(No. 3485.)
"BENGAL" (S.S.)
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Royal Courts of Justice on the 21st and 23rd of February 1888, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain PARISH, Captain WARD and Captain DYER, R.N., as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the steamship "BENGAL," and the loss of the life of her master, whilst on a voyage from Cardiff to Port Said.
Report of Court.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that when the said ship left Cardiff on her last voyage she was in a good and seaworthy condition, and was not overladen, and that her loss was due to the extreme violence of the gale, which she encountered between the 27th and 30th days of December last, in the course of which the master was washed overboard and drowned, without its being possible for those on board to do anything to save him.
Dated this 23rd day of February 1888.
(Signed)
H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)
ALFRED PARISH,
Assessors.
C. Y. WARD,
RICHD. C. DYER,
Annex to the Report.
This case was heard at the Royal Courts of Justice on the 21st and 23rd of February 1888, when Mr. Macdonell appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Crump for the owners of the "Bengal." Twelve witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Macdonell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Crump having then produced a witness, and recalled the chief officer, addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Macdonell having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follows:—
The "Bengal," which was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of London, of 1,673 tons gross, and 1,095 tons net register, and with engines of 160 horse power, was built at Middlesborough in the year 1874, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. John Glover, of No. 88, Bishopsgate Street, Within, in the City of London, ship owner, and others, Mr. John Glover being the managing owner. She left Cardiff at about 5 p.m. of the 25th of December last, with a crew of 23 hands all told, and a cargo of 2,106 tons of coal, besides 390 tons in her bunkers, bound to Port Said. Nothing particular occurred in the early part of the voyage; but at about 5 p.m. of the 27th when between 250 and 260 miles to the southward of the Wolf Rock, heading to the S.S.W., with the wind blowing a strong gale from about east to S.E., a heavy sea broke over her, which stove in the main hatchway, smashed the port lifeboat, carried the engine-room telegraph and the binnacle off the bridge, and at the same time injured two of the crew. The captain thereupon put the vessel before the wind, whilst they proceeded to repair the damage to the hatchway, and having removed the after binnacle to the bridge, she was then again brought with her head to the wind. The gale however continued to increase, the vessel making very bad weather, and on the evening of the 28th the captain put her before the wind, hoping, we are told, thereby to run out of the gale. She continued to run before the wind, occasionally shipping a good deal of water, until about 2 a.m. of the 29th, when another very heavy sea broke over her, carrying away the two after boats, about 100 feet of the bulwarks and stanchions on the starboard side, breaking the starboard steel rod of the midship wheel, and falling on to the main hatchway again, stove it in, at the same time injuring two more of the crew. The vessel was kept before the wind, whilst they endeavoured to repair the damages as well as they could, and at about 8 or 9 a.m. the same day she was again brought to the wind. In the meantime however a large quantity of water had got into her through No. 2 hatchway, as well as through the holes in the deck made by the tearing away of the stanchions, which made it very difficult to steer her; and accordingly the master and the two officers took it in turns to go to the wheel; and at about 11 a.m., whilst the master was at the wheel, a heavy sea broke over the ship, which carried him overboard, and he was drowned. During the day they continued to steer her by the after wheel, but at about 6 or 7 p.m., when they had nearly succeeded in repairing the midship wheel, the chain of the after wheel broke, and the vessel then fell off into the trough of the sea; and from that time until 2 a.m. the next day, when they had succeeded in repairing the midship wheel, the vessel, we are told, was quite unmanageable, and was turned completely round some six or seven times, labouring and straining heavily all the time. During the 30th the weather began to moderate, so that they were able effectually to secure No. 2 hatchway; but by that time a large quantity of water had got into the vessel, and at length it was observed to be coming in through the screw tunnel and the bunker-doors on the starboard side. Notwithstanding all their efforts, the water continued to gain upon them, and between 11 a.m. and noon of the 31st all the fires were out, and although an attempt was then made to keep the water under by working the deck pumps, and baling, it was found to be of no use; and there being at that time from 8 to 10 feet of water in the engine-room, the port lifeboat, which was the only one that remained—the starboard boat having been washed away on the 30th—was put over the side, and the whole of the crew, at about 9 p.m., got into her. They lay by the vessel the whole night, and on the following morning, the 1st of January, finding that the vessel was still afloat, they again went on board her, when they found that there was between 12 and 14 feet of water in the engine-room, it having risen about 4 feet during the night. Shortly afterwards a French steamer, called the "Ville de St. Nazaire," came in sight, and, having been signalled to, she bore down to them, and sent off two of her boats, by which they were taken on board, and they were landed on the 4th at St. Nazaire. The place where the vessel was abandoned was, we were told, in about latitude 44° North, and longitude 12° 14' West, and, as she was then nearly full of water, there can be little doubt that she must have foundered soon afterwards.
