Wreck Report for 'Celtic Monarch', 1887

(No. 3197.)

"CELTIC MONARCH" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th days of March 1887, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains RONALDSON and WILSON and W. B. ROBINSON, Esquire, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the steamship "CELTIC MONARCH," and the loss of the lives of two of her crew, whilst on a voyage from Cardiff to Philadelphia.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the vessel, when she last left Cardiff, was in good and seaworthy condition so far as regarded her hull, machinery, and pumps; that, although not overladen, she was laden down to the extreme limit with a heavy dead weight cargo, which was placed so low down in the vessel as to give her an excessive amount of stability; that there is nothing to show how the water got into the after-tank and after-hold on the 4th of January, but that in all probability it came in through some cock or cocks having been turned the wrong way; that there is also nothing to show how the rudder and rudder post, which appear to have been of the strength and thickness required by Lloyd's Rules, were carried away; and that the vessel was not prematurely abandoned.

Dated this 12th day of March 1887.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

 

 

 

R. WILSON,

Assessors.

 

 

W. B. ROBINSON,

 

 

 

Chief Constructor R.N.,

Retired,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th days of March 1887, when Mr. Mansell Jones appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Bucknill, Q.C., for Edward Hart, the Official Receiver appointed on behalf of the debenture holders, the mortgagees of 55/64ths shares of the "Celtic Monarch," Mr. Sims Williams for the owners of 5/64ths shares, and Mr. Botterell for the master and chief officer of the said vessel. The second engineer was present, but was not represented by either counsel or solicitor. Eighteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Sims Williams then addressed the Court on behalf of his own and Mr. Bucknill's parties, and Mr. Botterell, on behalf of the master and chief officer, and the second engineer having been heard on his own behalf, and Mr. Mansel Jones for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Celtic Monarch "was an iron screw steam ship, belonging to the Port of London, of 2,013 tons gross, and 1,307 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 204 horse-power. She was built at Newcastle-on-Tyne in the year 1879, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. John Patton and others, Mr. John Patton, junior, of No. 5, Newman Court, in the city of London being the managing owner. The vessel left Cardiff on the 2nd of January last, with a crew of 30 hands all told, and a heavy dead weight cargo of about 2,225 tons chiefly consisting of steel blooms, and with about 488 tons of coal in her bunkers, bound to Philadelphia and New York. The pilot left her at about 5 p.m. the same day some three or four miles short of Lundy Island, and she proceeded on her voyage with the wind blowing a fresh breeze from about S.W. At midnight the wind shifted to the N.W., and began to freshen, and on the 4th it was blowing a whole gale. On this day some very heavy seas broke over her, which smashed one of the boats, broke the steam pipes on deck, and did other damage; and at about 2 p.m. the second engineer, who had charge of the engines (the chief engineer having been confined to his berth from the time of leaving Cardiff), went to the captain, and told him that there was water in the after tank and in the after hold, that the tunnel was flooded, and the pumps choked, and that the water was gaining upon them; and he advised that they should put into Queenstown to clear the pumps. The captain told him to go and clear his pumps, and that he, the captain, would see about going to Queenstown; by which the second engineer understood him to mean that he was to go and mind his own business, and that he, the captain, would mind his; which was pretty nearly, I presume, what the captain meant. On sounding, it was found that there were in the after hold about three feet of water, and in the fore part of the after tank, which they sounded through the air tubes forward, from 17 to 18 inches, so that there would be a much larger quantity of water in the after part, the vessel being considerably down by the stern. The second engineer accordingly went, and having taken his pumps to pieces, cleared them, and on putting them together again they were found to work perfectly well, and the water was then pumped out. During the whole of the 5th, however, the gale continued, and the vessel is described as on that day burying herself in the seas; and at about 4 a.m. of the following morning, the 6th, water was found to be coming through the port bunker into the engine-room, bringing with it a quantity of dirt and coal dust. All the hands immediately left the engine-room, and the second engineer went to the captain, and told him that he thought that the vessel was going to sink, as there was a rent in the ship's side. None of the firemen could be induced to go down into the coal bunker to see what was the matter; and accordingly the first and third officers, both of whom held certificates of competency as masters, themselves went into the coal bunker, and after shovelling away about a ton of coals, discovered that the water was coming in through a hole in the alley way, where there had formerly been a pump, and which, when the pump had been removed, had been stopped up with a plate, but this plate had been washed off by the sea. On discovering where the water was coming in, tarpaulins and blankets were stuffed into the hole, and a piece of wood nailed over it, which stopped the flow of water into the vessel; and the pumps having been put on, they being by that time in good order, the water was pumped out. That day they had dinner very late in the cabin, and at about 3 p.m. the chief officer on going up to relieve the second officer, observed that the vessel was off her course, and that the wind, which, when he went below, was on the starboard bow, had got on to the port bow; and on asking about it, the second officer told him that the vessel had kept coming up and falling off again all the watch, and that he thought that she was not answering her helm. On going aft it was then found that the quadrant had settled down upon the deck, from which they concluded that the rudder had gone, but it was then blowing too hard to go out on the stern, and see whether this was so or not. It was found however, that by keeping the engines going slowly ahead she would lie within two or three points of the wind; and she was kept during the night heading that way; and in the