ninth questions which we are asked are as follow:—(8) "Whether when the master found " that the engines would not move, he was justified in " neglecting to let go the anchor; and whether proper " measures were taken to keep the vessel off the land?" And (9) "Whether the chief officer ordered the anchor " not to be let go; and, if so, whether he was justified " in giving this order?" It appears to us that it matters very little whether the order not to let go the anchor was given by the master or by the chief officer; the master was on deck, and in charge of the vessel, and if he thought that it was not a proper order it would have been his duty to countermand it; he must, therefore, bear the responsibility, if any, which may attach to the giving of that order. It seems that after the master had given the order to go easy astern he waited some short time, naturally expecting that his order would be carried out; but when he found that they could not start the engines he ordered the jib and fore staysail to be set to cant her head off the land. Finding that this had no effect upon her, and that the current was taking her towards the Point, he ordered all hands to be called up to get the anchor out. This, we are told, would take about 10 minutes to do, and by the time they were ready to let it go the vessel had drifted so near to the Point that both the master and chief officer came to the conclusion that if the anchor was dropped she would, when she swung to it, strike aft; they both thought that it was the safer course not to let go the anchor, and we are not, under the circumstances, disposed to blame them.

The tenth question which we asked is, "What was " the cause of the casualty?" The casualty was, no doubt, due to the engineers having been unable to get the engines to work when she was being set by the current down upon the Point.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Whether the master, chief officer, and chief engineer " are, or any, and which of them, is in default?" in our opinion no blame attaches to the master or to the chief officer; the whole blame rests with the chief engineer.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cost of the vessel to her owners?" We are told that she cost them 24,500l. in 1884.

The thirteenth question which we are asked is, "What " was her value at the time she last left the United " Kingdom?" We are told that the value which the owner put upon her at the time of her loss is 19,000l., not an unreasonable sum, seeing that she was only built in 1884.

The fourteenth question which we are asked is, " What were the insurances effected, and how were " they apportioned?" The hull and machinery were, we were told, insured for 19,000l., the freight for 1,000l., and the premiums and back averages for another 1,000l. They were all annual policies dating from February in each year.

Lastly, it is said that "The Board of Trade is of " opinion that the certificates of the master, chief officer, and chief engineer should be dealt with." As in our opinion the master and chief officer are not to blame, and as the omission to drop the anchor would at the outside amount only to an error of judgment, we shall not deal with their certificates. As regards, however, the chief engineer, although we are not prepared to say that he has been guilty of any wilful neglect or default, he has shown a want of skill and of resource in the circumstances in which he was placed; he seems to have lost his head, and to have done anything but what he ought to have done. On the other hand, he is described by the master in a letter which he wrote to the owners from Girgenti, as "a hard working steady man;" it is added however, that he "has no command over men, and every little " thing seems to break his heart," which is in our opinion a fair and just description of the chief engineer. Mr. Cooper also, the owners' superintending engineer told us that he had known him ever since he went to sea, and that he believes him to be a steady, attentive, good workman, and thoroughly fit for the position of a second or third engineer; but that he wants experience to have the sole and entire charge of the engines of a large vessel like the "Connaught." This was his first voyage as chief engineer, and we think that it would be well, if he did not, until he has gained a little more experience, and acquired a little more confidence, take charge of the engines of so large a vessel as this; and that it would be well, if he went for some time as 2nd engineer, as many engineers holding first class certificates do. On the whole however, and looking at all the circumstances of the case, we shall not deal with his certificate.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

C. Y. WARD,

 

 

 

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

J. H. HALLETT,

 

50022—93 200.—3/87. Wt. 12. E. & S.