Wreck Report for 'Egypt', 1887

(No. 3248.)

"EGYPT" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster on the 25th, 26th, and 28th days of April 1887, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains HARLAND and DRAGE, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the steamship "EGYPT," of Newcastle, on the 6th of March last, whilst on a voyage from New York to Lisbon.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circamstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that when the said vessel left New York on her last voyage, she was, so far as her hull and machinery were concerned, in a good and seaworthy condition, and that her cargo was properly stowed; but that the area of her freeing ports was deficient, and that she was greatly overladen. The Court accordingly suspends the certificate of James Wright, the master, for six months, but recommends that during the period of the suspension of his master's certificate a first mate's certificate be granted to him.

The Court made no order as to costs.

Dated the 28th day of April 1887.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

 

 

ZACHARY BROOKE DRAGE,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 25th, 26th, and 28th days of April instant, when Mr. Middleton appeared for the Board of Trade, and Dr. Raikes for the owners and master of the "Egypt." Thirteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Middleton handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Dr. Raikes then addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Mears, for Mr. Middleton, having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Egypt" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of Newcastle, of 1,571 tons gross, and 1,012 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 130 horse-power. She was built at Low Walker on Tyne in the year 1879, and at the time of her loss was the property of Messrs. Bucknall, of No. 22, Crutched Friars, in the City of London, Mr. Henry Corfield Bucknall being the managing owner. She left New York at about 3 p.m. of the 22nd of February last, with a crew of 20 hands all told, and a cargo of 45,725 bushels of wheat in bulk, and 17,480 bushels in sacks, and having about 314 tons of coals in her bunkers, bound for Lisbon. On leaving, the weather was moderate, with a fine breeze from the W.N.W., but on the following day the wind increased, and on the 25th it was blowing a whole gale from W. to W.N.W., and the vessel was kept running before it, making about 9 knots. During all this time the vessel was shipping very heavy seas, and at length, at about 6 p.m., a sea came over the starboard side, filling the well between the poop and forecastle, upon which the vessel was brought round head to wind, and the engines were kept going ahead between half speed and slow. At about 8.15 p.m. another heavy sea broke over the bows, smashed in the fore hatch, and running aft started the bulkhead in front of the poop, and broke some planks and two of the beams of the poop deck, flooding the forehold and the stoke hole. The vessel was thereupon again put before the wind and sea, and they proceeded to secure the fore hatchway, and to cover up the damaged planks on the poop deck with sails and tarpaulins, and at 5.30 a.m. the following morning, the 26th, another sea broke over her, filling the well and again smashing in the fore hatchway. The hatchway was again secured with planks and sails, but the vessel continued to make water, and towards daylight steam began to give out, and between 7.30 and 8 a.m. the fires were put out. They then tried to light the donkey, but the wash of water soon put the fires out, and having cut off all the connections they proceeded to bale her. On the 27th they commenced to jettison the cargo, and continued at it until the 2nd of March, when, finding that there were 14 feet of water in the engine room, and that the vessel was settling down forward, it was resolved to abandon her, and the boats having been properly provisioned, at about 11 a.m. all hands got into them. They remained near the vessel during that day and the following night; and on the following morning a vessel called the "Hannah Blanchard" was sighted, and on being signalled to, bore down and took them on board. They were then in about latitude 38° 4' north and longitude 56° 10' west, and it is stated that when they abandoned her she had 21 feet of water in the engine-room, and that in about 3 hours afterwards she was seen to go down. The "Hannah Blanchard" then proceeded on her voyage, and subsequently landed the "Egypt's" crew at New York.

