Wreck Report for 'Blackhalls', 1888

(No. 3656.)

"BLACKHALLS" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of a formal Investigation held at the Public Board Room, Post Office Chambers, Middlesbrough, on the 9th, 10th, and 12th days of November 1888, before CHARLES JAMES COLEMAN, Esquire, Judge, assisted by Captains HORE and BAKER, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British Steamship "BLACKHALLS," of West Hartlepool, on or near Schiermonikoog Island, Holland, on or about the 12th inst.

Report of Court.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the annex hereto, that the casualty was caused by the master not having verified his position at noon of the 12th of October by lead or sights, and in running on at full speed in thick weather at night afterward from an assumed position. The neglect in using the lead at noon of the 12th led to the loss of the ship, in which the Court finds the master, George Wild Hunter, alone to blame, and suspends his certificate, No. 6,861, for six months from this date.

Dated this 12th day of November 1888.

 

(Signed)

CHARLES JAMES COLEMAN,

Judge.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

KENNETT HORE,

Assessors.

 

 

C. H. J. BAKER,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Middlesbrough on November the 9th, 10th, and 12th instant, before C. J. Coleman, Esq., Judge, Mr. Dendy appearing for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Barnley for the master. The "Blackhalls'" official number, 81,516, which forms the subject of this investigation, was a British screw steam vessel, built of iron, at West Hartlepool, by Messrs W. Gray & Co., in 1880, and of 724 nett, and 1,142 gross tons register. She was rigged as a two-masted schooner, her length was 235.0 ft.; breadth, 31.6 ft.; and depth of hold, 15.0 ft.; and she was fitted with two compound inverted condensing engines of the following dimensions:-37"-50" diameter of cylinder, and 33" length of stroke, and 99 horsepower combined, built by Messrs. Thos. Richardson & Sons, of West Hartlepool, and she was the property of Messrs. R Ropner & Co., of West Hartlepool, and others, Mr. R. Roper being appointed managing owner on the 14th of March 1885.

The "Blackhalls" left Archangel for Amsterdam on the 3rd of October 1888, with a crew of 18 hands all told, no passengers, and about 1,100 tons of wood or boards as cargo. She was drawing 14 ft. 6 in. forward, and 15 ft. 3 in aft., had four boats, two of which were fitted as lifeboats, and all complete, with the exception of having no sails. There were three compasses on board, one a pole, one on the bridge, and one aft, the pole compass being used to steer and navigate the ship by, and the vessel was in all respects well found and fitted, and properly equipped for the voyage as far as the hull and machinery were concerned, and was commanded by Mr. George Wilde Hunter, who holds a certificate of competency, numbered 6,861, and who joined her on the 29th of June of the present year at Newcastle.

On Thursday the 11th of October, at 3.25 a.m., they were off Udsire Island, and just within the range of the lights, which bore S.E. by E. 1/2 E., distant about 20 miles. The bearings, the master stated, were taken by the second mate, as he was not on deck at the time. From this point a course was steered S.W. by S. 1/4 S. mag., and continued up to 1.20 p.m. of that day. The latitude and longitude for noon having been taken by observation, and stated to be 58.1 north and 3.51 15 east, but it must be here noted that the meridian altitude taken by the mate differed from that taken by the master some 6 or 7 miles, and that there would be of course some difference in the longitude had the time been worked with the two latitudes. The master's observation was the one used to find the longitude, and resulted in the longitude being found to be 3.5115" E., as stated above. There was, however, a correction to be applied to this of eleven miles, the master stating that he had rated the chronometer some days before, and their true position was eleven miles west of that shewn by the chronometer, but that he worked his position on the chart by what the chronometer shewed, although he knew himself to be eleven miles west of it in reality. At 1.20 the course was altered to S. by W. by pole, which was, the master said, S. 3/4 W. magnetic. This course they continued up to 8 p.m., and then further altered it to S. 1/2 W. by pole, or S. 1/4 W. magnetic, which was continued up to 10 p.m. All this time the ship was making eastward of a southerly course, and this seems to have occurred to the master by the track laid on the chart, for at this point the course was altered to S.S.W. or S. by W. 3/4 W. magnetic, which was steered up to 4 p.m. of the 12th, by which time the wind, according to the master, was N.N.W., but according to the mate W.N.W., blowing strong (say 6 or 7) with a heavy sea and hazy weather. The maintrysail and staysail were set aft but nothing forward.

