Wreck Report for 'Akaba', 1888

(No. 3693.)

"AKABA" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of a formal Investigation held at the Town Hall, Hull, on the 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 24th days of December 1888, before E. C. TWISS, Esquire, Stipendiary Magistrate, assisted by Captain METHVEN, Admiral MORESBY, and Captain BRAGG, into the circumstances attending the damage sustained by the British steamship "AKABA," of Liverpool, through striking on or near Hammond's Knoll, North Sea, on the 7th of November last, whereby loss of life ensued.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the annex hereto, that it was brought about-(1) by a proper course not having been set for Hasborough Gat, after having Lowestoft High Light abeam, at about 2.30 a.m. on the 7th of November last, at an estimated distance of 11 miles; (2) by safe and proper courses not having been steered, after the light on Smith's Knoll had been clearly made out, and (3) by the Would Light-vessel and the Hasborough Shore Light having, shortly before the casualty, been improperly mistaken for the Hasborough Light-vessel and the Cromer Shore Light respectively. The Court finds the master alone in default, and suspends his certificate for 3 calendar months from the date hereof.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated this 24th day of December 1888.

 

(Signed)

E. C. TWISS, Judge.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

R. METHVEN,

 

 

 

J. MORESBY,

Assessors.

 

 

J. THRELFALL BRAGG,

 

Annex to the Report.

This inquiry was held at the Town Hall, Hull, on the 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 24th days of December instant, when Mr. Saxelbye represented the Board of Trade, and Mr. A. M. Jackson appeared on behalf of the master and chief officer, whilst Mr. Dickinson, of Liverpool, watched the case on the part of the owners of the vessel. The second officer, who was also a party to the investigation, appeared personally, but was not represented.

The "Akaba," official number 91,229, is an iron screw steamer built at Stockton-on-Tees in 1885, by Messrs. M. Pearse & Co., and she is registered at the port of Liverpool. Her respective dimensions are-length, 350 feet; breadth, 42 feet; and depth of hold, 28 5/10 feet; and her tonnage 3,750.60 gross, and 2,472.54 nett register tons. She is owned by Mr. James Marke Wood, of Liverpool, her manager being Mr. James Robert Broadfeot, of the same port.

The "Akaba" left Calcutta on the 25th of September last, bound for Dundee, with a cargo of 22,629 bales of jute, and with a crew of 41 hands all told, under the command of Mr. John Clark Main, who held a certificate of competency as master, dated 1877. Her draught of water upon leaving was 24 feet 7 inches aft, and 24 feet forward in fresh water. There were five compasses on board, that is to say, the standard the pole, two wheelhouse compasses, and a compass aft Courses were set by the standard compass on the upper bridge, and the master stated that all the compasses were in every respect in good order. The master also said that from time to time when at sea he ascertained by observation the errors on the standard compass, and that when off Dover on the day before the casualty which is now under consideration, he found the error on north-easterly courses to be 5° error west of true meridian. The vessel carried four boats, namely, two lifeboats on the bridge deck swung in davits, and a jolly boat and pinnace on the poop aft, also in davits, and resting on skids. All four, we have been told, were fitted with every necessary equipment, and were at all times ready for immediate use. During the last passage out and home, the crew were practised in boat drill on one or two occasions.