morning, a boom having been rigged over the stern, the chief officer went out on it, and then saw that the rudder, as well as the rudder-post, had had gone away entirely, which fully accounted for the quadrant settling down on the deck. On the 7th a hawser with 30 fathoms of chain attached to it was put over the stern to steer her by, but this was found to be of no use. On the 8th another hawser was paid out with a quantity of fenders attached to the end of it, but this also turned out to be of no use. On the 9th they commenced to construct a jury rudder with a spar and planks, with the end of it in the shape of a fish's tail; but before it was finished, a steamer hove in sight, and on being signalled bore down to them, when she proved to be the "Zetland." On being asked to take them in tow, the master of the "Zetland" stated that it would not be possible for him to do so, as he was bound outwards with mails and passengers, that he had already had to put back to Queenstown, and was three weeks late; but he offered to take them on board, if they wished to abandon their vessel. The captain of the "Celtic Monarch," however, declined to leave his vessel, and the "Zetland" proceeded on her voyage, but before doing so gave them a rope with a bag at the end of it to be used either as a sea anchor or to steer by, but this also proved to be of no use. The same day, at about 10.30 p.m., another steamer was sighted, which, on being signalled, bore down to them, when she proved to be the "Knight Errant;" and the weather having by that time moderated, she consented to assist them. Accordingly the "Knight Errant" lowered her boat, and having passed her hawser on board the "Celtic Monarch," a 5-inch wire rope was made fast to it, and the "Knight Errant" having then dropped astern, the "Celtic Monarch" went ahead, at first slowly, but after daylight at full speed, and in this way they succeeded in making good progress; but at about 11.30 a.m. the "Knight Errant's" hawser parted, and the wind having by that time freshened considerably it was found impossible to pass the hawser on board again.. The "Knight Errant," however, kept by her, but at about 3 p.m. she ran down to them and signalled to be quick and abandon the ship, for that the weather was coming on bad. A consultation then took place between the master and his officers, and it was determined to abandon the ship. Orders were accordingly given to get out the remaining lifeboat, and the chief engineer having been put into her, she was swung out, but the vessel taking a heavy lurch, the boat was smashed against the side, and they had hardly time to get the chief engineer out, before she broke in two. On seeing this the "Knight Errant" ran down to leeward of them, and lowered her lifeboat with six hands in it, and a quantity of oil having been poured from the "Celtic Monarch" over the side, the "Knight Errant's" boat was enabled to approach to within about 20 yards of her, but they did not dare to go nearer to her, as the "Celtic Monarch" was lurching heavily to leeward, and the sea was making a complete breach over her, which would have filled the boat with water. After lying in this position for some time, unable to get any nearer to her, one of the firemen of the "Celtic Monarch" volunteered to jump overboard and carry a line to the boat; and having taken a line in his mouth he jumped from the stern, but the "Celtic Monarch" drifting more rapidly to leeward than he did, very soon left him behind, and he was carried away and drowned, as was also another fireman, who had jumped overboard at about the same time. As it was now becoming dark, the "Knight Errant's" boat, after having in vain tried to pick up the two men, turned and pulled towards their own vessel, but they had not got more than half way, when the boat was capsized and the oars were washed out of her. Fortunately, however, the men stuck to her, and on her righting again a buoy with a line attached to it was put out to act as a kind of sea-anchor, the boat without her oars being quite unmanageable. Finding that the life buoy was drifting more rapidly to leeward than the boat, the line was let out, and when the boat had got within five yards of the "Knight Errant," the chief steward of that vessel jumped overboard, and having got hold of the buoy, he was hauled on board again, and a communication was thus established between the "Knight Errant" and her boat. in hauling the boat however alongside, it was smashed, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the hands in her were saved. By that time it had become quite dark, and the two vessels lay to all night, but in the morning they were out of sight of one another. The "Knight Errant" thereupon steamed about at full speed for some 3 or 4 hours, and not seeing anything of the "Celtic Monarch," she resumed her voyage. Finding at daylight of the 11th that the "Knight Errant" was no longer in sight, the "Celtic Monarch" kept her engines going easy, now ahead, and occasionally astern, so as to keep as nearly as possible in the track of the inward bound steamers; the observation, which they got at noon of that day, showing them to be in about 51° 14' north and 13° 48' west, or about 150 miles west of the Fastnets, and this they were able to do, the wind being moderate from about N.W., and the vessel lying with her head to the northward, some three points from the wind and sea. Orders were also given by the captain to clear up the decks, and to mend the copper steam pipe on deck, so as to have the after winch ready, in case it should be required either for a tow rope or for the jury rudder. Fortunately the weather still remained moderate during the whole day, and at 2.30 a.m. of the 12th another steamer was sighted, and rockets having been sent up, she bore down to them, and proved to be the "Lake Superior." On her coming up, the "Celtic Monarch" lowered her remaining boat, a small boat, which had been damaged, but which they had succeeded in patching up, and the chief officer and two hands pulled to the "Lake Superior" to ask if she would take them in tow. The master of the "Lake Superior," however, stated that he was prohibited by his owners from towing, but that he would be quite willing to take them all on board if they wished to abandon their vessel. The chief officer thereupon returned to the "Celtic Monarch," and after a consultation between the master and officers, it was determined to abandon her; and on the "Lake Superior" sending her lifeboat all hands left her, and were taken on board in three trips, the captain and chief officer being the last to leave her. As soon as they were on board, the "Lake Superior" proceeded on her voyage, and on the 14th arrived at Liverpool, where the survivors from the "Celtic Monarch" were landed.