At 4 p.m. of the 12th the men at the helm having reported that they were making a weatherly course the vessel was kept a 1/4 point to the southward, or about S. by W. 1/2 W. magnetic, and continued up to 8 p.m. when they stopped and took a cast of the lead, and the mate who superintended the soundings reported 19 fathoms, and the log showed 342 miles. The vessel was then put full speed ahead for two hours or more, and at 10 p.m. she was stopped and another cast of the lead was taken, giving 16 fathoms, sand, and shells. She was again put full speed ahead, going about 8 knots and steering the same course, at 10.50 or 10.55 she struck on the sands at the north-east end of Schiermonik Island on the coast of Holland, being at that time about 70 miles out of her supposed position. On striking the ground the engines were reversed full speed astern, and the helm put hard-a-port; but the vessel drove on over the sands and remained fast. A portion of the deck cargo was then thrown overboard, and the engines kept full speed astern, the sea breaking over the vessel and disabling the starboard boats. The tanks were pumped out, but eventually refilled to save her bumping and driving higher up the sands; but no anchor was laid out astern, it being covered with deck cargo. At daylight the jollyboat was sent on shore with the mate to find out where they were and telegraph for assistance. At 10 a.m. of the 13th the lifeboat came and took off part of the crew, and at 11 a.m. the master and rest of the crew left her and landed in the ship's lifeboat, having saved their effects. No lives were lost. The next day the chief engineer revisited the vessel and found the engines completely useless. They were shifted aft nearly to the bulkhead, the steam pipes were broken, and the boilers lifted up with bumping on the sands. Several attempts were made to get her off which proved unsuccessful, and it was found that her plates were crushed in under the engine-rooms and she now lies a wreck. Part of the cargo was saved. In the course of the inquiry it was said that a light was seen on the port bow or port beam about 9.15 or 9.30 p.m. of the 12th, but the evidence on this point was so conflicting and confusing, that it is impossible for the Court to determine at what time the light really was seen.

The mate who was on watch, and the boatswain who was at the wheel, say that it was 9.15 to 9.30., and that the master was called in consequence. The master says on the other hand that the light was only reported to him at half-past ten, and, Evers, an A.B., who was on the look-out, says that it was 10 p.m., and that he called the captain. At any rate, whatever the time may have been at which it was seen, they all agreed in thinking it to be a fisherman's light, although from the course they steered, and the time at which the mate put it, viz., 9.15 or 9.30, would naturally lead us to suppose it to be the Borkum Light-vessel. They, imagining themselves 60 or 70 miles westward, did not pay sufficient attention to it, and at once concluded it was a fishing boat. The master appears to have used a compass corrector to find the error of his compass, but there is no evidence before the Court to enable it to determine whether the correction found was applied the right way or not, although the latter appears to have been the case, as the vessel was 70 miles to the eastward of her course in a run of 350 miles. Nor is there any memorandum or book showing the working of the sights to enable us to determine if the position was correctly found on the 11th at noon. Whatever may have been the courses steered on the 11th, it was absolutely necessary to determine their position correctly as noon on the 12th, either by sight or by soundings, before running down on a low coast like the north of Holland. No cast of the lead was taken, and nothing further than carrying on the dead reckoning by account to enter in the log book seems to have been done; whereas the difference in depth, the nature of the bottom at noon of the 12th, would have warned the master in the first place that be was not in the position that he supposed himself to be, and the fatal imprudence of running on at full speed during the night in thick and hazy weather from an uncertain position would have been at once apparent to him, and the neglect of these precautions led to the loss of the ship. How thick and hazy the weather was is evident, when neither the Borkum Light, which is visible 21 miles, nor the lights on the Island of Schiermonnik, visible 18 miles, could be seen; nor were they visible till some time after the vessel struck. The Court can only come to the conclusion that the "Blackhalls" was lost through the master not having verified his position at noon on the 12th, or in continuing to run on at full speed at night, and in thick weather after he was unable to verify or ascertain the position at noon on the 12th. The vessel does not appear to have been provided with a proper North Sea chart-that is to say, one in a condition fit to be used and lay off a course on; the master stated they had coast charts on board, but the only chart they had to navigate the vessel down the North Sea was the one produced, and which, in the opinion of the Court, was quite unfit for the purpose. The master was recalled and asked to look at his chart and show his position at noon on the 12th, and give the soundings he had on the chart. He said he had 27 fathoms, mud. On being asked why he did not take a cast of the lead to verify his position by dead reckoning at noon he replied, I never thought of it.