After leaving Calcutta the "Akaba" proceeded safely on her voyage until the 5th of November last, upon which day, at about 11 p.m., she arrived off Dover, where she lay until daylight on the following morning, when the master signalled to the shore for a pilot. A reply from the pier head shortly came, "Bye and bye." The "Akaba" was then kept steaming "dead slow" backwards and forwards; and later on a boat came off and asked the master "what he wanted?" He replied, "A North Sea pilot; are there any licensed men here?" The answer was, "No;" when the master said, "Send me a good man." The boat then returned, and at about noon a man named Alfred Reed came off; and, in answer to the master, stated that "he was a " pilot, and had been brought up in the North Sea all " his life; that he had commanded a vessel of his own, " and had been piloting for some time." He also produced a number of papers and references, some of very recent date, testifying to his ability; and the master, considering everything satisfactory, thereupon engaged him as pilot, but it was afterwards ascertained that he was not a licensed pilot. It may be mentioned that when at Port Said, Captain Main had written to a Dover pilot named Lombard, whom he had once before engaged, and who had taken the "Akaba" from Dover to Hull, to take her this voyage, but it seems that be had since then died, and on the receipt of the letter his widow took it to the pilot Reed, who, as has been already seen, was on this voyage engaged by the master. Between 12.30 and 1 p.m. on the day mentioned, the 6th of November, the vessel left Dover and proceeded on her voyage in charge of the pilot, and made all her courses correctly until 2 a.m. on the morning of the 7th, when Lowestoft High Light, according to the evidence of the master, was bearing about N.W., distant some 11 or 12 miles. The master informed the Court that from Dover to Lowestoft he had, unbeknown to the pilot, been continually keeping a check upon him, and found that he had made correctly from time to time the different lights, and had also made proper allowance for tide and currents, and that he was consequently satisfied that he was perfectly competent to carry out the duty he had undertaken. The master also stated that during the passage he had taken four-point bearings of Kentish Knock, Long Sand, and Ship Wash respectively, and had found that the courses had been made good.

At 1 a.m. the course had been altered to N.N.E. by standard compass, or N.E. by N. magnetic. It had been arranged during the afternoon of the previous day, the 6th, according to the statement of the master, that the pilot should take the vessel through Hasborough Gat, and at about 2 a.m. on the morning of the 7th, when Lowestoft High Light bore as before mentioned, the master went to lie down in the chart room below on the bridge deck, leaving the second officer in charge of the bridge, and with instructions to the pilot to let him be called "before they got up to the lights," meaning as he informed us, the Middle Cross Sand and Newarp light-vessels. The vessel was on the same course, the engines going full speed, with the wind and sea against her, making about 5 or 6 knots. At 2.30 a.m., the second officer, who had no knowledge whatever of the coast, obtained a four-point bearing of Lowestoft Light, which was then abeam distant about 11 miles. At 3 a.m. the pilot altered the course to N.E. by N. by compass, or N.E. magnetie, and at 3.10 a.m. the second officer saw the Corton Light two or three points abaft the beam, when the pilot observed that "she was a little off," and that" the next light would be the St. Nicholas." Shortly afterwards this latter light was made, and at 3.45 a.m. was a beam, distant about 7 miles. At 4 a.m. the second officer was relieved by the chief to whom he reported what lights he had seen and their respective distances. The chief officer, who also had no previous experience of this coast, informed us that lie did not examine the chart, nor did he know what lights he might expect to make, but that on coming on watch the pilot pointed out a light about a point abaft the beam, and said "that it was St. Nicholas Light, and that they had passed the Corton." The vessel continued at full speed on the N.E. magnetic course, the weather being at times thick with rain showers, and we were told by the chief officer, that during those showers, light-vessels, lights could be seen at a distance of 3 or 4 miles only. Shortly after 5 a.m., he saw a red light about half a point on the starboard bow, apparently distant about 10 miles. He asked the pilot what it was, and he replied "The Corton." The chief officer being very much surprised at the answer, watched the light carefully, and noticed that it was a red and white revolving light, whereupon he reported it as such to the pilot, who replied, "Then its Smith's Knoll, I didn't know we were so far off." When the pilot had said "It is the Corton," he had changed the course to E.N.E. by compass, or E. by N. magnetic, telling the man at the wheel to "keep the light broad on the port bow," and saying, "we must go outside of it," and that course was kept for 3 or 4 minutes, the time then being about 5.20 a.m.; but when he was informed that it was a red and white revolving light, he at once hauled the vessel round to the westward, telling the man at the wheel "west." About five minutes afterwards, the chief officer sent the man on the look-out, who had been posted on the upper bridge, it being too rough for him to be stationed on the forecastle head, to call the master, who at once came on the upper bridge, and the chief officer told him that he thought "the pilot was mixed." The master looked at the compass and saw that the ship was heading due W., and he at once said to the pilot "What are you doing going west, what are those lights ahead?" There had just appeared, according to the master's statement, a flashing or revolving light about four points on the port bow just dipping on the horizon, another flashing light nearly ahead, and another light further off, also nearly ahead. The pilot's reply was "It's all right." The master again urged "I want to know what they are, I can't count them out," but without answer the pilot proceeded to haul the vessel to the northward.

