(No. 3493.)
"CEDAR BRANCH" (S.S.)
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Royal Courts of Justice, on the 6th and 7th of March 1888, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains CASTLE and WARD as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "CEDAR BRANCH," on Aldborough Napes, on the 16th of February 1888.
Report of Court.
The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding of the said ship was due to her having been allowed to get to the westward of her proper course, and that the blame thereof rests partly with Arthur Ritson, the master, and partly with Richard Dobson, the pilot in charge. Under the circumstances the Court will not deal with the certificate of the said Arthur Ritson.
Dated this 7th day of March 1888.
(Signed)
H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)
JOHN S. CASTLE,
Assessors.
C. Y. WARD,
Annex to the Report.
This case was heard at the Royal Courts of Justice on the 6th and 7th of March 1888, when Mr. McConnell appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Gibson, of the firm of Messrs. Deacon, Gibson, and Metcalf, for the owners, and Mr. Botterell for the master of the "Cedar Branch." Six witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. McConnell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Gibson then produced a witness, and Mr. Gibson and Mr. Botterell having addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. McConnell having been heard for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—
The "Cedar Branch" is a steel screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Sunderland, of 2,515 tons gross, and 1,645 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 300 horse-power. She was built at Sunderland in the year 1886, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the present inquiry she was the property of the Nautilus Steamship Company, Limited, Mr. Francis Ritson, of No. 54, Fawcett Street, Sunderland, being the managing owner. She left Middlesbrough on the morning of the 14th February last with a crew of 28 hands all told, and a cargo of 2,802 tons, bound to the Tyne; and having there taken in about 760 tons of bunker coal, she left again on the following morning, the 15th, for Bombay, with Richard Dobson, a North Sea pilot, in charge, the wind at the time blowing a strong breeze from the N.E. with a heavy sea. At 2.10 a.m. of the following day she passed to the east of the Newarp Lightship, distant about one mile, upon which the course was altered from S.S.E. 1/2 E. to south. At 3.5 a.m. they passed the Cross Sand Head Light, distant from a mile to a mile and a half, and the same course was continued until 3.45, when it was altered to S. by W, and that course was kept till Lowestoft Lights bore N.W., distant about 8 miles, Corton Light we are told then bearing N. by W. 1/2 W. The course was then altered to S.S W. 1/2 W., and after running on that course some 12 to 14 miles, it was altered to S. 1/2 W., owing apparently to the land being visible on the starboard hand, and in about 20 minutes or half an hour afterwards, the second mate, who was on the bridge, called the pilot's attention to a buoy about two points on the starboard bow. The pilot immediately gave orders to starboard the helm, which brought the vessel's head round to about S.E., and very shortly afterwards she struck the ground. The pilot, thinking at first that she was on the Inner Gabbard, telegraphed to stop the engines, but it being then about 7.30 a.m., and consequently broad daylight, he soon afterwards made it out, from the ball on the buoy, to be the Aldborough Napes Buoy. In the meantime the captain, who had been below in the chart room, had come up on the bridge, and seeing that the vessel was still afloat, ordered the engines to be set on full speed ahead, and she shortly afterwards cleared the sand. It was then found, however, that the vessel was unmanageable, the rudder having been broken; and having by working the engines and setting her sails got her into a convenient position they dropped the anchor, Orfordness Lighthouse bearing N.W. by W. 1/2 W., and the Shipwash Light-vessel S.W. 1/2 W. There she remained until the following morning, when two steam tugs came to her assistance and took her into Harwich, and a jury rudder having been rigged she was brought round to London, where we are told she is now having a proper rudder fitted to her.
These being the facts of the case, I will now proceed to answer the questions which have been put to us, and I propose to take the first three questions together. They are as follow:—
1. "What number of compasses had the vessel on " board, and where were they placed?"
2. "When, and by whom were they last adjusted?"
And 3. "Did the master ascertain the deviation of " the compasses by observation from time to time?" We are told that she had three compasses—a standard compass on the upper bridge, a steering compass in the midship wheel-house, and a compass before the after wheel. They had been adjusted when the ship was launched in November 1886, but has not since been swung. The master, however, told us that he had taken every opportunity of ascertaining the deviation of his compasses by observation, and from the little book which he has brought in, containing a record of the deviation from time to time, he appears to have done so.