These being the facts of the case, I propose first to deal with the second question which has been put to us, and which is as follows:—"Whether the openings in " the bulwarks on either side of the well deck were " properly placed and sufficient to readily clear it of " water shipped thereon?" The vessel was what is commonly called a well-decked ship, having the main deck exposed for a length of some 80 feet between the poop and the forecastle, with bulwarks 5 feet high on each side. In the bulwarks there were originally two freeing ports on each side, 2 feet by 2 feet 6; but a third was subsequently added of the same size, giving a total freeing area of 15 square feet. Now in sub-paragraph F at page 16 of the instructions issued by the Board of Trade to their Surveyors on the subject of freeboard, and which have been approved by Lloyds', we find it stated that "the minimum freeing port area " is to be one square foot for each 3 feet in length of " the bulwarks in the well, and two-thirds of this is to " be in the after part of the well." Mr. Brown of the Consultative Department of the Board of Trade, told us that since those instructions were issued, the rule has, by agreement between Lloyds' and the Board of Trade, been somewhat modified, one square foot of freeing area being now required for every five feet instead of for every three feet length of bulwarks. And seeing that this is the minimum that is required by the rules, and that the bulwarks were 80 feet long, it is obvious that a freeing port area of only 15 square feet was not sufficient. It was said by Dr. Raikes that in addition to the freeing ports, there were on each side two mooring ports about 12 by 15 inches; and that if the area of these was added, it would bring the freeing area above the minimum required for a length of 80 feet of bulwarks; but all vessels have necessarily mooring ports in the bulwarks, and the requirement of one square foot of area for every five feet of length is in addition to the area of the mooring ports. Moreover, the instructions, as we have seen, require that two-thirds of the freeing area shall be in the after part of the well. Now the distances of the freeing ports from the bulkhead in front of the poop, measuring from the centre of each port, were as follows:—the aftermost 7 feet, the next from 40 to 45 feet, and the foremost about 65 feet from the bulkhead; so that the requirement that two-thirds of the freeing area should be in the after part of the well has also not been complied with. It was, however, contended by Dr. Raikes that the best position for a freeing port is where it would be clear of any hatchway or other obstruction that would prevent the water from getting readily to it, and that in this respect they could not have been better placed, the foremost being just abaft No. 1 hatchway, the next just forward of No. 2 hatchway, and the aftermost just immediately abaft No. 2 hatchway, and within 7 feet of the bulkhead. There can be no doubt that they could hardly have been placed in a better position, but this will not make up for the deficiency of freeing area; and that it was a serious inconvenience, if not a source of danger, to the crew, is clear from what we are told, that the well was frequently filled, more. especially in the after part, with water, and that the men in going from the bridge to the forecastle had to clamber along the boom, there being no fore and aft bridge provided for the purpose, and it being dangerous to go along the deck.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " having regard to the construction of the vessel and " to the possibility of her well-deck being filled or " partially filled with water, the deck pumps were so " arranged as to be available in case of necessity?" It seems that she had two deck pumps, one forward just before No. 2 hatchway, and the other aft upon the poop deck. There seems to have been no difficulty in getting to the after pump; and as regards the forward pump, so long as the steam was up there was no difficulty in working it; but when the fires were out, as they were in this case, and the weather was bad, it was not possible for the men to stand at them, owing to the large quantity of water in the well. At the same time it is difficult to say where else the deck pumps could have been placed; and it must always be remembered that steamers rely mainly upon the engine-room pumps to keep the water under; and that if the vessel is making so much water as to put the fires out there would be very little chance of their being able to keep the vessel free with the hand pumps, even if they could get at them to work them.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether, " hen the vessel left New York, she was in all re- " spects in good and seaworthy condition, and whether " her cargo was stowed in accordance with the regula- " tions approved by the Board of Trade?" The vessel, we are told, was built under special survey, and was classed 100 A1 at Lloyds', being, in many respects, above the requirements of Lloyds'. She was surveyed in December 1886, just previous to her departure from this country, and was continued on her class, and there is nothing to shew that she sustained any damage afterwards. There is, therefore, no reason to think that when she left New York she was not, so far as her hull and machinery were concerned, in all respects in good and seaworthy condition,' The cargo also, we are told, was stowed in accordance with the rules of the Board of Underwriters at New York, which have been approved by the Board of Trade. The wheat in bulk was placed in the lower holds, and mats and boards laid over it, and above these were laid six tiers of wheat in bags, bringing it up very nearly to the deck beams. There were also transverse wooden bulkheads dividing the holds into separate compartments, and shifting boards from deck to kelson. There is, therefore, no objection taken by the Board of Trade to the mode in which the cargo was stowed, nor is it pretended that it ever shifted.