It was then approaching 6 a.m., and the master went to the chart room to consult his chart and light books, and again returned to the bridge, but was unable to make out the lights, and observed to the pilot "Where's the Newarp?" The latter replied, "We haven't seen it, we are going to the east of Hasborough and everything," apparently being quite confident of his position. The vessel was now heading about N.N.W. Two or three minutes afterwards a bright white light was seen broad on the port bow, and the pilot remarked "That's Hasborough." The master had some doubts as to his correctness and so expressed himself to the pilot, when another light, apparentlya revolving one, croppedup a little further aft to the westward of the previous one, and the pilot at once said "Its all right now, there's Cromer and North Hasborough." It was now about 6.10 a.m. Upon this the master again returned to the chart room and took bearings, but he informed the Court that he was unable to remember what they were. He satisfied himself, however, that if the two lights were really North Hasborough and Cromer, the vessel was in a safe position. He told us that at the same time he placed the parallels over the Would Light-vessel and Hasborough Shore Light, and noticed that, if the lights seen were actually those lights, then the ship was amongst the sand shoals. After this he again returned to the bridge, but said nothing further to the pilot. Before he had been there more than a couple of minutes the look-out man reported a buoy under the port bow. The master having seen it at the same time, immediately ordered the engines full speed astern and the helm hard-a-port. This order was at once carried out, and a cast of the lead was taken amidships in 6 fathoms. Whilst going astern the vessel was felt to strike heavily, but she did not stop. After being kept astern for five minutes, the lead being in constant use and the water being found to have deepened from 6 to 14 fathoms, the helm was put hard-a-starboard and the engines full speed ahead, but upon the pilot reporting that she was coming against her helm, the chief officer was sent aft to see if there was anything wrong with the steering gear; and upon his return he reported to the master that the rudder was gone. It may here be observed that directly after the buoy had been reported, and which afterwards proved to be the southern buoy on Hammond's Knoll, breakers were seen on the starboard bow, and afterwards also breakers on Winterton Ridge abaft the starboard beam. It was also subsequently ascertained that the lights which the pilot had pronounced to be North Hasborough and Cromer were really the Would Light-Vessel and Hasborough Shore Lights.

To return to the narrative, so soon as it was reported that the rudder was gone, the engines were ordered full speed astern again, and directions were given to get all boats ready. After steaming astern for some 15 minutes an anchor was let go with about 100 fathoms of cable, and signals of distress were shown. It was blowing at the time a heavy gale from the eastward with a nasty sea. No assistance came, and throughout the day the vessel rode to her anchor, the engines being used occasionally to relieve the cable. About 7 p.m. a smack came under their stern and was asked to stand by, but the skipper replied he would go off to Yarmouth for assistance. An hour later another smack sailed up and she upon request did stay by. The following morning (the 8th) at about 10 a.m., a tugboat from Yarmouth arrived on the spot and asked the master if he required assistance, and the latter replied that he did, and that if the tug would get hold of his vessel forward and steer he would steam with his own engines. The master of the tug however said "he was no good" and he returned to Yarmouth, taking with him the second officer of the "Akaba," to report to the owners and Lloyd's Agent.

On the day following, the 9th, the vessel began to drag her anchor, there being a heavy gale from the eastward, which continued throughout the day and night, and a second anchor was let go with 45 fathoms of cable, which very shortly parted close to the anchor. A spare anchor was then got ready, but as the first anchor still held it was not then let go. At 3.30 p.m. however, it was let go with about 100 fathoms of cable, and at about 6 p.m. the stream anchor, with a 5 inch wire hawser, was let go, and this with the other anchors safely held the vessel throughout the night.

The next morning, the 10th, three tugs and two lifeboats came off from Yarmouth and were alongside at about 8 a.m., and at 10 a.m. two of the tugs commenced to tow, the third being astern to steer her.

