Wreck Report for 'Hearkaway', 1887

(No. 3318.)

"HEARKAWAY" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 20th and 21st of July 1887, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Vice-Admiral POWELL, C.B., Captain RONALDSON and Captain BAKER, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship "HARKAWAY" and thirteen lives in the Bristol Channel on the 20th of May 1887.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that when the said ship last left Hull she was much too deeply laden, and that her loss was due to the steam having been allowed, whilst she was lying to, to get so low, that when the wind shifted suddenly from the port to the starboard bow, she could not be kept head to wind, but fell off into the trough of the sea; and that the seas breaking on board stove in the doors in front of the poop, filling the cabin with water and putting the stern under; and the engine room skylight having then been stove in, the water got into her in such quantities that she speedily foundered.

Dated this 21st day of July 1887.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

R. ASHMORE POWELL,

 

 

 

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

C. H. J. BAKER,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 20th and 21st of July 1887, when Mr. Muir Mackenzie and Mr. Lushington appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Barnes for the owners, and Mr. Crump for the master and chief officer of the "Harkaway," and Mr. Meek watched the case for the Victoria Colliery Company. Thirteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Muir Mackenzie handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. A witness was then produced on behalf of the owners, and Mr. Barnes and Mr. Crump having addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Muir Mackenzie having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Harkaway" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of London, of 507 tons gross and 323 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 70 horse-power. She was built at Paisley, in the county of Renfrew, in the year 1882, and at the time of her loss was the property of "Harkaway" Steamship Company, Limited, of No. 16, Water Lane, in the City of London. She left Hull on the 16th of May last with a crew of 12 hands all told and 4 passengers, consisting of the master's wife and two children, and the chief engineer's wife; and having on board a cargo of 637 tons of wheat, besides from 35 to 37 tons of bunker coal, bound to Liverpool; and at 9.30 a.m. of the 19th had arrived of the Longships, when a course was set to pass inside the Smalls. Until then the weather had been fine; but after passing the Longships the wind began to freshen from the S.W., and the wind and sea increasing, accompanied with mist and rain, the course was at about 6.30 p.m. altered to pass outside the Smalls. At about 9.30 p.m. the wind had increased considerably, gradually working round more to the westward, upon which all sails were taken in, and the vessel was brought with her head to the wind, and she was kept under easy steam, with the wind about a couple of points upon her port bow, until about 1.30 a.m., when the wind having suddenly flown round to the W.N.W., and blowing with terrific force, the vessel canted with her head to the southward; upon which orders were at once given to put the helm hard-a-port, and the engines full speed ahead. Owing however to the steam having been allowed to get too low, they were not able to get up the speed, and she continued in the trough of the sea, shipping very heavy seas. Whilst in this position a very heavy sea broke on board her, and running aft smashed in the doors in front of the poop, filling the cabin with water and forcing out the bulkhead. It was then observed that the after ventilator between the end of the after hatchway and the cabin bulkhead was broken off at about four feet above the deck, and that the water was pouring down into the hold, upon which orders were at once given to stop it up, and that seems to have been done. In the meantime however the water in the cabin, as well as that which had got down through the after ventilator, had put the stern under, and the vessel being still in the trough of the sea, between 4 and 5 o'clock another sea broke over her, smashing in the engine room skylight, and at the same time carrying away the jolly boat. Finding that the vessel was fast settling down the captain then gave orders that the lifeboat should be got ready, and as soon as the men were in it, he carried one of his children from the chart room and put her in, and whilst returning to the chart room for the other child, a heavy sea broke over the vessel, washing him overboard. On recovering his senses he saw the vessel just disappearing under the water, and at a little distance off the lifeboat bottom upwards, with several men clinging to it. He accordingly swam to it, and having succeeded in righting it, he and the chief officer, two able seamen and a fireman, got into her, and there found the little child still alive. At this time we are told they were about 30 miles S.S.W. of the Smalls. In about a couple of hours afterwards the child died, and shortly afterwards the fireman; and at about 1 p.m. one of the A.B.'s. At 2 o'clock a steam vessel, which proved to be the "Explorer," of Liverpool, was seen, and on being signalled bore down towards them, but she failed to reach them, and was ultimately lost sight of. In about an hour afterwards a racing yacht called the "Thistle" sighted them, and by very skilful management succeeded in getting near them, and in taking the survivors on board.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether, " when the vessel left Hull, she was in all respects in " good and seaworthy condition?" that is to say, so far as her hull, machinery, and equipments are concerned. It seems that she was built in 1832 under special survey, and was classed 100 A 1. in March last she underwent her No. 1 survey, and was then passed by Lloyd's and continued in her class. Since then she has made only one short voyage without having met with any accident; and there is therefore no reason to think that she was not, when she left Hull, in a perfectly good and seaworthy condition so far as her hull, machinery, and equipments are concerned.