At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Dendy put in the following questions upon which the opinion of the Court was desired by the Board of Trade:-

1. What number of compasses had the vessel on board, where were they placed, and were they in good order and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel?

2. When, and by whom were they made, and when, and by whom were they last adjusted?

3. Did the master ascertain the deviation of his compasses by observation from time to time, were the errors of the compasses correctly ascertained and the proper corrections to the courses applied?

4. Whether a safe and proper course was set at or about 3.25 a.m. of the 11th October, and whether due and proper allowance was made for tide and currents?

5. Whether proper measures were taken at or about noon of the 11th October to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel?

6. Whether safe and proper alterations were made in the course at or about 1.20 p.m. of the 11th October, and from time to time thereafter?

7. What was the light sighted at or about 9.30 p.m. of the 12th October?

8. Whether, having regard to the state of the weather, the vessel was navigated at too great a rate of speed?

9. Whether the lead was used with sufficient frequency?

10. Whether a good and proper look-out was kept?

11. What was the cause of the casualty?

12. Was the vessel supplied with proper and sufficient charts?

13. Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

14. Whether the master and officers are, or either of them is, in default?

In the opinion of the Board of Trade, the certificate of George Wild Hunter, the master, should be dealt with.

To which the Court replied as follows:-

1. The vessel carried three compasses, a pole, a bridge, and an after compass. They were in good order, and sufficient for the safe navigation of the ship.

2. The compasses were said to have been made by Messrs. Berry, of West Hartlepool, and were last adjusted by a professional adjuster in 1884.

3. The master stated that he corrected his compass daily by a compass corrector, for the courses he was going to steer, and that he made a deviation card for the pole compass on the 10th of August last, but there was no evidence to satisfy us that they were correctly applied.

4. A safe course was set at 3.25 a.m. of the 11th of October, but no allowance was made for tide or current at that time, as it was not thought necessary.

5. Proper measures were observed, inasmuch as sights were taken for the longitude and the meridian altitude at noon for the latitude, but whether these sights were correctly taken or correctly worked, there is no evidence before the Court to show. No sight books or memorandum books being saved, but there was a difference of six or seven miles between the master and mate's altitude at noon, which is unaccounted for. The sights seem to have been worked by the master's observations, and the latitude and longitude found was 58.1 north and 3.51 east.

6. Safe and proper alterations were not made after 1.20 p.m. of the 11th, and up to 10 p.m. of the 11th, the vessel being steered to the eastward of her course. The master appears to have discovered this also, by again altering the course at 10 p.m. to S.S.W., thereby showing that the previous alterations had been carrying him out of position. No allowance was made for tide or currents.

7. The evidence involved in the question as to the time when the light was first seen was most conflicting. The master puts it at 9.15 to 9.30. The former would rather favour the presumption that it was the Borkum Light-vessel, but upon the whole we are inclined to agree with Mr. Dendy for the Board of Trade, that it was a fisherman's light.

8. The vessel was navigated at too great a speed, considering the state of the weather, and from the fact that the position at noon was not ascertained or verified but only assumed.

9. The lead was not used with sufficient frequency, especially at or about noon of the 12th when it was absolutely necessary to determine the position of the vessel. Had it been used then, it would have shown the master that he was out of position either from steering improper courses, or effect of tide, and have warned him against running on full speed at night.

10. A good and proper look-out seems to have been kept.

11. She casualty was caused by the master not having verified his position at noon on the 12th, and in continuing to run on at full speed during the night in thick weather, he not having verified his position by the lead, or sights at noon of the 12th.

12. The vessel was not supplied with a proper North Sea chart, the one produced in Court being for 1880, and in such a state as to be almost unfit for use, and this was the only chart the master had for laying down his course. He however stated there were coast charts on board, but they were not produced. It was the master's duty to have seen that the ship had proper charts, and in that unfortunately he failed.

13. The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care after noon of the 12th.

14. The master is alone in default. This is a case of negligence solely arising from careless navigation in not determining the position of the ship at noon on the 12th, and in running on in thick weather without having done so.

We find the master in default for such unseamanlike neglect, and suspend his certificate for six months from this date.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated this 12th day of November 1888.

 

(Signed)

CHARLES JAMES COLEMAN,

Judge.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

KENNETT HORE,

Assessors.

 

 

C. H. J. BAKER,

 

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