I will next take the fourth and fifth questions together; they are as follow:—4. "Whether a safe " and proper course was set and steered after pass- " ing the Newarp at or about 2.10 a.m. of the 16th of " February; and whether due and proper allowance " was made for tide and currents?" And 5. "Whether " safe and proper alterations were made in the course " after passing Middle Cross Sand Light, and from time " to time thereafter, and whether due and proper " allowance was made for tide and currents?"
The pilot, who seems to have had the sole charge of the navigation from the time of leaving the Tyne until she struck, told us that he made no allowance for tides, currents, or deviation, believing, from what the master told him, that the standard compass, by which he steered, shewed no deviation on any of the courses. He said that he steered the courses which he was always accustomed to steer, and which, if made good, would have taken him about midway between the Inner Gabbard and the Aldborough Napes, and about six or seven miles to the east of the Napes. As a fact, however, he struck upon the Napes, and it is therefore clear that the courses steered were neither safe nor proper ones, the vessel having been set some six or seven miles to the westward of her proper course. How this occurred we shall presently see.
The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify " the position of the vessel from time to time?" After passing the Newarp the only step which seems to have been taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel was by taking cross bearings of Lowestoft and Corton Lights, which placed them about eight miles from Lowestoft Lights. Beyond this no measures what- ever were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel.
I will now take all the remaining questions together. They are as follow:—
7. "Whether the master was on deck at a time when " the safety of the vessel required his personal super- " vision?"
8. "Whether a good and proper look out was kept?"
9. "Whether the total neglect of the lead was " justifiable?"
10. "What was the cause of the stranding of the " vessel?"
11. "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper " and seamanlike care?" and
12. "Whether the master and officers are, or either of " them is, in default, and whether blame attaches to the " pilot? And it is added that in the opinion of the " Board of Trade the certificate of the master should " be dealt with."
In considering these questions, it will be necessary, with a view to decide with whom the responsibility for this casualty rests, that we should first inquire what were the relative positions of the master and pilot on board this vessel. Mr. Francis Ritson, the managing owner and the father of Captain Ritson, the master, told us that Richard Dobson, the pilot, was to have the sole charge of the navigation of the vessel from the time of her leaving the Tyne until she arrived in the Downs; and that the captain would have no right to interfere with him except in very exceptional cases, as, for instance, if he saw that the pilot was running the ship into danger, or that he was manifestly unfit for the discharge of his duties. But that appears to me to be the ordinary relation which subsists between a master and pilot; the master would not interfere with him except in very exceptional cases. And that this was the footing on which Captain Ritson and the pilot Dobson stood is clear from what the former told us—that although he left the navigation to the pilot, he always checked the courses, and he could only have done so with the object of seeing that the vessel was not being run into danger. And now let us see how Captain Ritson proceeded to carry out this, which he admits to have been his duty, namely, checking the courses steered. He told us that he was on the bridge when they passed the Newarp, but that immediately afterwards he went into the chart room and lay down, and that he did not come out again until after the vessel had struck. On being asked, however, what course was steered from the Newarp, he admitted that he did not know, and that he had not enquired; he also admitted that when the pilot came to the chart room, and told him that Lowestoft Lights bore N.W., distant 8 miles, and that he had, or was about to, put her on a S.S.W. 1/2 W. course, he did not lay down the vessel's position on the chart to see whether that course was or was not a proper course. So far therefore he appears to me not to have done what he admits it was his duty to do, namely, checked the courses, without which it would be impossible for him to know whether the vessel was being run into danger. He seems to have left the navigation absolutely in the pilot's hands, which he had no right to do.
