Wreck Report for 'Alice Jane', 1888

(No. 3672.)

"ALICE JANE."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of a formal Investigation held at the Lecture Hall, Greenwich, on the 28th and 30th days of November 1888, before R. H. B. MARSHAM, Esquire, assisted by Captains RONALDSON and BROOKS, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British sailing ship "ALICE JANE," of Guernsey, on the Gunfleet Sand, North Sea, on the 5th November 1888.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the annex hereto, that the cause of the casualty was that the master, John Felix Dumaresq, did not use the lead sufficiently, nor anchor when he found that the vessel was in danger and that the water was shoaling rapidly, nor put her on the other tack; and the Court finds the master in default and suspends his certificate for six months, recommending him for a mate's certificate in the meanwhile.

Dated this sixth day of December 1888.

 

(Signed)

R. H. B. MARSHAM, Judge.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

EDWD. BROOKS,

 

Annex to the Report.

The case was heard at the Lecture Hall, Greenwich, on the 28th and 30th days of November 1888, when Mr. Sceales represented the Board of Trade; but no advocate appeared for the owners or the master of the "Alice Jane."

The "Alice Jane" was a brigantine, built at Liverpool in 1836, of wood, and registered in Guernsey, of 199.77 tons, her official number being 1,038. Her length was 101.6 feet; breadth, 22 5 feet; and depth, 14.4 feet. She was owned by Mr. W. F. Stokes, of 29, Val Plaisant, Jersey, and others, Mr. Stokes being the managing owner; and was commanded by Mr. John Felix Dumaresq, who for some years has held a certificate of competency, which, as well as the log-book, charts, and all the ship's papers, was lost with the vessel. On the 10th of October last she left Sundsvall, in Sweden, with a cargo of 90 standards of deal, carrying a deck load as high as her bulwarks, bound for St. Heliers, in Jersey, her crew consisting of seven hands all told. Her draft of water was 13 1/2 feet aft and 13 feet forward. There was a chronometer on board, besides two compasses that were fitted in the skylight, and which, the master informed the Court, were correct, as well as a spare compass kept in the master's cabin. Her sails and rigging were good; she had two fly-wheel pumps, and she carried two boats, one, a long boat, which was quite new, the other a jollyboat, almost new and in good condition. She had no deep-sea lead or lead line, only a hand lead of about seven pounds weight, to which an iron shackle was bent when necessary. The line attached was short, so that when it was used another line had to be bent on to it Soon after leaving Sundsvall the vessel become ex posed to a head wind and boisterous weather, in con sequence of which she put into Elsinore, where she stayed six days. The date of her departure the master who gave us little information that was not con tradicted by the mate and the boatswain, could no furnish us with; but the chief officer recollected that it was on Friday, the 26th of October last The vessel left Elsinore with a fair wind, and on the 31st of October made the Oxoe Light, which is near Christiania. From this point the master set course of S.W. by W., the wind being E.N.E., and the ship continued on this course till 10 a.m. on Saturday the 3rd of November, when, on taking a cast of the lead, it was assumed, from the depth of the water being 18 fathoms and the bottom sand and shells, that the vessel was on the Dogger Bank. The course was now altered to S.S.W., the master setting the patent log. No observations were able to be taken on account of the hazy weather that continued throughout the voyage. On the 4th day of November the master of the "Alice Jane" spoke a fishing smack, when he was informed that Yarmouth bore W. by N., at a distance of about 25 miles. The master had expected to be 6 or 7 miles more to windward; but he decided to keep on the same course of S.S.W. with the view of passing between the Galloper and North Hinder Lights, in order to make for the French coast;

At midnight the mate took the watch, the course being about that time altered, as he informed us, but which the master denied, to S.W. by S. 1/2 S. The wind was still blowing from the eastward, and continued so up to the time of the casualty, while it rained hard up to about 3.30 a.m. Soon after taking the watch the mate said that he saw a flashing light, but not being able to make out what it was called the master, who said he thought it was the North Hinder, but the mate did not concur in this opinion on account of the way in which the light was revolving or flashing.

The last bearing of that light was E.N.E.; it was lost in about half an hour. At 3.45 a.m. the mate, seeing another flashing light four or five miles off, bearing W.N.W., again called the master, who looked at it through his glasses and said he thought it was the North Sand Head Light.

At 4 a.m. the mate went below, and he stated to the Court that at that time the course was still S.W. by S. 1/2 S; The vessel's speed had been, and continued to be till just before the casualty, about four knots an hour. At 4 a.m. the mate was succeeded by the boatswain, who stated that the wind was then about E.S.E., and that he steered S.W. by W., the course given him by the mate, who, however, said that at 8 a.m., when he again came on deck, the boatswain told him the course was altered from S.W. by S. 1/2 S. at 5 a.m., and that it at once occurred to him that the course was an unsafe one.

At about 4.45 a.m. the boatswain seeing a light on the lee bow about two miles off, called the captain, who, the boatswain said, told him that it was the North Foreland Light.

At 8 a.m. the mate took charge of the watch, and about this time the master, who was on deck, heard a gun fired, which the master took to signify that he was running into danger, from a light-ship bearing E.N.E., about 2 miles off, which afterwards proved to be the Sunk Lightship. No cast of the lead was then taken. The vessel was now under topsail, foresail, two jibs, and mainsail.