I will now take the first question, which is as follows:—" Whether the vessel's load-line disc was so placed as " to give her sufficient freeboard, if she was loaded " down to it; and whether the master had proper and " sufficient instructions as to the loading of the vessel " for a North Atlantic voyage." it seems that the centre of the disc was 2 feet 7 inches below the deck; it was placed there originally by the builders on the recommendation of the manager to the owners, and was never afterwards moved; and the letter which contained the manager's recommendation was, we were told, framed and hung up in the captain's cabin, as an instruction to him as to the depth to which he might load the vessel Now it is quite clear that an owner would be justified in placing the load-line on the side of his vessel at the point down to which she might, under the most favorable circumstances, be loaded. What, therefore, we have to consider is, whether, under any circumstances, the owner would have been justified in sending this vessel to sea with a freeboard of 2 feet 7 inches. To shew. us what would be a minimum freeboard for this vessel under the existing Rules and Tables of Freeboard, which have been approved of by Lloyds' and the Board of Trade, Mr. Brown, of the Consultative Department of the Board of Trade, was produced, but objection was taken by Dr. Raikes to his examination, on the ground that his would be expert evidence on a matter which was within the cognizance of the Court and its Assessors, which he said would not be admissible either in this Court or in the Court of Admiralty. Moreover that the evidence was unnecessary, as the information could be readily obtained by a mere inspection of the Rules and Tables of Freeboard, so that, as Dr. Raikes stated, he who runs might read. That it is expert evidence cannot be denied, but it is expert evidence of a character not specially possessed by the gentlemen who usually act as the Assessors to the Court in these cases; whereas information on these matters is peculiarly within the cognizance of the officers of Lloyds' and of the Board of Trade, who are daily dealing with these questions of freeboard. Nor if we may judge from the number of questions that were asked by Dr. Raikes of Mr. Brown, and the manner in which his calculations were questioned, is it so very easy and simple a matter as is contended to calculate accurately the proper amount of freeboard which a vessel ought to have under these, involving as it does the most careful and minute knowledge of the vessel's moulded depth, and of the additions and allowances proper to be made for sheer, for length, for deck erections, for camber, for iron deck, and for deficiency in freeing port area, and other matters; and I therefore prefer to obtain it on the evidence of a gentleman like Mr. Brown, who is thoroughly familiar with all these details, and who can therefore give us the most reliable evidence on the subject. Now the purport of Mr. Brown's evidence was that, after making all due allowances, the minimum freeboard which this vessel ought to have had, was 2 feet 9 3/4 inches for a summer voyage, 3 feet and 3/4 of an inch for a winter voyage, and 3 feet 7 1/2 inches for a North Atlantic winter voyage. It follows then, if Mr. Brown's calculations are correct, that under no circumstances could this vessel have been properly loaded down to 2 feet 7 inches, the point at which the load line was placed, the minimum freeboard for a summer voyage bing 2 feet 9 3/4. But it was said by Dr. Raikes that there ought to be a deduction made of 5 inches from Mr. Brown's estimates on account of certain additions claimed for deficiency of freeing port area, and for the want of proper arrangements to enable the crew to get backwards and forwards from the bridge to the forecastle. The ground on which these additions were made is as follows:—On reference to sub-paragraph (f.) on page 16 of the instructions, it will be seen that, "if the " freeing port area is less than the required amount" an "addition is to be made to the freeboard of one per " cent. of the moulded depth of the ship;" and as the moulded depth of the ship was 21 feet, that would give an addition to the freeboard of 2 and 1/2 inches. Again in sub paragraph (e.) it is said that, "if the crew are not " berthed in the bridge house, and the arrangements to " enable them to get backwards and forwards from their " quarters are not satisfactory, an addition shall be " made to the freeboard of one per cent. of the moulded " depth of the ship," which would give us another two and a half inches. And as the freeing port area was, as we have seen, below the amount required by the rules, and as there were no arrangements whatever for the crew to get backwards and forwards from the bridge to the forecastle, where their quarters were, Mr. Brown very properly added five inches to the freeboard on that account. It remains to consider what were the instructions given to the master in regard to the loading of the vessel for a North Atlantic winter voyage. So far as we can see, there were none; the only instructions which he seems to have had were those contained in the letter from the owner's manager, and by which he was authorized to load down to 2 feet 7 inches, a freeboard too little for even a summer voyage, and without any directions whether any, and what allowance, should be made for a North Atlantic voyage.