These being the facts of the case, the first question, upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether " the vessel's rudder and stern frame were properly " constructed, and whether the plates were of sufficient " strength and thickness." The vessel, it appears, was built under special survey of Lloyd's, and we may therefore fairly assume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the rudder was properly constructed, and in accordance with the requirements of Lloyd's. Whether it is or is not of sufficient strength or thickness to resist any exceptional pressure which might be brought to bear upon it is a point upon which this Court, with the information that it has before it, is quite unable to offer any opinion. To answer this question satisfactorily, the Court ought to have before it, full information as to the strains, to which the rudder would be exposed, and which that thickness of iron would be able to bear. Mr. Phillips, the superintending engineer to the owners of the ship, told us that the thickness was calculated to meet ten times the highest strain that it would be possible to bring upon it, and if so, that would seem to be sufficient. All, however, that we can say is that, so far as appears, the rudder and stern frame were properly constructed, and the plates were of sufficient strength and thickness.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " the rudder was properly repaired before leaving " Liverpool?" Mr. Phillips told us that before leaving Liverpool he gave directions to Messrs. Adair, who were doing the repairs to the ship, to bush the rudder, and that he believed that it had been done. On the other hand, the second engineer, who was at the time in the employ of Messrs. Adair as a fitter, putting the pumps in order, told us that he did not believe that the rudder had been bushed, for that there had not been time to do it properly during the 24 hours that the vessel was in dry dock. Mr. Phillips also told us that there are three ways in which the rudder can be bushed. Either you may lift the rudder, calliper the pintle and the gudgeons, and having thus ascertained the amount of play, drill some pieces of steel of the requisite size with a flange at the top to prevent their slipping down out of place, and then put them in to fill up the interstice between the pintle and the gudgeons, and then drop the rudder down. Or you may prepare the pieces of steel, and put them in their places without lifting the rudder at all. Whilst a third way is to fill up the interstice between the pintle and the gudgeon with white metal run in hot. The Court, however, was of opinion that it would be proper that the person who had actually done the work should be produced, and accordingly this morning a man named Robert Foster, in the employ of Messrs. Adair, was produced, and he has described very fully the way in which the work was done. He told us that, having received directions from Mr. Adair, junior, to bush the pintle, he went to the shop and got his platform and tools, which he took to the ship; and having put a plate of iron under the upper gudgeon, stopping it with clay to prevent the metal running out, and having also made a collar at the top with clay, he poured in some of Babbet's patent anti-friction metal hot, and then sent up two men to the deck to move the rudder backwards and forwards until the metal had set. He then treated the lower gudgeon in the same way. After that he proceeded to deal with the heel of the rudder, and there drove in two half circles of steel of sufficient thickness to prevent the play of the rudder. He told us that he has been for 16 years in Messrs. Adair's employ, and has always been employed on this particular kind of work, and that he did it in a proper way. We have no doubt, therefore, that the rudder was properly repaired before they left Liverpool.