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " the bulkhead in front of the poop, the engine-room " skylight, and the after ventilator, were properly con- " structed; and whether they could be efficiently " closed and secured in heavy weather?" The engine-room skylight, which we are told was made of teak, with thick panes of glass, appears to have been strongly and substantially constructed, and being placed on coamings on the top of the engine-room casing, was raised well above the water. The after ventilator also, which was of strong malleable iron, was placed between the after end of the after hatch and the cabin bulkhead, and stood some 8 or 9 feet above the deck, and was no doubt properly fitted with means to exclude the water from going down, in case it should at any time be necessary to unslip the cowl, but which we are told would seldom or never be required. So far, therefore, as the engine-room skylight and the after ventilator are concerned, there is every reason to think that they were properly constructed. The bulkhead however in front of the poop was, we are told, made of wood, and had two doors also made of wood, one on each side. And although it seems that there were shutters, which could be slipped into grooves to protect the lower half of these doors in case of bad weather, it is clear that this was the weak point in this vessel's construction, the more so as there was an open alleyway through the deck-house, so that any water coming on to the deck forward of the midship house, and which was not able to escape through the ports, would necessarily pass through the alley-way into the after well, and strike with great force against this bulkhead. At one time no doubt it was usual to construct these bulkheads of wood, but experience has shewn that they are very liable to be burst in by a heavy sea, and they are therefore now more generally constructed of iron; and the freer they are from doors and openings the safer they are. That this too was the weak part in the vessel is clear from the evidence of Captain Courtman, who told us that he had commanded her for the first three years after she was built, and that he was always afraid in bad weather of these doors giving way. Captain Freear also, it is clear, felt that the cabin was not a safe place, in case the weather became bad, for he removed his wife and children to the chart house before the bulkhead was burst in. in our opinion this bulkhead was not sufficiently strong to resist the very heavy seas which this vessel would be likely to take on deck, more especially when very deeply laden.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " the disc was so placed as to give the vessel sufficient " freeboard, if loaded down to it? and whether on or " about the 30th of March last the mate conveyed the " warning that, if the vessel was loaded to her disc, she " would be overladen, to the master?" The centre of the disc was, we are told, about 1 foot 6 inches below the deck line, half an inch one way or the other. Mr. McIntyre told us that it had been placed there by him, when he built her in 1882, the position being determined, not on any calculations of the proper amount of freeboard which she should have, but because the disc had been there placed in the case of some five or six sister ships which he had previously built; the allowance he said was about 1 1/2 inches for every foot depth of hold. Mr. McIntyre also told us that he had since estimated what amount of freeboard she ought to have had by the New Load Line Tables, and had found that for a summer voyage 1 foot 6 and 5/8 would be sufficient. To arrive however at this figure Mr. McIntyre had deducted 4 3/8 inches for deck erections, and 1 1/2 inches for excess of sheer, which in our opinion he was not justified in doing. The proper freeboard for this vessel, according to the calculations laid before us by Mr. Brown, of the Consultative Department of the Board of Trade, was 1 foot 11 3/4 inches for a summer voyage, and 2 feet 1 1/4 inches for a winter voyage. And if so 1 foot 6 inches would not be a proper position at which to place the disc, so as to give her a sufficient freeboard even for a summer voyage. It further appears that, whilst the vessel was lying at Sunderland in March last, Mr. Whall, the Board of Trade Surveyor at that place, called the attention of the mate to the position of the disc, and told him that, if she was loaded down to it, it would be his duty to interfere, or that she would stand a good chance of being stopped; and that information seems to have been communicated by the mate to the master.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the cargo was properly stowed, and whether all " necessary and reasonable precautions were taken to " prevent it from shifting as required by Section 3 of " The Carriage of Grain Act, 1880?" It seems that the greater part of the cargo consisted of grain in bulk with two tiers of bags in the hatchways, and in the fore part of the vessel where the grain in bulk sloped of from about the after part of the fore hatch to the bulk head forward. Captain Courtman, who commanded her for the first three years, told us that he had frequently carried cargoes of grain in her, but that on all those occasions he had had shifting boards extending some five feet down from the deck. On the present occasion, however, there were no shifting boards; and although we are told that the cargo consisted of the hard Californian grain, which would not be liable to settle, more especially on so short a voyage, we are of opinion that it would have been only a proper precaution, seeing that in all probability the shifting boards were actually on board, if the master had taken the precaution to ship them. At the same time I am bound to say that there is nothing to shew that the cargo ever shifted, or that the vessel acquired a permanent list; on the contrary, the evidence is that she remained upright until she foundered.