These being the facts of the case, I will now proceed to answer the questions which have been put to us, and the first question which we are asked is, "Whether, " when the vessel left Cardiff, she was in all respects " in good and seaworthy condition?" The vessel which, as I have stated, was built in the year 1874, was built under special survey, and classed 90 A 1 at Lloyd's. She was purchased by Messrs. Glover about 18 months or two years afterwards, and has ever since remained in their possession, and has been, during that time, employed chiefly in the Black Sea and Mediterranean trades. In July, August, and September last she was put into the hands of Mr. Eltringham, of South Shields, when she had new boilers put into her, a new iron upper deck from forward to within about 30 feet of the stern, besides other repairs, and was thoroughly overhauled, at a cost of about 4,500l. She then passed her No. 3 survey, and was continued in her class, 90 A 1. From that time we are not told that she sustained any damage, and we have, therefore, no reason to think that she was not, so far as her hull and equipments were concerned, in a thoroughly good and seaworthy condition when she last left Cardiff.
The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " the ventilators were properly constructed, protected, " and secured?" Mr. Eltringham told us that the coamings of the ventilators were originally 2 feet 6 high, but that, when he repaired?? her last year, he replaced them with coamings 3 feet high, made of steel plates, 1/4 of an inch thick, riveted to the iron deck in the usual way, with angle iron attachments. There were also, we are told, wooden plugs on board, and canvas covers, to be put on in case of bad weather; and there is no reason to think that the ventilators were not in all respects properly constructed, protected, and secured.
The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " the hatchways were fitted with proper and sufficient " fore and afters, and whether the hatches were of suffi- " cient strength, and whether they were properly covered " and secured?" We are told that the vessel had originally three hatchways, two forward and one abaft the bridge. No. 1 hatchway was 12 feet by 9 feet; No. 2, 24 feet by 11 feet; and No. 3, 20 feet by 11 feet. In each of the two larger hatchways, Nos. 2 and 3, there was across the centre a 'thwart ship piece of the same depth as the coamings, and two fore and afters, fitted in slots, on which the hatch covers rested. No. 1 hatchway, which was smaller, had no 'thwart ship piece, but only a fore and after. When the repairs were done last year two new hatchways were made in the after deck, one a little before, the other a little abaft No. 3 hatchway, to facilitate the stowing of the cargo; they were however only 8 feet by 8 and 8 feet by 4 respectively, and were simply fitted with fore and afters. All the hatchways, we are told, had coamings of 2 feet 3 or 2 feet 6 inches high, Mr. Glover was not able to say with certainty which. On the occasion of the repairs being done last year, all the hatch covers and the fore and afters were renewed. The hatch covers were of Baltic deal, 3 inches in thickness, and the fore and afters were of pitch pine, 12 inches by 6 1/2 inches. no doubt teak or oak would have been better than pitch pine, but the Assessors are not disposed to think that they were not sufficient, or that the hatchways were not properly covered and secured.
The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the bunker hatchways and all other deck openings " were properly covered, protected, and secured?" There were, it seems, four bunker hatchways abaft the bridge, two on each side and one forward of the bridge amidships; but they were comparatively small, and appear to have been perfectly well covered, protected, and secured; nor is it pretended that any of them gave way.
The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the pumps were sufficient and in good order?" The vessel was fitted with the usual pumps in the engine-room, namely, two bilge pumps, a ballast donkey, and a bilge injection; in addition to which she had five pumps on deck. Now the presumption would be that, as the vessel had so recently passed her No. 3 survey, the pumps would all be in good order. It is true that Mr. Eltringham told us that he had not done anything to the deck pumps, but she would hardly have been passed by Lloyd's and continued in her class unless they had satisfied themselves that the deck pumps were in good order. One of the seamen, indeed, said that when he came to try them on the 31st, he could not make them work, but that is, perhaps, not to be wondered at, seeing that at that time the stoke-hole plates had been washed up, so that the bilges would be full of small coal, which might very possibly choke the pumps. On the whole, there is nothing, in our opinion, to show that the pumps were not sufficient and in good order.