The third question which we are asked is, Whether " when the vessel left Cardiff she was in all respects in " good and seaworthy condition?" The vessel, as I have already stated, was built under special survey, and when launched in the year 1879 she was classed 100 A1 at Lloyd's. In November 1885 she passed her first time survey, and in December of last year, immediately previous to her departure on her last voyage, she was again surveyed by Lloyd's, and was continued in her class. We have therefore no doubt that she was, when she last left Cardiff, in a thoroughly good and seaworthy condition as regards her hull as well as her machinery.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the pumps were sufficient and in good order?" The second engineer told us that he was employed at Liverpool by Messrs. Adair as a fitter to put the pumps in order; and although he states that they wanted repacking when they started, that was a matter of small importance, for he says that he did it in about an hour and a half. Practically, too, he admits that the pumps were in good order; it is true that they became choked, but that would not show that they were not in good order, for the best pumps would become choked if dirt got into them. As soon, however, as the dirt had been got out of the bilges, the pumps, we are told, worked well, and they were in good order, and were able to keep the vessel free right up to the time of their leaving her. I should add that she seems to have had an ample supply of pumps, having two bilge pumps, a donkey, a circulating pump, and a pulsometer.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the cargo was properly stowed so as to make the " vessel as easy as possible in a sea way; and whether " it was properly and efficiently secured?" It seems that on the bottom of the vessel was laid a tier of wood, upon which were placed two or three tiers of steel blooms; then there was a tier of wood, and then two tiers of steel blooms, and so on, and at the top there was a tier of steel blooms stowed solid, forming a level platform right across from side to side of the ship. Planks were then set fore and aft, secured by shores having a forked upper end to fit into the beams above, the shores being cleated below to the planks. We are told that in the after lower hold there was a space from the top of the cargo to the 'tween deck beams of between four and five feet; whilst in No. 1 lower hold there was a distance of from 10 to 12 feet. In the 'tween decks the whole of the cargo seems to have been laid upon the deck, none of it rising more than two or three inches above the coamings of the hatchway, which were about 18 inches high; and this was also shored off from the deck above. So far then the cargo appears to have been well and efficiently secured from shifting; and although we are told that the shores were constantly coming down and required to be daily put up again, we are disposed to think that these shores were hardly required to prevent the cargo from shifting. It was so securely packed that it could hardly under any circumstances short of the vessel going on her beam ends have shifted. We are told, however, that of the 2,225 tons of cargo which she had on board no less than 1,625 tons were stowed in the lower hold, whilst only 600 tons were placed in the 'tween decks, and that, too, down on the floor.. It was said indeed that there were coals in the 'tween decks, but there would be a much larger quantity of coals in the lower hold, and looking at the disposition of the cargo, the very large quantity in the lower hold as compared with that in the 'tween decks, we are somewhat disposed to think that it must have given her an excess of stability, much more than would make it possible for her to ride easy in a sea way.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was overladen?" The captain told us that after the cargo and bunker coal had been taken in the water was just up to the centre of the disc as she lay in the inner dock in fresh water; and that on getting into the outer basin and into salt water it was just up to the bottom of the disc. Now it appears that the centre of the disc was 4 feet 8 inches below the deck line; so that in fresh water she would have had a freeboard of 4 feet 8 inches, and in salt water of 5 feet 2 inches. Now Mr. Brown, Shipwright Surveyor in the Consultative Branch of the Board of Trade, has told us that the freeboard which this vessel should have had, according to the tables of the Load Line Committee, is for a summer voyage 4 feet 6 inches, for a winter voyage 4 feet 8 1/2 inches, and for a North Atlantic voyage in the winter 5 feet 2 inches. So that she had exactly the minimum amount of freeboard which she was required to have by these tables. Whilst, therefore, we are not prepared to say that she was overladen, it is clear that she was laden down to the extreme limit, which would be all the more dangerous, seeing the heavy deadweight character of the cargo and its low position in the vessel.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the damage the vessel sustained on " or about the 4th of January, and whether the cargo " then worked adrift or shifted to any serious extent?" The damage which the vessel sustained on or about the 4th of January was probably due to various causes; first of all, it was probably due to the extreme violence of the weather; secondly, to the heavy dead-weight cargo which she had on board, and to the excessive stability of the vessel; and thirdly, to the quantity of water which had in some way or other got into the after-tank and after-hold. There is, however, no reason to think that either on that day or on any subsequent day the cargo got adrift or shifted.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the after-tank was partially full of water and the " after-hold flooded on or about the 4th January; and, " if so, what was the cause thereof, and did this cir- " cumstance contribute to the damage sustained?" We are told that when this vessel left Cardiff there was a small quantity of water left in the after part of the after-tank. The second engineer stated that it was left there on purpose, so that when the vessel got to sea the working of the water fore and aft might clear the mud away from the roses; and it is clear that there was not much water there at that time, for the captain said that they had sounded through the air-pipes in the fore part of the tank and found no water there. On the 4th, however, when the second engineer reported water in the after-hold and after-tank, and that the pumps were choked, and proposed that they should put into Queenstown to clear the pumps, both the after-hold as well as the after-tank were sounded, and they then found 3 feet of water in the after-hold, and from 17 to 18 inches in the fore part of the after-tank. How it was that the water got in there it is quite impossible for us to say. There was, however, one remark made by the witness, William Reedy, the donkey man, which struck us a good deal. He said, "We were all a parcel " of dummies as regards the cocks in the engine-room;" and in that opinion the Court is disposed to think that there is a good deal of truth, and that they were probably a parcel of dummies, not excepting, perhaps, even the second engineer. He seems to think that the water may have got into the vessel by turning the cocks the wrong way; but says that that must have occurred when he was off duty. But whether this was or was not the way in which the water got in, there can be no doubt that the presence of the water did contribute to the damage.