A brig was at this time seen steering about W. by S. 1/2 S., and the master steered after her. About 9 a.m. the tug "Harwich" came close to the "Alice Jane" and told the master to heave-to, as he was standing into danger. A boat was sent from the tug, and two men coming on board the "Alice Jane" the master asked them the name of the light-ship. They refused to inform him, saying it was not their duty to do so, but offered to take the vessel in tow for salvage on ship and cargo. The master declined, but offered 5l. The men then asked for 100l.; the master refused: the men returned to the tug, and she steamed away. The boatswain stated that the tug returned and said that the "Alice Jane" would be ashore in a few minutes. The mate also stated that the tug returned, and told the "Alice Jane" in the master's hearing to put about; but the master, as well as one A.B. who was called before us, denied that the tug hailed the "Alice Jane" twice. About this time the mate stated that a buoy was seen ahead, upon which the master ordered the man at the wheel to pass to leeward of it; that they passed close to it, he, the mate, being able to read on it the "N. E. Gunfleet;" that thereupon he told the master they now had their position; that the master and he then consulted the chart; that he, the mate, suggested tacking ship, but that the master refused, saying, "Leave her on this tack yet awhile." The tide was now running strong to the W.S.W., it being spring tides, and about three-quarters flood. The course of S.S.W. appears to have been kept. Another buoy, the Middle Gunfleet Buoy, was soon seen ahead, and the mate, believing that the vessel was driving on to the sands, asked the master to let go the anchor. The master did not do so, but ordered preparations to be made for that purpose. A short time prior to this, the first cast of the lead since leaving the Dogger Bank seems to have been taken. It gave 7 fathoms, a second cast 5 fathoms, and a third 3 fathoms, only afew minutes elapsing between each cast. The mate stated that upon the third cast he again suggested anchoring to the master, but at that time the master put the helm down to let the vessel come round. Before she did so she struck and remained fast, then commenced to bump heavily and make water. The crew got the long boat out and all entered it except the master, who refused to leave the ship till every possible effort was made to get her off, and rowed clear of the sands towards a pilot cutter, which took them all on board. Two hours afterwards a boat was sent by the pilot cutter to the master, who was persuaded to leave the ship, which had struck on the Gunfleet Sands. The master stated to the Court that he had seen only one buoy, and that this he did not see till after the vessel struck.

A heavy sea set in, and the next morning the vessel was seen to have beaten over the sands and got ashore off the Naze, with her bottom out of her, and she has since become a total wreck.

These were the facts of the case, and on the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Sceales put to the Court the following questions:-

1. Whether the vessel was supplied with proper lead lines?

2. Whether at or about 10 a.m. on the 3rd November the vessel had arrived on the Dogger Bank? Whether a safe and proper course was hereafter steered, and whether due and proper allowance was made for tide, currents, and leeway?

3. What was the light visible at or about midnight between the 4th and 5th November?

4. What was the light seen at or about 3.45 a.m. of the 5th November? Did the master take it to be the North Sand Head Light, and if so was he justified in so doing?

5. What was the lightship sighted on the morning of the 5th November, and whether the master took proper measures to ascertain what it was?

6. Whether proper courses were set and steered after noon of the 4th November, and whether due and proper allowance was made for tide, currents, and leeway?

7. Whether on the morning of the 5th November the master was justified in refusing the services of the tug?

8. Whether, when the water was found to be shoaling, and a buoy or buoys were sighted, proper measures were taken to prevent the vessel going on to the sand?

9. Whether proper measures were taken from time to time during the voyage to ascertain and verify as far as possible the position of the vessel?

10. Whether the lead was used with sufficient frequency?

11. Whether a good and proper look-out was kept?

12. What was the cause of the casualty?

13. Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

14. Whether the master and the mate are, or either of them is, in default?

And stated that the Board of Trade were of opinion that the certificate of the master should be dealt with.

Mr. Sceales then addressed the Court on behalf of the Board of Trade, and the Court gave judgment as follows:-

1. The vessel was not supplied with proper lead lines. She ought to have had a deep-sea lead and line.

2. The Court is of opinion that she had arrived on the Dogger Bank at 10 a.m. of the 3rd of November. A safe and proper course was set, but no allowance was made for tide and currents.

3 and 4. The evidence was so conflicting, that the Court cannot determine what was the light seen at about midnight between the 4th and 5th November, nor the light seen about 3.45 a.m. on the 5th November.

5. The lightship sighted on the morning of the 5th November was the Sunk Lightship. The master took no precautions at that time to ascertain what it was.

6. A proper course was set if the vessel was, as the master was informed by a fishing smack, 25 miles from Yarmouth, bearing W. by N., on 4th of November about noon, which position the master did not take any steps to verify; but proper allowance was not made for the set of the tide.

7. On the morning of the 5th November the master was justified in refusing the services of the tug at the high price demanded.

8. No measures were taken to prevent the vessel going on the sand until after the master got a sounding of 3 fathoms.

9. The weather being hazy throughout the voyage no opportunities were afforded of taking observations.

10. The lead was not used with sufficient frequency.

11. A good and proper look-out was kept.

12. The cause of the casualty was that the master took no means of verifying his position, though he was in danger, did not use the lead sufficiently, and did not anchor when he found the water was shoaling rapidly, nor did he put her on the other tack.

13. The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

14. The master alone was in default.

And the Court suspends the master's certificate for six months, and recommends a mate's certificate to be granted in the meanwhile.

 

(Signed)

R. H. B. MARSHAM, Judge.

 

 

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

EDWD. BROOKS,

 

54010-182. 180.-12/88. Wt. 23. E. & S.