I will take the 5th and 6th questions together, they are (5) "Whether she had sufficient freeboard?" and (6) "Whether, having regard to the structural " strength of the vessel, she was overladen?" The master has told us that when she left Hull the water was just touching the bottom of the load line, and if the centre of the disc was 1 foot 6 inches below the deck line, that would give her a freeboard of 1 foot 6 1/2. On getting however into salt water, she would rise about an inch and a half, making her freeboard when she got out to sea 1 foot 8 inches. And if her minimum freeboard for a summer voyage should, according to the Load Line Tables, have been 1 foot 11 3/4 inches, it is clear that on leaving she had a very insufficient free. board. It was said, however, that she had been at sea about 4 days before she met with any damage, and that during that time she would probably have consumed about 27 or 28 tons of coal, which would give her a rise of about 4 inches, giving her a freeboard of about 2 feet at that time, which would be slightly in excess of the minimum, which, according to Mr. Brown, she should have had on leaving Hull. Whilst then we are prepared to say that, when she left Hull, she had an utterly insufficient freeboard, we cannot say that, when she met with the accident which ultimately led to her loss, she had a less freeboard than that required by the rules for her for a summer voyage.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the vessel failing off into the " trough of the sea on the morning of the 20th of May, " and were proper measures then taken to get her head " to the sea?" And with it I will take the eighth question, which is, "What was the cause of the failure " on the part of the engineer to get up more than " 30 lbs. of steam?" We were told by the captain that, when her head fell off, he telegraphed to the engine-room to go at full speed, and finding that she had not sufficient way on her, he sent down to the engine-room to ask what the cause was, and was told that they could not get up more than 30 lbs. of steam, whereas according to the captain she should have had about 50 lbs., so as to have been in a position to act in the event of any emergency arising. How it was that the steam was allowed to get so low we are not informed, and as none of the engineers or firemen were saved, we have no means of knowing. As soon, however, as it was found that more steam was required to be got up, the master took the requisite measures for that purpose by sending some of the deck hands below to help the firemen feed the fires; but at that time the water was over the stoke hole plates, and they had to pass the coal, which was partially wetted, by hand into the fires, a very difficult operation to perform with the vessel lying in the trough of the sea. We are also told that an attempt was made to get way on the ship by setting first the fore staysail and then the fore trysail, but it was all in vain, and the vessel continued to lie in the trough of the sea, without its being possible to get her head to wind and sea.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the damage the vessel sustained, " and her subsequent foundering?" The cause of the vessel foundering was due, first to the steam having been allowed to get so low that they were not able to keep her head to the wind, so that she fell off into the trough of the sea. In this position she would necessarily take large quantities of water on deck, which running aft burst in the cabin doors and broke off the after ventilator, filling the cabin and letting the water down into the after hold. The result would be to put the vessel very much by the stern, bringing the engine-room skylight much nearer to the water, and once the engine-room skylight was smashed in, it would only be a question of time when the vessel would fill and go down. The weakness of the bulkhead in front of the poop, added to the depth to which the vessel was laden, were no doubt the causes of her loss.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " every possible effort was made to save life?" There is nothing to show that every effort was not made by those on board to save life, or that any undue anxiety was shown by the survivors to save their own lives in preference to the lives of the others.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Did " the 'Explorer' do all that was reasonably possible " under the circumstances for the purpose of rescuing " the survivors of the 'Harkaway?'" The "Explorer," we are told, was very high out of water and as light as a cork, and with such a gale as was then blowing she would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get to windward. We were told by the mate of the "Explorer" that, when they saw the boat, they made all possible efforts to get up to her, but that they were unable to do so, and having then lost sight of her they thought that she had gone down, and that after waiting for about half an hour without seeing anything of her they bore away. We are quite prepared to believe that the "Explorer" did make all possible efforts to get to them, although it might well appear to the master and mate of the "Harkaway" that they had not done so.