The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " she was overladen?" We are told that she had a cargo of 2,106 tons of coal, besides 390 tons of bunker coal, making a total of 2,496 tons dead weight, which would be about 100 tons more than she was originally designed to carry, for 1 see from the specification that she was intended to carry about 2,400 tons dead weight. At the some time, 2,496 tons would be only about one and a half times the under deck tonnage, and therefore primâ facie would not be an excessive cargo. Let us see, however, what freeboard she had. According to the evidence which has been laid before us, the distance between the deck line to the centre of the disc was 5 feet; and as we were told by the chief officer that the water, when she lay in the East Bute Dock, just previous to her departure, and when fully laden, was just below the bar, that would give her a freeboard at that time of 5 feet 1 inch. Moreover the water in the East Bute Dock being fresh, she would rise about 5 inches on getting into salt water; so that when she got to sea her freeboard would have been about 5 feet 6 inches. Now Mr. Brown of the consultative department of the Board of Trade, a gentleman upon whom the Court from long experience is disposed to place the greatest reliance, has laid before us in detail the calculations on which he estimates the freeboard which this vessel should have had by the load line committee's tables, as approved by Lloyd's and the Board of Trade; and he has told us that her freeboard for a winter voyage should have been 5 feet measured from a line carried out horizontally from the inside of the water way, or 4 feet 10, measured from the point where the deck, if continued on the round, would intersect the ship's side. So that with a freeboard of 5 feet 6 inches, it is obvious that according to the rules she would not be overladen. The evidence, however that there was a distance of 5 feet between the deck line and the centre of the disc, on which this calculation rests, is not very conclusive; and accordingly, Mr. Crump has estimated the freeboard in another way. According to the chief officer, the vessel when in the East Bute Dock drew 21 feet 3 forward, and 22 feet 2 aft, giving her a mean of 21 feet 8 1/2 inches. According to the carpenter, she drew 21 feet forward and 21 feet 10 aft, giving her a mean of 21 feet 5. Now the plans, which have been laid before us, and upon which Mr. Brown's estimates have been framed, show the vessel's moulded depth to have been 25 feet 8, and adding the depth of keel 9 1/2 inches, that gives her a total depth at side from the top of the upper deck beam to the bottom of the keel of 26 feet 5 1/2 inches. Deducting from this the mean draught, we get, according to the chief officer, a freeboard of 4 feet 9 1/2 inches, and according to the carpenter, of 5 feet and 1/2 an inch. To this, however, would have to be added half an inch for the thickness of the iron deck and 5 inches for the rise on getting into salt water; so that, taking the calculation in this way, we get a freeboard, according to the chief officer, of 5 feet 3, and according to the carpenter, of 5 feet 6 inches, and this too measured from the point at which the deck, if continued on the round, would intersect the ship's side, from which point a freeboard of 4 feet 10 inches would, according to Mr. Brown, be sufficient. It is clear, therefore, that according to the tables the vessel had an ample amount of freeboard, and that she was consequently not overladen.
The seventh question which we are asked, is, "What " was the cause of the damage the vessel sustained on " the 27th of December, and from time to time there- " after?" The damage which the vessel sustained was no doubt due to the extreme violence of the gale, and to the heavy seas which broke on board her. According to the chief officer, he had never during the whole of his experience seen more terrific seas. Letters, too, have, with the consent of the learned counsel for the Board of Trade, been put in, one from the captain of the "Wordsworth," which left Cardiff, I think, on the 27th, and the other from the captain of the "Tiber," which left Cardiff on the 24th, from both of which it appears that they encountered the same gale of wind, and they describe it as being of a very severe character. There is also a case, which was only very recently before this court, that of the "Kaieteur," in which it appeared that at about 2.30 a.m. of the 29th a huge wave passed over that vessel, leaving her almost a complete wreck. And as the "Bengal" was at the time only about 40 or 50 miles distant, it is quite possible that the wave which passed over the "Bengal" at 2 a.m. of the same day, and stove in the main hatchway, may have been the same which struck the "Kaieteur" at 2.30 a.m. and left her almost a complete wreck.
The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " every possible effort was made to repair the damage, " and to keep the water under?" Everything appears to have been done that could possibly have been done to repair the damage to the hatchway and the deck, and to keep the water under.