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "What was " the cause of the rudder carrying away on or about " the 6th of January, and whether every possible effort " was subsequently made to rig and fit a jury rudder, " or to steer the vessel by other means?" It is quite impossible for us to say what was the cause of the rudder carrying away. It may have been due in part to the extreme stability of the vessel, thus bringing a greater strain than usual upon the rudder; or it may have been due to some defect in the material or the workmanship. All that we do know about it is that the rudder was first missed in the afternoon of the 6th of January; and after this every effort was in our opinion made to rig and fit out a jury rudder. On the 7th they paid out a hawser with 30 fathoms of chain cable attached to the end, but that was found to be of no use. On the 8th they paid out another hawser with a number of fenders attached to the end, but that also was found to be of no use. On the 9th they commenced making a jury rudder with a spar and planks, and it was whilst they were doing this that the "Zetland" came up. Then they seem to have tried the sea anchor, which had been given to them by the "Zetland," but found that of no use. And when the "Knight Errant" came up and got hold of them they naturally ceased to work any longer at the jury rudder. On the 11th they naturally did not put it over the stern, for their object was to remain in about the same spot, so as not to get out of the track of the steamers; and this they did by occasionally backing and going ahead; and as she would only lie with her head to the northward, any attempt to use the rudder might have taken them out of that track. I may add that Mr. Robinson tells me that after an experience of forty-five years in Her Majesty's dockyards, he has never known a jury rudder constructed which would be of the slightest use in bad weather. You can easily get a jury rudder to act in fine weather, but that was not the kind of weather with which this vessel had to contend. Moreover, even had they succeeded in getting this jury rudder over the side, it is very doubtful whether they would have been able to work it effectively without the after-winch; and that winch could not be used without steam, and the pipe leading to it was broken. We think therefore that every possible effort was made by those on board to rig and fit out a jury rudder and to steer the vessel.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "What " were the circumstances in which two firemen jumped " overboard, and whether every possible effort was made " to save them?" I have already stated in some detail the circumstances under which these two firemen jumped overboard and were drowned; and it is unnecessary to repeat it here. Suffice it to say that all that could be done for them from the "Celtic Monarch" was to throw to them life-buoys, and that we are told was done. As regards the "Knight Errant's" lifeboat, we are told by the carpenter who was in that boat that they tried to pull towards them, but as soon as they got out of the shelter of the "Celtic Monarch" they found they could make no way, and that it was quite impossible to reach them. We have no reason to think that every possible effort was not made to save these men.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " having regard to the condition of the vessel on or " about the 12th January, to the fact that the pumps " were able to keep the water under, and that the " weather was moderate, that there was a good supply " of coal and stores, that another steamer was in sight, " and to the position of the vessel, she was prematurely " abandoned?" And first as regards the condition of the vessel; it is quite true that the vessel's engines were working, that she had plenty of coals and stores, and that her pumps were in good order, and were able to keep the vessel free. On the other hand, she had lost her rudder, and was entirely out of control, the coamings of the hatchways and of the forward end of the midship house were started, the doors into the alley ways had been torn away, she had no boats except one small one, which was damaged, and she could only lie in one direction, with the wind some 2 or 3 points on her port bow, when the engines were going easy ahead, and if they were stopped she fell off at once into the trough of the sea. As regards her crew, she had lost two of her firemen, the chief engineer was confined to his cabin, the third engineer and one of the men had had their ribs broken, and another of the men was confined to his bunk, and all of them were thoroughly knocked up, the vessel having been beating about in a helpless condition for about 6 days, during which they had not been able to go to their berths. It is true also that when they abandoned her the weather was moderate, but it was what one of the witnesses called foxy weather, fine for a time, and then coming on to blow violently, and the fact that it could not be relied on is sufficiently proved by the violence of the gale after the "Knight Errant's" hawser parted, rendering it quite impossible to re-establish any communication with her, and by the fact that on the same day on which they left her the "Lake Superior" was running before a gale with the wind aft making some 13 knots. Again as regards the vessel's position, she was no doubt in the track of the homeward bound steamers, but if a gale had sprung up, making it necessary to turn her engines ahead to prevent her getting into the trough of the sea, she might easily have got out of the track of vessels and on to the west coast of Ireland, her head being to the northward. It is said also that there was another vessel in sight, and that she made no attempt to get any assistance from her; that vessel, we are told, was the "British Prince," homeward bound with passengers and mails. She had been for some little time in company with the "Lake Superior," and was sighted, we are told, at the same time as that vessel from the "Celtic Monarch;" and the master of the "Celtic Monarch" naturally supposed that the rockets which he had thrown up, and in answer to which the "Lake Superior" had come up to her, had been seen equally by the other vessel. The "Lake Superior," however, being the faster ship, had outrun the "British Prince," and come first to the "Celtic Monarch's" assistance, and the "British Prince" thereupon continued her course. The master of the "Celtic Monarch" did not know until after the return of his chief officer that the "Lake Superior" would not take them in tow, and by that time the "British Prince's" lights were out of sight. What ground, too, is there for supposing that the "British Prince" would have taken them in tow, even had she been able to signal to her, which the master tells us he was not able to do, all his remaining rockets having been wetted. The risk, too, of not falling in with any other vessel, if he allowed the "Lake Superior" to leave him, must have been forcibly brought home to the captain's mind by the fact that they had lost sight of the "Knight Errant" during the night of the 10th, and that they had not seen any vessel during the 11th, being as they were on the extreme northern limit of the track of the steamers, and with great risk of being set still further to the north. ward. Looking at all these circumstances, we are clearly of opinion that the vessel was not prematurely abandoned.