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " she was overladen?" It was stated by Mr. Mears that we have really no reliable information as to what the weight of cargo which she had in her was; we were told how many bushels of wheat she had on board, but the weight of wheat varies, and it is therefore quite impossible to say what was the actual weight of the cargo. Documents have, however, been brought in with a view to show what was her draught, and what her freeboard when she left New York; and the first of these to which I will refer is what is usually called the Consular Notice, which the master is required to deliver or cause to be delivered to the consul before taking his departure. In this document it is stated that she drew leaving 18 feet 10 forward, and 19 feet 7 aft, giving her a mean of 19 feet 2 1/2, and that she had a freeboard of 2 feet 4. The master told us that he had not filled up that notice, that he signed it and gave it to his agents at New York. and that they no doubt filled it up before giving it in. He also stated that it was not his practice at New York to fill up this Consular Notice, that he only signed it, and gave it to his agents to fill up. The practice is certainly a very loose one, and is calculated to defeat those provisions of the Carriage of Grain Act, by which it is sought to obtain authentic information as to the draught and freeboard of all British ships leaving foreign ports with grain cargoes. I think, however, that it will appear that the figures in that Consular Notice, although not filled up by the captain, are correct, and that they must have been furnished either by the master himself, or by some person who knew the draught and freeboard which the vessel had on leaving. And I am inclined to think so from the report which the master sent to his owner before leaving New York, and which it is admitted was filled in by him. In that report, which is signed by the master, the chief officer, and the chief engineer, and is dated the 22nd day of February, the day on which she left New York, it is stated that the draught of water on leaving was 18 feet 10 forward and 19 feet 7 aft, giving a mean of 19 feet 2 1/2 inches, and opposite are these words, "water partly fresh." Then follows the freeboard amidships, which is said to have been 2 feet 7 inches "in salt water." Now, the vessel took in her cargo in the Atlantic Dock at Brooklyn, and the chief engineer has told us that he tested the density of the water in the dock, and found it to be about one-third salt water and two-thirds fresh, and that he accordingly filled his boilers with it. We were also told by the master that in passing from the dock into salt water the vessel would rise about 3 inches; so that, if her freeboard on getting into salt water was 2 feet 7 inches, her freeboard in the Atlantic Dock would be 2 feet 4 inches. The Consular Notice and the report therefore agree, the draught given in both documents is the same, namely, 18 feet 10 forward and 19 feet 7 aft, giving a mean of 19 feet 2 1/2 inches, and whilst the freeboard given in the Consular Notice is that of the vessel in the Atlantic Dock, the freeboard given in the report to the owners is that of the vessel in salt water. This, too, agrees with what the captain himself stated; he said that he had intended to leave at 7 a.m., but that a dense fog coming on he remained in the dock with his steam up till 3 p.m., and that during that time he estimated that they consumed something like 13 to 14 tons of coals, including the getting up of the steam. In addition to which he said there was a greater amount of ashes and refuse than usual, which could not be thrown overboard until they got out to Sandy Hook; and for all which he allowed about one inch and a half; so that, when the vessel would get to Sandy Hook, she would in his opinion have had a freeboard of 2 feet 8 1/2 inches. Granting, then, that she had a freeboard of 2 feet 8 1/2 inches when she got out to sea, was this a sufficient freeboard? Obviously not, seeing that, according to the evidence of Mr. Brown, which has not been disputed, she ought to have had a freeboard of 3 feet 7 1/2 inches for a North Atlantic winter voyage. The vessel was therefore grievously overladen.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the damage the vessel sustained or " the evening of the 24th of February, and thereafter, " and whether every possible effort was made to repair " it and to keep the water under?" The damage which the vessel sustained was, no doubt, due in a measure to the extreme violence of the gale; had the weather been more moderate she would probably have performed the voyage in safety. At the same time it is, in our opinion, equally clear that, if she had not been so deeply laden, and had had a freeboard, as she ought to have had, of 3 feet 7 1/2 inches instead of only 2 feet 8 1/2, she would have been in a much better position to weather the gale. As regards the conduct of the master and officers, after the vessel got into difficulties, we find, as in almost all cases of this description, that nothing could have been better. On finding that they could not keep the fires alight, they took to the hand pumps; and on those becoming choked, they proceeded to cut holes through the bulkheads separating the chain locker from No. 1 hold, and between the cabin and the after hold, and continued to jettison the cargo, until they were finally compelled to abandon her.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" She seems to have been navigated with proper and seamanlike care. The casualty was chiefly due to her having been so grievously overladen.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " she was prematurely abandoned?" With 21 feet water in the engine-room, and no means of getting out, with the boilers displaced, No. 1 hold full of water, and the vessel evidently going down by the head, it could only be a question of time when, she would founder; and under these circumstances they were fully justified in abandoning her.