Another duty which the master had to discharge was to inform the pilot whether there was any, and if so, what, deviation on the courses which it was proposed to steer? Now it appears that before leaving the Tyne, as well as after sighting the Lowestoft Lights, and when the pilot proposed to put her on a S.S.W. 1/2 W. course, he asked the master whether there was any deviation on the compass, and the master, he said, told him that there was not any. According to the master, what he said was, that the deviation was very trifling, but that he must not trust to the compass, because he had a cargo of iron on board. It appears to me, however, that whether the master told him that there was no deviation, or that the deviation was trifling, amounted to the same thing; it meant in effect that the deviation, if any, might be disregarded. If, too, he thought that the iron cargo would affect the compass, it was the master's duty to ascertain the extent of it, and inform the pilot thereof, and not to leave him to steer a course which, if there was any considerable deviation, might be a very improper one, the more so as the master must have known that after losing sight of Lowestoft Lights, the pilot would have nothing to trust to but the compass until he sighted Orfordness. As a fact, however, we have no reason to think that the iron cargo in any way affected the standard compass, for we are told by Mr. Ritson, the managing owner, who superintended the stowage of the cargo, that no part of the cargo was less than 30 feet distant from the compass. We may therefore consider the case apart altogether from the cargo which she had on board.
This being so, let us now proceed to inquire what right the master had to tell the pilot that the deviation apart from the cargo which she had in her, was so trifling that it might fairly be disregarded. It is true that the deviation card shews very little deviation on any of the courses, but that was prepared immediately after the vessel had been launched, and it is well known that in new vessels the deviation frequently alters very considerably, and it is therefore of the greatest importance that the master should correct the deviation of the compasses from time to time by observation, and this he seems to have done. Looking, however, at the little book in which the master had entered the deviations observed, we find that on the voyage immediately preceding the last, which was from Sunderland down the east coast, and when she had a cargo of coals on board, which could not have in any way affected the compasses, the deviation of the standard compass soon after leaving Sunderland, and when she was on a S.S.E. course, was 13° westerly, and that shortly afterwards, when she was put on a S. 3/4 E. course, it was 8° westerly. On continuing her course down the east coast, when the course was altered to S.W. by S. 1/2 S., the deviation became 7° easterly, and later on, when standing over from the Start to Ushant on a S.W. course, the deviation was no less than 11° easterly. This can hardly be called a trifling deviation. It was said by Mr. Ritson, the owner, that that voyage commenced in June, and that the compass might have been affected by the extreme heat of the weather, but there is no evidence that it was so intensely hot at that time, and even assuming that it was, the Assessors are not prepared to admit that so great a change in the deviation could have been due to the weather. Mr. Ritson also said that possibly the large deviation of 11° east in running from the Start to Ushant might have been due to the vessel having had considerable heel, but there is no evidence that she had any heel at that time; and the assessors tell me that if the vessel had a heel, the master ought to have entered in his book the number of degrees the vessel was heeling at the time of observation, and not to have entered the deviation as if the vessel was upright. The master also stated that in going from the Tees to the Tyne he had not found any great deviation on the compass, but he was then going north, which would give him no indication what the deviation would be on southerly and westerly courses. He also told us that in going from Harwich to London after the casualty he had found the deviation very trifling, but it is well known that after a vessel has struck the ground or been in collision, the deviation of the compasses is no evidence of what they were before. On the whole it appears to us that the master had no right to tell the pilot that the deviation was trifling and might be disregarded; on the contrary, taking the experience of the voyage immediately preceding, which shewed a deviation between Sunderland and Ushant varying from 13° westerly on a S.S.E. course, and 8° westerly on a S. 3/4 E. course, to 7° easterly on a S.W. by S. 1/2 S. course, and 11° easterly on a S.W. course, the conclusion to which he should have come is that in all probability the deviation would be very considerable, being westerly on courses to the east of south and easterly on courses to the west of south.