The ninth question which we are asked is, "What was " the cause of the death of the master, and whether in " the circumstances any attempt could have been made to save him?" Owing to the quantity of water which the vessel had taken in, it became very difficult to steer her, and accordingly the master and the officers took it in turns to take the helm, in the opinion of the Assesors, a very wise precaution. Whilst the officers where at the wheel, they seem to have taken the precaution of lashing themselves; but the master, unfortunately, neglected to do so, and when the sea broke over her, he was washed overboard. In our opinion, it was quite impossible in the then state of the weather for anything to have been done to save him.
The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" This vessel, which had a length of 270 feet with 33 feet beam, and 24.4 feet depth of hold, belonged to an unfortunate class of vessel, of which this Court bad at one time only too great an experience. This class of vessel had three tiers of beams and two decks laid, but very little beam, and great depth of hold. Some ten or twelve years since they were built in large numbers in the ports on the north-eastern coast, but as early as 1878 and 1879 this Court called attention to the dangerous character of these vessels, and to the great care which was required in loading and handling them. I refer more especially to the cases of the "Tiara," the "Emblehope," the "Prometheus," the "Joseph Ferens," the "Marlborough," and a number of others. Most of these vessels have since disappeared, for very few of them now ever come before us, and Mr. Glover has told us that at the present time they would never think of building vessels of such dimensions, but would give them 4 or 5 feet more beam. Owing to their construction, such vessels have great difficulty in rising to a sea, more especially when running before a gale of wind, and the Assessors think that the master of the "Bengal" was guilty of an error of judgment in putting her before the wind. We are quite ready to admit that he did it with the best intentions, hoping thereby to run out of the gale, but it was not a wise proceeding, and may possibly have led to the loss of the vessel. It would have been far better to have kept her with her head up to the wind. So far, then, we think that the vessel was not skilfully handled. There is also another point, in which it appears to the Assessors that there was a little want of seamanship. We are told that the after steering gear gave way, and the vessel became unmanageable at about 6 or 7 p.m. of the 29th, and that between that time and 2 a.m. of the following day the vessel was, as it were, left to take care of herself, and that she turned completely round some six or seven times, labouring and straining heavily all the time. The Assessors think that measures ought to have been taken to prevent her doing this by putting a relieving tackle on the tiller, by which the vessel could have been kept under control, for it was during that time probably that she sustained the greatest damage. Except, however, in these respects, the vessel seems to have been well and properly navigated.
The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Whether she was prematurely abandoned?" When the crew abandoned her, on the evening of the 31st of December, she had already from 8 to 10 feet of water in the engine-room, and when they boarded her again on the following morning, there were from 12 to 14 feet of water in her. With such an amount of water in the engine-room, and with all the fires out, it is impossible that the vessel could have remained afloat much longer, and under these circumstances they were quite justified in abandoning her.
The twelfth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the officers are, or either of them is, in default?" Except in the matters to which we have already called attention, we do not think that blame attaches to the master or officers of this vessel. Indeed we think that, under the circumstances, great credit is due to the chief officer for having saved the lives of all those who were on board.
The thirteenth question which we are asked is, " What was the cost of the vessel to her owner?" The owner, Mr. Glover, told us that they gave 21,150l. for her, which he says was about 12,000l. less than she had cost some 18 months before.
The fourteenth question which we are asked is, "What was the value at the time she last left Cardiff?" Mr. Glover has valued her at between 15,000l. and 16,000l. The Assessors are however disposed to think that, looking at the very great depreciation that has taken place in shipping, she was probably not worth more than from 14,000l. to 15,000l.
The fifteenth question which we are asked is, "What " where the insurances, and how were they appor- " tioned?" Mr. Glover told us that the vessel was insured for 12,000l, of which 8000l. was at Lloyd's and the remainder in clubs. There was also 1000l. upon the freight, but there were no other insurances of any kind upon her. It seems that Mr. Glover, when asked by the Board of Trade to state in what amount she was insured, declined to give the information, saying that he would do so in Court, his reason apparently being that it could have no bearing on the question of the loss of the vessel. But in our opinion it has a very important bearing on the point, for when a vessel is over insured one of the main incentives for keeping her in good condition is removed. In the present case the vessel was insured much below her value, and there was therefore no reason why Mr. Glover should not have given the required information, and we trust that he will in future have no hesitation in doing so; the more so as full and candid answers on these points might very frequently obviate the necessity for an inquiry.
(Signed)
H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur.
(Signed)
ALFRED PARISH,
C. Y. WARD,
Assessors.
RICHD. C. DYER,
50022—406. 180.—3/88. Wt. 12. E. & S.