Now the only person who has come forward to say that she was, in his opinion, prematurely abandoned is the second engineer; neither the first, nor the second, nor the third officers have presumed to say so; but it is the second engiueer who does it, a person holding only a 2nd class certificate of competency, and who told us that he had been battened down in the engine-room for some four or five days, during which he had not been on deck, and who could, therefore, know comparatively little of the dangers to which the vessel was exposed, or of the risk of her being carried out of the track of vessels. The accusation, too, comes with a bad grace from him, seeing that when the water came into the engine-room through the port bunker, he and the whole of the hands belonging to that department rushed out of the engine-room spreading a report that she was about to sink, and could not be induced to go into the bunker to see where the water was coming in, but left it to the 1st and 3rd officers to shovel away the coals and find it out. When, too, the boat of the "Lake Superior" came alongside, the persons who first got into her were the whole of the hands from the engine-room, except the 2nd engineer, who seems to have stayed behind to get some of his things together. He, too, took good care to go in the second boat, although he now tells us that he never thought the vessel was in danger, and says that he thought that the master and officers might also have gone off in that boat if they had not had some reasons of their own for staying behind, implying that they had some improper motives for so doing. And yet this gentleman was obliged to admit that it was at his own urgent entreaty that the boat pushed off, and that as soon as he got into the boat he asked them, for God's sake, to push off, saying that the boat was full enough, and that it might come back for the rest, adding that his own life was as valuable to him as any other's. And yet this gentleman now comes and tells us that, in his opinion, there was never any danger, and that he wished to remain by the vessel if he could only have got 3 or 4 more to stay with him. We do not believe him. In our opinion the master remained by the vessel as long as it was at all prudent to do so; he had refused to leave her when the "Zetland" offered to take them off, and when the "Knight Errant" tendered her services he accepted them, and did his best to get the vessel to a port of safety. Had he, when the "Lake Superior" offered to take them on board, refused to leave the vessel, it is quite possible that they might never have had another chance, and that the vessel might either have foundered or been wrecked on the west coast of Ireland without having any means of saving their lives.