I will take the three last questions next. The tenth question is, "What was the cost of the vessel to. her " owners?" We are told that she cost nearly 21,000l.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "What " was her value at the time she left on her last voyage?" Mr. Bucknall has told us that she was valued at that time for insurance at the sum of 16,000l.; and the assessors are disposed to think that that may possibly have been her value.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "What " were the insurances effected, and how were they " apportioned?" We are told that she was insured for 16,000l., but of this 3,0001. had been taken by the owners; practically, therefore, they had insured her for only 13,000l. in addition to which there was an insurance of 500l. upon outfit, but no insurance upon either freight or disbursements.

Lastly, there is the ninth question, which is as follows:—" Whether the master and officers are or either " of them is in default, and whether blame attaches " to the owner?" and it is added that "the Board of " Trade are of opinion that the certificate of the master " should be dealt with." As regards the officers, no blame in our opinion attaches to them for this casualty, the whole blame rests with the master and the managing owner. The managing owner is to blame for not having given the master any proper or sufficient instructions as to the depth to which the vessel might be safely laden, and for giving him authority, if not instructions, to load her down, so that she would have a freeboard of only 2 feet 7 inches, even on a voyage across the North Atlantic in midwinter. It was said by Dr. Raikes that the owners were not naval architects, and that they had no means of knowing what was and what was not a proper freeboard for a North Atlantic voyage in winter. That is a defence which might have been entitled to some weight before the issue of the report of the Load Line Committee, and before its acceptance by the Board of Trade and Lloyds. But if they did not know how to assign a freeboard to this vessel, they had a very easy mode of doing so by applying to Lloyds, and Lloyds would at once have told them what was a proper freeboard for her for a summer voyage, what for a winter voyage, and what for a North Atlantic voyage in winter. This is what they ought to have done, and having obtained the required information they should have given the master the necessary instructions on the subject. It was also said that they had chartered the vessel, and were not, therefore, responsible for the depth to which she was laden; but that defence cannot avail them. They had no right to charter their vessel on conditions which would enable the charterers to overload her to an extent which would be dangerous to the lives of those on board; but they should have ascertained to what depth she might be safely laden, and instructed their captain not to allow her to be laden beyond that depth. The master was still their servant, and it is clear from the detailed reports which he sent to them from every port as to the nature of the voyage, the cargo, the draught and freeboard of the vessel on leaving, and the state and condition of the vessel and her equipments, that he looked to them as his employers, and that he would have been quite prepared to carry out any instructions that they might have given him. The owners cannot thus relieve themselves of responsibility.