With these facts before us, let us now see what probably was the cause of the stranding, or, in other words, how it was that between the Newarp and the Aldborough Napes the vessel got set some 6 or 7 miles to the westward of her course, that being the distance at which the vessel should, according to the pilot, have passed clear to the eastward of the Napes if the courses which he steered had been made good. We have seen that on passing the Newarp at z.10 a.m. the course was altered from S.S.E. 1/2 E. to south, and that that course was continued till 3.45, when it was altered to S. by W., on which course they were when they sighted the Lowestoft Lights bearing N.W.; and at that time we are told Corton Light bore N. by W 1/2 W., putting the vessel about 8 miles from Lowestoft Lights. But if the courses which she is said to have steered had been made good, they would have taken her, not 8 miles, but 12 miles from Lowestoft Lights when those lights bore N.W.; so that in the run from the Newarp to Lowestoft the vessel had already, from some cause or other, been set some 4 miles to the westward of her course. From this point she is put on a S.S.W. 1/2 W course for 12 to 14 miles, when it is altered to S. 1/2 W., and after standing on that course for 20 minutes or half an hour, she strikes upon the Aldborough Napes, which she would naturally do if the same cause which had operated to set her some 4 miles to the westward of her course between the Newarp and Lowestoft had still continued to act. Now what was this cause P According to Mr. Ritson, the managing owner, it was, what he called, a great storm wave coming from the east which drove her to the westward of her course; but if so, it would equally have affected the large number of vessels that were at the same time going up and down the east coast, and would have put many of them on shore or on the sands. Nor could it have been due to the winds or tides, for the wind, we are told, was about N.N.E., with only occasional snow squalls from the east, and the tide, which was ebb, would be on her starboard bow, setting her off the land until shortly before she struck, when it was about slack water. There is then only one cause to account for her having got so far to the westward of her course, and that is the deviation of the standard compass, by which she was being steered and navigated. If, as it is only reasonable to conclude, there was the same amount of easterly deviation on that compass on courses to the west of south as there was on the preceding voyage, it will easily account for her having got some 6 or 7 miles to the westward of her course before she reached the Napes. In our opinion it is clear that the casualty was due to the deviation of the compass, for which admittedly no allowance was made, so that the vessel was all the time being steered to the westward of her proper course.
This being so, it is clear that the vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care, and the question is, with whom the blame rests? No doubt the chief blame for the casualty rests with the master for leading the pilot to suppose that there was little, if any, deviation on the compass, when the experience of the preceding voyage shewed that on the courses which the pilot would have to steer there was very considerable deviation. The master is also to blame for having left the navigation so entirely in the hands of the pilot, without even informing himself of the courses which she was being steered; and he is more especially to blame for not having, when the pilot came to the chart-room and told him that Lowestoft Lights bore N.W., distant 8 miles, and that he had put her on a S.S.W. 1/2 W. course, verified the position of the vessel on the chart, which would have shewn him that she had already been set some 4 miles to the westward of her course. Nor, in our opinion, is the pilot himself wholly free from blame. We do not indeed blame him for not having taken a cast of the lead, for he might fairly trust, if the compass had little or no deviation, as the master told him, that the courses which he steered would take her some 6 or 7 miles outside the Napes, and with the wind and sea that was then on, it would not have been easy to take a cast of the lead without stopping the vessel altogether; but we do blame him, knowing that his proper course would take him some 6 or 7 miles outside the Napes, for having allowed the vessel to get so close into the shore, which must for a long time before she struck have been distinctly visible to him, the weather, as he admits, being quite clear except during the occasional snow showers, and it being broad daylight. It seems almost unaccountable, when he found himself so close to the land, that he did not haul the vessel off to the eastward; and the only explanation seems to be that given by the second officer, namely, that he was trying to pick up some landmark, having got out of his reckoning.
On the whole it appears to us that the blame for the casualty must be shared between the master and the pilot. Over the pilot we have no jurisdiction, and what we have now to consider is, whether we shall deal with the master's certificate. Looking, however, at the position in which the owner seems to have regarded the pilot, that he was to have sole charge of the ship to the Downs, that he had frequently before been employed in the same capacity, and that he had the owners' entire confidence, facts which go far to excuse the master for having trusted so implicitly to the pilot, the Assessors are disposed to take a lenient view of the case, and they will therefore not deal with the master's certificate.
(Signed)
H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur.
(Signed)
JOHN S. CASTLE,
Assessors.
C. Y. WARD,
50022—416. 180.—3/88. Wt. 12. E. & S.