The twelfth question which we are asked is," Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care." There is nothing, in our opinion, to show that she was not.

The thirteenth question which we are asked is, "Whether the master and officers are, or either of " them is, in default?" And it is added that "the " Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificates of " the master, officers, and engineers should be dealt " with." From what has been said, it is clear that we have no intention of dealing with the certificates of either the master or the officers of this vessel. If blame is to be attributed to any one, it is to the second engineer for leaving Cardiff with the bilges in so foul a state, as he describes them to have been. At the same time it must be remembered that the chief engineer was then in charge, and upon him therefore the chief responsibility must rest. Again, the second engineer is to blame for not having at once taken steps to clear the pumps when he found, on the 4th of January, that there was water in the after hold and after tank, and that it was gaining upon them, and for proposing to the master to put back to Queenstown, a step which the result showed to be quite unnecessary. He is also to blame for not exercising proper control over the men in the engine-room, for giving way to panic when the water came through the port bunker by saying that there was a rent in the ship's side, and for not going himself into the bunkers when he found the firemen would not do so, to see whence the water came, but leaving it to the first and third officers to do so. But he is above all to blame for making groundless charges against the master and officers for which there is not the slightest foundation. At the same time it cannot be pretended that any of these acts, culpable as they no doubt were, contributed in any way to the loss of the vessel, for the bilges were cleared out, and the pumps were put in order and were kept going until they finally abandoned the vessel; nor is there anything to show that it was by his neglect or default that the water got into the after hold and after tank on the 4th, and thus contributed to the damage which the vessel sustained. Had there been, we should have had no hesitation in dealing with his certificate.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

 

 

 

R. WILSON,

Assessors.

 

 

W. B. ROBINSON, C.C.R.N.,

 

50022—108. 200.—3/87. Wt. 12. E. & S.