As regards the master, we think that he is also to blame for having taken this vessel to sea so deeply laden. He told us that he had commanded vessels for 14 years, and for the last 11 years steamers, and from the indorsement on the copy register he seems to have been master of the "Egypt" since the 13th April 1886, and during that time had made a good many voyages in her. The reports, too, which the master has made to. his owners on all those voyages, commencing with the 17th of April 1886, and coming down to the 22nd of February last, when she left New York, have been brought in, and they show that this is by no means the only voyage on which this vessel has been grievously overladen. I find on examining these reports that the vessel very often left with a mean draught of 19 feet 3 and 19 feet 4, and as her total depth at side amidships was only 21 feet 6 1/2 to 21 feet 7, she must on those voyages have had freeboard of only 2 feet 3 to 2 feet 4 inches. One voyage is, however, especially noteworthy, it is from Oran to Philadelphia; on that voyage she is stated to have had 1,744 tons of cargo, besides 280. tons of bunker coal, and her draught is given as being 19 feet 3 forward and 19 feet 7 aft, giving her a mean of 19 feet 5, and her freeboard is stated to have been 2 feet 3, which was afterwards altered to 2 feet 7. Now Oran is an open roadstead in the Mediterranean, where the water is perfectly salt, and yet she leaves with an alleged freeboard of 2 feet 3 (it should have been 2 feet 2), the total depth at side being only 21 feet 7 fnches; and it is clear therefore that on that voyage she must have been disgracefully overladen. The case is in our opinion a very bad one; here is a valuable vessel and cargo which have been entirely lost, and the lives of all 'on board saved almost by a miracle. The Legislature has given us no power to punish the owner, but we have power to deal with the master; and looking at all the facts of the case, and to the persistent manner in which this master seems to have taken the vessel to sea grievously overladen, we think that we shall not be doing our duty unless we suspend his certificate for six months. We shall, however, on the application of his counsel, recommend to the Board of Trade that during the suspension of his master's certificate he be allowed a first mate's.

At the close of the case, Dr. Raikes asked me to state in the report that the master had in giving his evidence mentioned that the surveyor to the Board of Underwriters at New York, had given him a certificate that the vessel was properly laden in accordance with their Rules, and that she was not in his opinion overladen, and that that certificate was on board the vessel and had gone down in her. Since then, however, duplicates of the documents referred to by Dr. Raikes have been obtained from the United States, and sent to me, and it may be well therefore to see to what they amount. First, then, there is a certificate, which is signed by Mr. J. C. Williams, one of the surveyors, and bears date the 16th of February last, and in which it is said that the "Egypt" has heen "passed to load " grain in bulk and bags in accordance with the Rules " of the National Board of Marine Underwriters," and that her draft of water was to be 19 3/12 mean. The other is a certificate, signed by Mr. H. S. Viney, another surveyor, and dated the 21st of February, which says that the vessel is now loaded, "and that the extent " and manner of loading is in conformity with the " Rules of the Board of Underwriters of New York, " the vessel is drawing 19 feet 3 1/2 inches water, or " has 29 inches freeboard, and in my opinion is not " overladen, nor in that particular unseaworthy." It then gives the draft as 18 feet 11 and 19 feet 8, giving a mean draught of 19 feet 3 1/2 inches, as stated in the body of the certificate. And the first remark which I would make on this document is, that if the vessel had a mean draft of 19 feet 3 1/2, it is quite impossible that she could have had a freeboard of 29 inches or 2 feet 5, for her total depth at side was only 21 feet 6 1/2 to 21 feet 7 inches. But it appears to us that, whether the surveyor did or did not give the master a certificate that the vessel was not overladen, is a matter of very little consequence; we do not know on what principles they estimate the amount of freeboard which a vessel ought to have; it may be that it is left to the absolute discretion of one or other of the surveyors; what we have to do is to ascertain what freeboard she ought to have had by our rules, a point which the master and owner could, if it had suited their interests, easily have ascertained. it appears to us then that these documents ought not in any way to alter the views which we have already expressed, that this vessel was greatly overladen, more particularly for a North Atlantic winter voyage.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

 

 

ZACHARY BROOKE DRAGE,

 

50022—159. 180.—5/87. Wt. 12. E. & S.