After they had got hold, they gave a broad sheer and the spare anchor parted, and the only anchor that was successfully weighed was the stream anchor. The tugs then proceeded to tow the vessel to the eastward, and later on in the day the "Columbia" tug came on the scene and rendered assistance. Shortly afterwards the tug's tow-rope parted, and the lifeboat which was towing on the "Akaba's" starboard side having been thrown by a heavy sea against the steamer's side, some of the lifeboat men on the deck slacked the lifeboat's tow-rope, and as she came astern she appeared likely to foul the "Columbia's" tow-rope, whereupon the lifeboat men let go the "Columbia's" tow-rope, and the "Akaba" was at once all adrift. The lifeboat men at this point commenced to alarm the "Akaba's" crew, saying that "they would " stay no longer, and that if the crew did not go with " them, they would all be dead men in two hours on " the 'Leman and Olver.'" The master used every endeavour and persuasion to induce the crew to stay by their vessel, but without avail, and at 2 p.m. 29 of them were taken on board the tugs, and they then all went off, leaving the "Akaba" with her master and eleven hands and the "Columbia." Those who remained, with the exception of the officers and pilot, did so on the promise that they should be taken on board the "Columbia" before dark.

After the tugs and lifeboat men and the 29 hands had gone, the "Columbia's" hawser was successfully got on board forward, and the fore-trysail, fore-staysail, and jib having been set, the "Columbia" proceeded to tow away to the northward. About 3 p.m. the men came to the master and asked that he would carry out his promise and allow them to go on board the "Columbia" before dark. After some demur he acquiesced, and they then proceeded to put out the port lifeboat, but just as they were about to launch her, it was discovered that she was stove in, and they then went over to the starboard lifeboat. In crossing the deck, the master met with a very severe fall over the boat chocks, and cut his cheek very seriously, which rendered him for a time almost unconscious. All hands then, with the exception of the master and the chief officer, got into the boat, which was already swung out, and the master at the after fall and the chief officer at the forward fall, started to lower away, and when the boat was waterborne, it was found that the end of the forward fall was fast to the lifeboat on the port side, and the after tackle being unhooked, and the vessel rolling, the bow of the boat was brought high out of the sea, whilst her stern was submerged and the boat filled with water. A ladder and ropes were at once thrown to the men, and the master and chief officer used every endeavour to haul them on board, and were successful in rescuing all, with the exception of the pilot, the chief engineer, and one A.B., who unhappily were drowned.

From the evidence it would seem that the chief engineer had his foot entangled in one of the life-lines and fell heavily, face downwards, upon the belaying-pins of the mast, and never moved again, the consensus of opinion amongst the witnesses being that he was killed by the fall.

Whilst the men were being rescued, the "Columbia" had been hailed, and had come round under the lee of the "Akaba," and, having passed under her stern, lay a little on her weather quarter. After the injured men had been attended to, the jolly-boat on the port side was successfully launched, and ultimately all the remaining hands were safely taken on board the "Columbia," between 4 and 5 p.m. The "Columbia" again started to tow, but at 8 p.m. the hawser parted. At daylight the following morning, the 11th, the master, chief officer, and four hands returned to their vessel and again made fast the hawser, and, other vessels coming to their assistance, the "Akaba" was ultimately towed to the Humber and brought safely into dock at Hull at about 2 p.m. on the 12th, the master, chief officer, and four hands having remained on board to navigate her since daylight of the 11th, during which time they had managed to get up steam on the main boiler. After the vessel had stranded, the master appears to have had some conversation with the pilot with respect to his having mistaken the Would Light-vessel and Hasborough Shore Lights for the North Hasborough Light-vessel and Cromer Shore Light, when he admitted his error, but assigned no reason or explanation for his mistake.

Such was the narrative of the case as gathered from the evidence of the witnesses who were called and examined before the Court. In the course of his evidence, the second officer stated that after having been landed, at Yarmouth no one would take him back to his vessel, although tugs were actually going off to her, and that he himself had offered 50l. to anyone who would take him off. We were also told that it was solely and entirely owing to the conduct of the lifeboat men that the 29 hands of the "Akaba" were induced to desert their master and their vessel in the manner in which they did, but this observation does not apply to the crew of the National lifeboat.

At the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. Saxelbye submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court:-

1. What was the cause of the casualty?

2. Whether, when the vessel was off Dover in November last, the master took proper measures to ascertain that the person who he engaged as pilot for the North Sea was properly qualified to act in that capacity?