The twelfth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" There is nothing to show that the vessel was not navigated in a proper and seamanlike manner, or that everything was not done by the master which it was possible for him to do to save the vessel and the lives of those on board.

The thirteenth question which we are asked is, "Whether blame attaches to the master, Mr. Sawer, and " Mr. Forsey, or either of them, in respect of the position " of the disc, and the overloading and loss of the " vessel?" The vessel, it seems, was purchased by the "Harkaway" Steamship Company, Limited, soon after she had been built in the year 1882, and has remained in their possession ever since. Now we were told that the affairs of this company were managed by a Mr. William Sawer and a Mr. John Forsey; but that they were not the managing owners. It is admitted that they were part owners of the vessel, and that they had the management of her affairs, but it is said that they were not the managing owners; the company, it is said, being their own managing owner. It is, however, a mere quibble of words, for Mr. Sawer and Mr. Forsey managed the ship's affairs, arranged what freights she should take, and no doubt got the usual commissions thereon; so that practically, if not in name, they were the managing owners. We are told that when they bought the vessel the disc was already on the vessel's side, having been placed by the builder in the same position in which it was in some 5 or 6 sister ships which he had previously built. From the time, however, of the vessel coming into their possession, neither Mr. Sawer nor Mr. Forsey took any steps whatever to ascertain whether this was or was not a proper place at which the disc should remain. It is said that they are not practical men, and would not therefore know, whether it was or was not a proper place; but if so, they might have applied to Lloyds, who would at once have assigned them a proper freeboard. It is said also that they had the experience of past voyages, for that they had frequently loaded her down to her load line, and that she had always performed her voyages in safety. But there is the old saying of the pitcher which goes too often to the well; moreover it is well known that vessels as they become older, cannot carry such heavy cargoes as they could when new. No doubt the law imposes on the master the duty of not going to sea with a vessel too deeply laden, but the duty of fixing the position of the load line, and of seeing that it is placed in a proper position, rests with the managing owner, or with the gentleman or gentlemen who discharge the duties of managing owner, and that would be with Messrs. Sawer and Forsey. These gentlemen are therefore in our opinion responsible for having allowed the disc to remain in an improper position, and for her having been allowed to leave Hull too deeply laden; although we are not prepared to say that they are responsible for the loss of the vessel, seeing that by the time the accident which immediately led to her loss occurred, she had more than the minimum amount of freeboard required for a summer voyage.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

R. ASHMORE POWELL,

 

 

 

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

C. H. J. BAKER,

 

50022—226. 180.—8/87. Wt. 12. E. & S.