3. Whether, after leaving Dover, and up to the time the vessel arrived off Lowestoft, the master took proper measures to satisfy himself as to the capabilities of the pilot?

4. Whether the master gave up the navigation of the vessel to the pilot after passing Lowestoft, and if so, was he justified in so doing?

5. Whether the chief and second officers made themselves acquainted with the lights they were about to pass during their respective watches, and took proper or any measures to ascertain what lights were passed or seen, and whether they took any measures to check the navigation of the vessel?

6. Whether, on the morning of the 7th November, when the master and chief officer were apparently ignorant as to the position of the vessel, the master was justified in relying upon the pilot's assurances and in allowing him to navigate her?

7. Whether, when the master was called on deck by the chief officer, he took proper and sufficient measures to satisfy himself as to the position of the vessel, and that she was being safely navigated, and whether he took proper, sufficient, or any measures to ascertain what the various lights afterwards seen really were?

8. Whether a good and proper look-out was kept?

9. Whether the lead was used prior to the stranding, if not, was its neglect justifiable?

10. Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

11. Whether, when the attempt was made to leave the vessel on the 10th November in the starboard lifeboat, proper measures were taken to ascertain that such bout could be lowered in safety?

12. What was the cause of the swamping of the lifeboat?

13. Whether every possible effort was made to save life?

14. Whether the master and chief and second officers are, or either of them is, in default?

The Board of Trade is of opinion that the certificate of the master should be dealt with.

Mr. Jackson, having called one witness, addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Saxelbye replied on the part of the Board of Trade, and the Court, in giving judgment, replied as follows to the respective questions:-

1. The casualty was brought about by (1) a proper course not having been set for Hasborough Gat, after having Lowestoft High Light abeam at about 2.30 a.m. on the 7th of November last, at an estimated distance of 11 miles; (2) by safe and proper courses not having been steered after the light on Smith's Knoll had been clearly made out; and (3) by the Would Light-vessel and the Hasborough Shore Light having, shortly before the stranding, been improperly taken for the Hasborough Light-vessel and the Cromer Shore Light.

2. When the vessel was off Dover the master took all the measures he had at his disposal to ascertain that the man whom he engaged as pilot was qualified to act in that capacity, although he was not a duly qualified pilot.

3. After leaving Dover, and up to the time of arriving off Lowestoft, the master, according to the evidence, did take proper measures to satisfy himself as to the capabilities of the pilot.

4. After passing Lowestoft the master did practically give up the navigation of the vessel to the pilot, and in the opinion of the Court he was not justified in doing so.

5. The chief and second officers did not make themselves acquainted with the lights they were about to pass, or had passed during their respective watches, further than by making verbal enquiries of the pilots as to them.

6. Having regard to all the circumstances, the Court considers that on the morning of the 7th, when the pilot appeared to be ignorant of his position, the master was not justified in allowing him to continue in the navigation of the vessel.

7. When the master was called on deck by the chief officer, he did take some measures to endeavour to satisfy himself as to the position of the vessel, and to ascertain what the various lights afterwards seen were, but they were not proper nor sufficient.

8. A good and proper look out was kept.

9. A cast of the lead was taken immediately before the vessel stranded and after the buoy on Hammond's Knoll had been seen. Had soundings been taken sooner they might have been of advantage.

10. Up to 2 o'clock on the morning of the 7th the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care, but not afterwards.

11. Under the pressure of circumstances, consequent on the previous desertion of a greater part of the crew, the Court is not prepared to say that proper measures were not taken to ascertain that the starboard lifeboat could be lowered in safety.

12. The cause of the swamping of the lifeboat was owing to the end of the forward tackle fall having been accidentally fast when the boat was being lowered into the water.

13. Every possible effort was undoubtedly made to save life.

14. The Court does not find either the chief or second officer in default, but it does so find the master, and deems it necessary to deal with his certificate; but having regard to his praiseworthy conduct after the casualty for several days under most trying circumstances, the Court adjudges that his certificate be suspended for three calendar months only.

 

(Signed)

E. C. TWISS, Judge.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

R. METHVEN,

 

 

 

J. MORESBY,

Assessors.

 

 

J. THRELFALL BRAGG,

 

54010-207. 180.-1189. Wt. 23. E. & S.